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  • Engelhardt's take on the Military Balance

    Tiny wars still don't work
    By Tom Engelhardt

    In terms of pure projectable power, there's never been anything like it. Its military has divided the world - the whole planet - into six "commands." Its fleet, with 11 aircraft carrier battle groups, rules the seas and has done so largely unchallenged for almost seven decades.

    Its Air Force has ruled the global skies, and despite being almost continuously in action for years, hasn't faced an enemy plane since 1991 or been seriously challenged anywhere since the early 1970s.

    Its fleet of drone aircraft has proven itself capable of targeting and killing suspected enemies in the backlands of the planet from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Yemen and Somalia with little regard for national boundaries, and none at all for the possibility of being shot down. It funds and trains proxy armies on several continents and has complex aid and training relationships with militaries across the planet.

    On hundreds of bases, some tiny and others the size of American towns, its soldiers garrison the globe from Italy to Australia, Honduras to Afghanistan, and on islands from Okinawa in the Pacific Ocean to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Its weapons makers are the most advanced on Earth and dominate the global arms market. Its nuclear weaponry in silos, on bombers, and on its fleet of submarines would be capable of destroying several planets the size of Earth. Its system of spy satellites is unsurpassed and unchallenged.

    Its intelligence services can listen in on the phone calls or read the emails of almost anyone in the world from top foreign leaders to obscure insurgents. The CIA and its expanding paramilitary forces are capable of kidnapping people of interest just about anywhere from rural Macedonia to the streets of Rome and Tripoli. For its many prisoners, it has set up (and dismantled) secret jails across the planet and on its naval vessels. It spends more on its military than the next most powerful 13 states combined. Add in the spending for its full national security state and it towers over any conceivable group of other nations.

    In terms of advanced and unchallenged military power, there has been nothing like the US armed forces since the Mongols swept across Eurasia. No wonder American presidents now regularly use phrases like "the finest fighting force the world has ever known" to describe it. By the logic of the situation, the planet should be a pushover for it. Lesser nations with far lesser forces have, in the past, controlled vast territories. And despite much discussion of American decline and the waning of its power in a "multi-polar" world, its ability to pulverize and destroy, kill and maim, blow up and kick down has only grown in this new century.

    No other nation's military comes within a country mile of it. None has more than a handful of foreign bases. None has more than two aircraft carrier battle groups. No potential enemy has such a fleet of robotic planes. None has more than 60,000 special operations forces. Country by country, it's a hands-down no-contest. The Russian (once "Red") army is a shadow of its former self. The Europeans have not rearmed significantly. Japan's "self-defense" forces are powerful and slowly growing, but under the US nuclear "umbrella." Although China, regularly identified as the next rising imperial state, is involved in a much-ballyhooed military build-up, with its one aircraft carrier (a retread from the days of the Soviet Union), it still remains only a regional power.

    Despite this stunning global power equation, for more than a decade we have been given a lesson in what a military, no matter how overwhelming, can and (mostly) can't do in the twenty-first century, in what a military, no matter how staggeringly advanced, does and (mostly) does not translate into on the current version of planet Earth.

    A destabilization machine
    Let's start with what the US can do. On this, the recent record is clear: it can destroy and destabilize. In fact, wherever US military power has been applied in recent years, if there has been any lasting effect at all, it has been to destabilize whole regions.

    Back in 2004, almost a year and a half after American troops had rolled into a Baghdad looted and in flames, Amr Mussa, the head of the Arab League, commented ominously, "The gates of hell are open in Iraq." Although for the Bush administration, the situation in that country was already devolving, to the extent that anyone paid attention to Mussa's description, it seemed over the top, even outrageous, as applied to American-occupied Iraq. Today, with the latest scientific estimate of invasion- and war-caused Iraqi deaths at a staggering 461,000, thousands more a year still dying there, and with Syria in flames, it seems something of an understatement.

    It's now clear that George W Bush and his top officials, fervent fundamentalists when it came to the power of US military to alter, control, and dominate the Greater Middle East (and possibly the planet), did launch the radical transformation of the region. Their invasion of Iraq punched a hole through the heart of the Middle East, sparking a Sunni-Shi'ite civil war that has now spread catastrophically to Syria, taking more than 100,000 lives there. They helped turn the region into a churning sea of refugees, gave life and meaning to a previously nonexistent al-Qaeda in Iraq (and now a Syrian version of the same), and left the country drifting in a sea of roadside bombs and suicide bombers, and threatened, like other countries in the region, with the possibility of splitting apart.

    And that's just a thumbnail sketch. It doesn't matter whether you're talking about destabilization in Afghanistan, where US troops have been on the ground for almost 12 years and counting; Pakistan, where a CIA-run drone air campaign in its tribal borderlands has gone on for years as the country grew ever shakier and more violent; Yemen (ditto), as an outfit called al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula grew ever stronger; or Somalia, where Washington repeatedly backed proxy armies it had trained and financed, and supported outside incursions as an already destabilized country came apart at the seams and the influence of al-Shabab, an increasingly radical and violent insurgent Islamic group, began to seep across regional borders. The results have always been the same: destabilization.

    Consider Libya where, no longer enamored with boots-on-the-ground interventions, President Obama sent in the Air Force and the drones in 2011 in a bloodless intervention (unless, of course, you were on the ground) that helped topple Muammar Gaddafi, the local autocrat and his secret-police-and-prisons regime, and launched a vigorous young democracy ... oh, wait a moment, not quite. In fact, the result, which, unbelievably enough, came as a surprise to Washington, was an increasingly damaged country with a desperately weak central government, a territory controlled by a range of militias - some Islamic extremist in nature - an insurgency and war across the border in neighboring Mali (thanks to an influx of weaponry looted from Gaddafi's vast arsenals), a dead American ambassador, a country almost incapable of exporting its oil, and so on.

    Libya was, in fact, so thoroughly destabilized, so lacking in central authority that Washington recently felt free to dispatch US Special Operations forces onto the streets of its capital in broad daylight in an operation to snatch up a long-sought terrorist suspect, an act which was as "successful" as the toppling of the Gaddafi regime and, in a similar manner, further destabilized a government that Washington still theoretically backed. (Almost immediately afterward, the prime minister found himself briefly kidnapped by a militia unit as part of what might have been a coup attempt.)

    Wonders of the modern world
    If the overwhelming military power at the command of Washington can destabilize whole regions of the planet, what, then, can't such military power do? On this, the record is no less clear and just as decisive. As every significant US military action of this new century has indicated, the application of military force, no matter in what form, has proven incapable of achieving even Washington's most minimal goals of the moment.

    Consider this one of the wonders of the modern world: pile up the military technology, pour money into your armed forces, outpace the rest of the world, and none of it adds up to a pile of beans when it comes to making that world act as you wish. Yes, in Iraq, to take an example, Saddam Hussein's regime was quickly "decapitated," thanks to an overwhelming display of power and muscle by the invading Americans. His state bureaucracy was dismantled, his army dismissed, an occupying authority established backed by foreign troops, soon ensconced on huge multi-billion-dollar military bases meant to be garrisoned for generations, and a suitably "friendly" local government installed.

    And that's where the Bush administration's dreams ended in the rubble created by a set of poorly armed minority insurgencies, terrorism, and a brutal ethnic/religious civil war. In the end, almost nine years after the invasion and despite the fact that the Obama administration and the Pentagon were eager to keep US troops stationed there in some capacity, a relatively weak central government refused, and they departed, the last representatives of the greatest power on the planet slipping away in the dead of night. Left behind among the ruins of historic ziggurats were the "ghost towns" and stripped or looted US bases that were to be our monuments in Iraq.

    Today, under even more extraordinary circumstances, a similar process seems to be playing itself out in Afghanistan - another spectacle of our moment that should amaze us. After almost 12 years there, finding itself incapable of suppressing a minority insurgency, Washington is slowly withdrawing its combat troops, but wants to leave behind on the giant bases we've built perhaps 10,000 "trainers" for the Afghan military and some Special Operations forces to continue the hunt for al-Qaeda and other terror types.

    For the planet's sole superpower, this, of all things, should be a slam dunk. At least the Iraqi government had a certain strength of its own (and the country's oil wealth to back it up). If there is a government on Earth that qualifies for the term "puppet," it should be the Afghan one of President Hamid Karzai. After all, at least 80% (and possibly 90%) of that government's expenses are covered by the US and its allies, and its security forces are considered incapable of carrying on the fight against the Taliban and other insurgent outfits without US support and aid. If Washington were to withdraw totally (including its financial support), it's hard to imagine that any successor to the Karzai government would last long.

    How, then, to explain the fact that Karzai has refused to sign a future bilateral security pact long in the process of being hammered out? Instead, he recently denounced US actions in Afghanistan, as he had repeatedly done in the past, claimed that he simply would not ink the agreement, and began bargaining with US officials as if he were the leader of the planet's other superpower.

    A frustrated Washington had to dispatch Secretary of State John Kerry on a sudden mission to Kabul for some top-level face-to-face negotiations. The result, a reported 24-hour marathon of talks and meetings, was hailed as a success: problem(s) solved. Oops, all but one. As it turned out, it was the very same one on which the continued US military presence in Iraq stumbled - Washington's demand for legal immunity from local law for its troops. In the end, Kerry flew out without an assured agreement.

    Making sense of war in the 21st century
    Whether the US military does or doesn't last a few more years in Afghanistan, the blunt fact is this: the president of one of the poorest and weakest countries on the planet, himself relatively powerless, is essentially dictating terms to Washington - and who's to say that, in the end, as in Iraq, US troops won't be forced to leave there as well?

    Once again, military strength has not carried the day. Yet military power, advanced weaponry, force, and destruction as tools of policy, as ways to create a world in your own image or to your own taste, have worked plenty well in the past. Ask those Mongols, or the European imperial powers from Spain in the sixteenth century to Britain in the nineteenth century, which took their empires by force and successfully maintained them over long periods.

    What planet are we now on? Why is it that military power, the mightiest imaginable, can't overcome, pacify, or simply destroy weak powers, less than impressive insurgency movements, or the ragged groups of (often tribal) peoples we label as "terrorists"? Why is such military power no longer transformative or even reasonably effective? Is it, to reach for an analogy, like antibiotics? If used for too long in too many situations, does a kind of immunity build up against it?

    Let's be clear here: such a military remains a powerful potential instrument of destruction, death, and destabilization. For all we know - it's not something we've seen anything of in these years - it might also be a powerful instrument for genuine defense. But if recent history is any guide, what it clearly cannot be in the twenty-first century is a policymaking instrument, a means of altering the world to fit a scheme developed in Washington. The planet itself and people just about anywhere on it seem increasingly resistant in ways that take the military off the table as an effective superpower instrument of state.

    Washington's military plans and tactics since 9/11 have been a spectacular train wreck. When you look back, counterinsurgency doctrine, resuscitated from the ashes of America's defeat in Vietnam, is once again on the scrap heap of history. (Who today even remembers its key organizing phrase - "clear, hold, and build" - which now looks like the punch line for some malign joke?) "Surges," once hailed as brilliant military strategy, have already disappeared into the mists. "Nation-building," once a term of tradecraft in Washington, is in the doghouse. "Boots on the ground," of which the US had enormous numbers and still has 51,000 in Afghanistan, are now a no-no. The American public is, everyone universally agrees, "exhausted" with war. Major American armies arriving to fight anywhere on the Eurasian continent in the foreseeable future? Don't count on it.

    But lessons learned from the collapse of war policy? Don't count on that, either. It's clear enough that Washington still can't fully absorb what's happened. Its faith in war remains remarkably unbroken in a century in which military power has become the American political equivalent of a state religion. Our leaders are still high on the counter-terrorism wars of the future, even as they drown in their military efforts of the present. Their urge is still to rejigger and re-imagine what a deliverable military solution would be.

    Now the message is: skip those boots en masse - in fact, cut down on their numbers in the age of the sequester - and go for the counter-terrorism package. No more spilling of (American) blood. Get the "bad guys," one or a few at a time, using the president's private army, the Special Operations forces, or his private air force, the CIA's drones. Build new bare bones micro-bases globally. Move those aircraft carrier battle groups off the coast of whatever country you want to intimidate.

    It's clear we're entering a new period in terms of American war making. Call it the era of tiny wars, or micro-conflicts, especially in the tribal backlands of the planet.

    So something is indeed changing in response to military failure, but what's not changing is Washington's preference for war as the option of choice, often of first resort. What's not changing is the thought that, if you can just get your strategy and tactics readjusted correctly, force will work. (Recently, Washington was only saved from plunging into another predictable military disaster in Syria by an offhand comment of Secretary of State John Kerry and the timely intervention of Russian President Vladimir Putin.)

    What our leaders don't get is the most basic, practical fact of our moment: war simply doesn't work, not big, not micro - not for Washington. A superpower at war in the distant reaches of this planet is no longer a superpower ascendant but one with problems.

    The US military may be a destabilization machine. It may be a blowback machine. What it's not is a policymaking or enforcement machine.

    Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project and author of The United States of Fear as well as a history of the Cold War, The End of Victory Culture

  • #2
    Re: Engelhardt's take on the Military Balance

    great read. two points that should be considered as a context and background to the whole premise though: 1) the unchallenged dominance of the US over space/sea are the preconditions and underpinnings for the entire world economy, which would collapse the instant that the safe and secure transfer of electronic data and goods were obstructed, even slightly, by another power. 2) for the entire period, the american people, and most of their sons and daughters in the mid to lower levels of the US military, largely believed that they are the 'good guys' and have some semblance of a personal ethical code. the us government has been weaning that concept out of the military from the top down for some time now, at an ever increasing pace.

    if the US wanted to brutally clear, occupy and draw wealth from a particular region, it could do so in the short term. but politically it can't because that is not what nice americans do, and long term it cant because that would set the wheels of opposition in motion.

    the irony is world population hate americans for their cynical interventionism, but their leaders understand that america is acting relatively benevolently in the scheme of things.

    though the last 40 years the idiocy of our politicians is pretty shocking....

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: Engelhardt's take on the Military Balance

      You can ONLY do this if you have the World reserve currencey & its F.I.A.T !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
      Mike

      Comment


      • #4
        Re: Engelhardt's take on the Military Balance

        Originally posted by cbr View Post
        great read. two points that should be considered as a context and background to the whole premise though: 1) the unchallenged dominance of the US over space/sea are the preconditions and underpinnings for the entire world economy, which would collapse the instant that the safe and secure transfer of electronic data and goods were obstructed, even slightly, by another power. 2) for the entire period, the american people, and most of their sons and daughters in the mid to lower levels of the US military, largely believed that they are the 'good guys' and have some semblance of a personal ethical code. the us government has been weaning that concept out of the military from the top down for some time now, at an ever increasing pace.

        if the US wanted to brutally clear, occupy and draw wealth from a particular region, it could do so in the short term. but politically it can't because that is not what nice americans do, and long term it cant because that would set the wheels of opposition in motion.

        the irony is world population hate americans for their cynical interventionism, but their leaders understand that america is acting relatively benevolently in the scheme of things.

        though the last 40 years the idiocy of our politicians is pretty shocking....
        You can ONLY do this if you have the World reserve currencey & its F.I.A.T !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
        Mike
        Fiat Reserve Currency status and the (incredibly) bloated US military budget are fused at the hip - can't have one without the other.

        That said, what's the role of the military? Not the grunts - I know many of these guys and they're the best - period, without any jingo BS. As an instrument of neo-liberalism? They're misused as its goon squad - get with the program or else. How much evidence does someone need.

        I do think Engelhardt, despite his cogent presentation, misses the salient point - destabilization is the goal, at least in the short term. Nation building? You've got to be kidding. The very last thing the US needs are strong, nationalistic oil-rich states . . . anywhere. The form of government is irrelevant. Dictatorship, theocracy, republic, Chavez-istas; it doesn't matter. The critical key is play ball . . . or else.

        So by-George, he had it right - because he knew . . . (Cheney told him )















        Comment


        • #5
          Re: Engelhardt's take on the Military Balance

          Most wars are irregular in nature(meaning NOT traditional/conventional combined arms force on force conflict).

          In fact, it would probably make sense to call irregular conflict regular, and traditional/conventional conflict irregular.....but that would be too confusing.

          As I've posted before, possibly the best recent resource for this stuff is:

          David Kilcullen's Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla

          Focused on 4 major trends:

          Population Growth
          Urbanization
          Littoralization(living by the water)
          Connectivity(democratization of communication and information)

          But it's worth noting that countries are often good at fighting the last war...rather than the next.

          When it comes to promoting global security at the ultra-local level, my personal feelings are that helping host nations build appropriate capacity will require a hybrid/fused entity.

          I think it will(or should be) be a law-enforcement led and OGA/military supported effort.

          For over 60 years the US has had a fantastic organization that has quietly(largely) worked to promote security and build local capacity and relationships called US Army Special Forces(Green Berets).

          They are diplomats and teachers with guns....although they have strayed from their core role(diplomats/teachers are just a couple of their truly core roles) with the often all too kinetic hunt to shoot bad guys in the face over the last decade plus.

          If it were up to me(which of course it isn't), I'd put some money into developing an equivalent law enforcement parallel capability to the military's Green Berets.

          Put a dozen cops with local language skills offering the full spectrum of ethical and professional policing capabilities at the disposal of a host nation to build their capacity in fighting corruption, utilizing best practices, utilizing technology(where locally appropriate), and developing deep long-term local law enforcement relationships in THEIR local language. And they are supported by enablers offering a full spectrum of support focused on building locally led ultra-local governance capacity.

          insufficient(and relatively cheap) investment in tactical ultra-local(US cop who speaks Swahili assisting in the slums of Nairobi) host nation support due to expensive strategic geo-political(aircraft carrier diplomacy) influence/control is a recipe for further ultra-local global disenfranchisement.

          Look at Hezbollah and Israel.......the US(and other nations that fail at governance) risks facing a hundred ultra-local Hezbollahs.

          An F18 armed aircraft carrier battle group can influence geopolitics in a country/region......and while it can obliterate a slum/favela from orbit overhead...it can't govern it.

          Governing the oceans is a different matter though!

          But the declining numbr of total surface combat vessels in the US Navy will see governance of the oceans come under threat over time too....even with greatly enhanced capability per combat vessel.

          I'm a supporter of the US need for aircraft carriers for force projection........but how many are needed?

          Personally, I'm of the believe that if you could swap a carrier battle group or two for REAL influence over ultra-local "slumlord governors" then it would be more than a fair trade.

          I reckon there's scope to use the term "slumlord" in an entirely new context beyond being a bad property landlord.

          "Slumlord" is the new urban warlord.

          There is simply no way the US(or any other western country or "player") could ever invest enough money in foreign language skills and experimentation with effective hybrid law enforcement/OGA/NGO/military teams to help positively shape the future urban ultra-local battle for governance.

          Comment


          • #6
            Re: Engelhardt's take on the Military Balance

            in related news . . .





            China’s Overhyped Sub Threat

            Beijing’s submarine fleet is not as big or powerful as U.S. military planners once feared. Have its blue-water ambitions been overstated?

            It was the U.S. Navy’s biggest jolt in years. On October 26, 2006, a Chinese Song-class attack submarine quietly surfaced within nine miles of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk as the 80,000-ton-diplacement vessel sailed on a training exercise in the East China Sea between Japan and Taiwan.


            The Song-class vessel, displacing 2,200 tons, was close enough to hit the Kitty Hawk with one of its 18 homing torpedoes. None of the carrier’s roughly dozen escorting warships detected the Song until it breached the surface.
            The Song’s provocative appearance was, for the Americans, “as big a shock as the Russians launching Sputnik,” one NATO official told Britain’s Daily Mail newspaper, referring to the Soviet Union’s launch of the first-ever space satellite in 1957. “This could well have escalated into something that was very unforeseen,” said Adm. Bill Fallon, then commander of U.S. Pacific forces.


            The incident underscored the then explosive growth of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s undersea force, as well as Beijing’s apparent intention to wrestle the Western Pacific away from the once-dominant U.S. Navy. “The Chinese are building a credible submarine force which will make it very difficult for the U.S. Navy to maintain sea control dominance in or near coastal waters off of China,” warned Rear Adm. Hank McKinney, former commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s submarine force.


            Of particular concern to American defense officials was the projected introduction, over the coming decade, of up to 20 new nuclear-powered attack submarines, known as “SSNs,” that are an order of magnitude more capable than the Song class. “The acquisition of increasing numbers of SSNs would give it (the PLAN) the ability to contest U.S. naval forces farther from China’s shores,” Thomas Mahnken wrote in China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force, edited by Naval War College professor Andrew Erickson and published in 2007.


            Yet six years later, McKinney’s and Mahnken’s alarm has been proved false. The PLAN still possesses a tiny number of nuclear-powered submarines. The Songs and other short-range diesel boats remain the backbone of China’s undersea force. Beijing’s production of new submarines has declined and the PLAN’s overall undersea fleet is likely to contract in coming years. “I don’t think they know whether they want to make the full-up commitment it would take to do this (submarine) thing right,” Owen Cote, Jr., an analyst at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says of the Chinese.


            Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy and its Pacific allies have crafted plans to stabilize or even grow their own submarine fleets. In 2006, Western observers feared the undersea balance of power in the Pacific would tilt. In a sense, they were right. It has tilted — back towards the United States and its allies.


            How that happened speaks volumes about China’s evolution as a regional power.

            Crunching the numbers

            In early 2011, the PLAN possessed “more than 60 submarines,” according to the Pentagon’s Congressionally-mandated annual report on Chinese military capabilities.


            That force included five nuclear-powered attack submarines: three of the 1980s-vintage Type 091 Han-class SSNs that are rapidly reaching the ends of their service lives, plus two Type 093 Shang-class boats. The next-generation Type 095 SSN is due to enter service around 2015, according to Pentagon estimates.


            The PLAN’s diesel-sub fleet is much larger than the nuclear fleet: more than 50 in all, including 13 Songs, four of the newer Type 041 Yuan class, plus a dozen Russian-made Kilos. Obsolete Romeo- and Ming-class vessels round out the total for diesel boats.
            Four or five experimental ballistic-missile submarines or “boomers” — all but one of them nuclear-powered — comprise the remainder of the PLAN undersea force. By comparison, in 2011 the U.S. Navy possessed 53 attack submarines, four guided-missile submarines and 14 ballistic-missile boats: 71 in all.


            Just seven years ago, U.S. analysts predicted the Chinese submarine fleet would outnumber the American sub fleet by 2011. Writing in China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force, Richard Fisher of the International Assessment and Strategy Center predicted the PLAN would have around 74 boats in 2010 — a figure at least a dozen higher than the real, current total.


            Something happened between 2006 and 2011 that changed the calculus for the PLAN submarine force — and by extension for China’s regional aspirations. Actually three things happened: China stopped importing submarines, while also putting the brakes on domestic sub production; and the U.S. Navy successfully doubled its submarine production.


            Moscow factored in the former changes. The purchase of a dozen Russian Kilos helped to boost the PLAN’s acquisition rate for submarines in 2005 and 2006. In both of those years, Beijing added seven submarines to its fleet, including seven Kilos overall.


            But Russia is unlikely to resume supporting such a high rate of Chinese submarine acquisition, as Beijing is a potential strategic rival to Moscow — and since the Russian Navy’s own sub force is steadily declining to long-term levels of just a dozen each nuclear attack, nuclear ballistic-missile and diesel-attack boats. “There are powerful incentives for Russia to keep China just below its future submarine capabilities,” Fisher noted.

            With an end to Russian imports, China must build all its own submarines. But here, too, Beijing relies on Russian assistance. As late as 2003, “Russia continued to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to India’s and China’s naval nuclear propulsion programs,” the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reported.


            The high rate of Chinese sub procurement in 2005 and 2006 justifiably drew the attention of Western analysts. But by using those years as their baseline, analysts often projected PLAN sub force levels that were unrealistically high.
            From 2007 on, China acquired only domestically-built submarines, meaning the growth of the PLAN undersea force was constrained by the not inconsiderable limitations of the Chinese arms industry, which can’t function without Russian-provided engines and electronics — and which, even at the best of times, struggles with safety and quality control.


            A possible case in point: in early August 2011, there were unconfirmed reports that a Type 094 boomer leaked radiation during work on its electronic systems in the port of Dalian, apparently prompting the PLAN to cordon off the area and crack down on media coverage of the alleged incident.


            With the Kilo purchase complete, Beijing added just two boats in 2007, none in 2008 and two each in 2009 and 2010. It appears that, barring a major reversal of the current trend, the PLAN will acquire no more than two submarines a year over the medium term.


            That’s the same submarine production rate as in the United States — though only recently. In the early 2000s, Washington purchased just one submarine a year, on average. A cost-savings initiative launched in 2005 drove the price of the current Virginia-class attack submarine down to around $2 billion apiece, allowing the U.S. Navy to purchase two Virginias annually starting in 2011.


            U.S.-built submarines traditionally last up to 35 years, versus fewer than 30 for lower-quality, Chinese-built boats. With similar pre-existing force levels and identical production rates, the U.S. undersea fleet will level off at a higher level than the Chinese fleet will.


            “Excluding the 12 Kilos purchased from Russia, the total number of domestically produced submarines placed into service between 1995 and 2007 is 30, or an average of about 1.9 per year,” wrote Ronald O’Rourke from the U.S. Congressional Research Service. “This average rate of domestic production, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a steady-state force of domestically produced submarines of about 38 to 56 boats of all kinds, again assuming an average submarine life of 20 to 30 years.”


            And that’s being optimistic. “It’s possible that the greater resources required to produce nuclear-powered boats might result in a reduction in the overall submarine production rate,” O’Rourke wrote. “If so, and if such a reduced overall rate were sustained indefinitely, it would eventually result in a smaller steady-state submarine force of all kinds.”


            According to current Pentagon projections through 2040, the U.S. submarine fleet should never dip below 51 boats, with a peak of 73 in 2013 and 2014. And all of those boats are nukes — a not insignificant distinction.

            Sub versus sub

            Even under the most favorable projections, the PLAN will possess just a handful of nuclear-powered attack submarines at a time over coming decades. China’s SSN fleet could actually decline in the short term, as the three ancient Type 091s are likely to leave service before an equal number of Type 095s are ready.


            That matters because only nuclear-powered submarines, with their high endurance, are capable of true “blue-water” operations far from shore bases. It’s for that reason that all of the U.S. Navy’s submarines are nuclear-powered: Washington’s global military presence demands it.


            To project power beyond its own coastal waters, Beijing needs nuke boats. The fact that China isn’t building large numbers of SSNs reflects either a lack of serious interest in a true, global naval presence — or an inability to back up grand military ambitions with working hardware.


            China is left with an undersea fleet composed mostly of diesel attack submarines, which by virtue of their short range tend to be defensive in nature. “Current Chinese diesel submarines rarely deploy outside the first island chain (west of the Philippines) and essentially never deploy beyond the second (east of the Philippines),” Cote wrote. “Nor would these submarines be well-suited for extended deployments into the Pacific or Indian Oceans because of range and crew habitability constraints.”


            Even as defensive weapons, China’s diesel submarines lack flexibility. For one, “the PLA has only a limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea,” according to the Pentagon’s annual China report. Moreover, the PLAN’s subs are optimized for attacking surface targets such as U.S. aircraft carriers. Lacking the most sophisticated sensors and weapons, they’re far less useful for hunting U.S. submarines. “China has very limited (Anti-Submarine Warfare) capabilities and U.S. submarines are the most difficult ASW target in the world,” Cote wrote.

            “Thus, China would have difficulty preventing U.S. submarines from operating in its shallow coastal waters,” Cote continued. That’s important because one of the American subs’ main tasks is to destroy enemy submarines. China’s undersea fleet cannot prevent the United States’ undersea fleet from hunting it down in its own home waters.


            Considering the imbalance between large, sophisticated, ASW-optimized U.S. submarines and their smaller, less flexible, surface-attack-focused Chinese rivals, a census of the two nations’ undersea boats can create a false impression of near parity: 60 Chinese subs versus 70 U.S. ones. But if the American vessels can hunt the Chinese vessels almost with impunity, it almost doesn’t matter how many submarines Beijing possesses.


            Even if numbers really did matter, the trends aren’t in China’s favor. Beijing might match the United States in submarine production rates, but it can’t possibly keep up with the combined sub acquisitions of Washington and its closest Pacific allies. Japan is in the process of adding six diesel attack boats to its current force of 16. Australia aims to double its fleet of six diesel boats. South Korea is also doubling its six-strong undersea fleet. Six years ago, Vietnam purchased six Kilos from Russia.


            The Song submarine’s surprise appearance alongside the USS Kitty Hawk helped stoke fears of Chinese undersea dominance that were further fueled by a brief surge in PLAN sub acquisition. Today, with more U.S. and allied submarines entering service and fewer Chinese boats on the slipways, those fears — and the policies and assumptions they produced — warrant reconsideration. China isn’t building a world-class, globally-deploying submarine force. It’s building a mostly defensive, regional undersea force — and a smaller one than once predicted.

            England's global naval dominance was unquestioned until Kaiser Bill decided he wanted a navy capable of going toe-to-toe with the Brits, a pre-condition for the Great War . . .

            Comment


            • #7
              Re: Engelhardt's take on the Military Balance

              Hi Don,

              While I would agree completely that big slices of the growing "threat" China represents...including the almost Iranian level of comedy regarding it's "new" subs, I reckon the article may be off a bit.

              As I understand it, the US Virginia class submarine, while far from cheap, has been a huge success from a military procurement perspective consistently coming in early and under budget.

              But it was my understanding that the US is facing a very real race to build enough new Virginia class boats to replace the large number of aging/retiring Los Angeles class boats. As I understand it, the US has a demographic bubbles of retirees soon in it's Los Angeles class boats.

              According to the squids I know, Japan has a pretty well respected diesel/electric/fuel cell boats.......and it's worth mentioning that modern fuel cell subs are considered extremely serious threats as anti submarine warfare(ASW) hasn't been a huge priority for the US in recent years.

              In the coastal/littoral where China's subs will likely be operating, they are a truly serious threat......but in perspective subs operating in and around the coastal/littoral are essentially defensive in nature, which every nation has the legitimate right to conduct.

              Australia's proposal to build a fairly sizeable sub fleet(to replace/supplement it's troubled Collins class subs) has yet to turn into reality as domestic production of submarines has been a big problem in the past(Collins class), and crewing them is already a massive problem with a far smaller fleet.

              The author neglected to mention Singapore's small fleet as a US ally at all, but included Vietnam's new fleet(with sub crew training and support from India interestingly enough). I don't think anyone thinking rationally would include Vietnam as a US ally(at least certainly not at this stage).......at best Vietnam and the US have an aligned interest in checking any regional Chinese expansionism.

              Future potential submarine capability is quite impressive and will play a considerable role in the Pacific.

              In any case, the Pacific has recently become a massive wet chessboard what with all the new diplomatic, economy, and military pieces moving being positioned around, everything from Japan's military shift, Philippines renewed relationship and fastball arms procurement, US very high level visits to Myanmar and Cambodia, to China's unilateral rather than multilateral negotiations over things like the Spratleys.

              Comment


              • #8
                Re: Engelhardt's take on the Military Balance

                Everything I've read about Japan is an advanced anti-sub capability.

                The Chinese naval effort is fundamentally defensive.

                The key for China is to have a serious deterrent that can reach the US, without breaking the bank. Otherwise the only deterrent is negative publicity that the US nuked China. True, that could bring together a global coalition against the rogue super power, but I bet China wants a bit more protection than that.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Peak Oil with Strategic Overreach?

                  Suppose we offered battle ...

                  By Peter Lee

                  Suppose we gave a war ... and only a People's Republic of China maritime surveillance vessel showed up?

                  That is the first of many conundrums facing the US military as it considers the megaboondoggle known as ''Air-Sea Battle''.

                  With the Barack Obama administration aspiring to pivot out of the Middle East (albeit with a stopover in Syria and, just maybe, Iran), and into Asia, it was felt that a new US military doctrine was required to drive planning, preparation, and budgets.

                  Air Sea Battle - its name consciously mimicking Air Land Battle, the doctrine that guided US vigilance against another big red boogeyman, the Soviet Union, in Europe in the 1970s - originated with a study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment published in 2010. It is unapologetically constructed around the challenge - the ''unprovoked challenge'', as the authors characterized it - that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) might pose to the United States.

                  Actually, the threat is not to the United States. It is the threat to the ability of the US military to operate in the Western Pacific. And, for that matter, it isn't an actual threat:


                  With the spread of advanced military technologies and their exploitation by other militaries, especially China's PLA, the US military's ability to operate in an area of vital interest, the Western Pacific, is being increasingly challenged. While Beijing professes benign intentions, it is an old military maxim that since intentions can change overnight - especially in authoritarian regimes - one must focus on the military capabilities of other states. [1]


                  Well, it could be a threat.

                  And if it were a threat, it could be called anti-access/area denial. And it could get its own cool acronym: A2/AD. Which is what they did.

                  Too bad the threat wasn't defined as ''regional reaction/domain denial''. Then we could call the threat R2D2 and people would associate the People's Republic of China with the Star Wars robot that looked so cute and harmless in the first movies but then became a flying, high-tech killing machine in the prequels.

                  It is perhaps unkind to mock Air Sea Battle and the effort, expense, and gravitas that went into its preparation. Unfortunately, it is eminently mockable. Its apparently disabling paradox is illustrated on pages 9 and 10 of the CSBA study:


                  It must be emphasized that an AirSea Battle concept is not about war with China. Nor is it about ''rolling back'' Chinese influence, or even about ''containing'' China. Rather, it should be seen as part of a larger ''offsetting strategy'' that acknowledges that China's tremendous economic achievement simultaneously enables it to acquire formidable military capabilities. ... One of the key elements of such an offsetting strategy is demonstrating a continuing US ability to reassure allies and partners in the region that they will not be the victims of coercion or a form of ''Finlandization'' on the part of China. To accomplish this, the United States must have a demonstrable ability to intervene effectively in the event of a military confrontation or even conventional conflict with China.


                  The key question: if we are not fighting a war with China; if indeed China is doing bad things like coercion and Finlandization but does not engage in military hostilities with the United States, how do we get from of Air Sea Just Sitting There to Air Sea Battle?

                  That is a problem the authors can't answer - unless China obliges by launching a first-strike attack on US military forces, in other words turns the threat of A2/AD into reality. This is openly identified as the first assumption underlying the Air Sea Battle concept:


                  This paper assumes that China would have the strategic and operational initiative at the outset of war and that, even with warning, US military forces would not be authorized to preempt imminent Chinese military action kinetically. Thus the United States must be able to recover from the initial blow by aggressor forces and sustain operations for the concept to be viable.


                  As to the scenarios in which the People's Republic of China might choose to attack the military forces of the United States - under which circumstances the authors assume full participation by treaty partners Japan and Australia on the US side - the study is, unfortunately, silent.

                  So the Air Sea Battle slides past the awkward issue of why or when China would launch a first strike against US forces, and fast forwards to an interesting discussion of how it would be done.


                  In the opening minutes of a conflict, seek to render US and allied forces ''deaf, dumb and blind'' by destroying or degrading US and allied Low Earth Orbit (LEO) ISR [information, surveillance and reconnaissance], Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), third-generation Infrared System (3GIRS) sensors and communications satellites. This would be accomplished by employing directed-energy weapons, direct-ascent and co-orbital anti-satellite weapons, or terrestrial jamming, in concert with coordinated cyber and electronic warfare attacks;

                  >> Conduct ballistic missile salvo attacks, complemented by LACMs [land attack Cruise missiles] launched from various platform types, against US and Japanese air and naval bases. Attacks on Japanese targets could be supplemented by air strikes. Key targets would include forward air bases including those at Andersen, Kadena and Misawa; major logistics nodes such as Guam (airfields and port facilities); and key logistics assets such as fuel storage tanks. The PLA's objective would be to deny US forces the ability to generate substantial combat power from its air bases in the Western Pacific;

                  >> Conduct major strikes using land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) launched from various platforms and submarines against all major US Navy and allied warships at sea within 1,500 nm of the Chinese coast, with particular emphasis on the maritime areas around the PRC's littorals. The PLA's objective would be to raise the cost of the US and allied fleet operations within this ''keep-out'' zone to prohibitive levels (see Figure 4); and

                  >> Interdict US and allied sea lines of communication (SLOCs) throughout Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. Nuclear submarines could patrol forward near Hawaii in the Pacific and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean to interdict the flow of supplies and reinforcements moving to forward bases; attack Navy assets transiting to and from operating areas in the Western Pacific; and force the Navy to divert substantial resources to convoy escort and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in non-forward areas.


                  With the United States securely in the category of innocent victim of unprovoked aggression, the planners and the US military are off to the races: space war, cyber war, ''blinding attacks'', ''thinning out'' the PLA's missile inventory, three months of warfare against Chinese surface and submarine war vessels, and so on.

                  And, by the way, bye-bye Beijing, per the study's assumptions:
                  Neither US nor Chinese Territory Will Be Accorded Sanctuary Status

                  Neither belligerent will be off-limits to strikes by the other. At a minimum, selected US conventional counterforce strikes - both kinetic and nonkinetic (eg, cyber) - inside China will be authorized from the conflict's onset. A limited number of very high-leverage targets, principally those related to China's air defenses, command and control, ISR, and counter-space/space control, as well as fixed-site and mobile ballistic missiles (including production sites), lie at the heart of the PLA's A2/AD operational approach. According these targets sanctuary status would severely undermine US attempts to maintain a stable military balance in the Western Pacific and, as such, decrease the effectiveness of deterrence.


                  The report makes another necessary assumption to keep the party going:


                  Mutual Nuclear Deterrence Holds


                  Tacit agreement not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons would appear to be in both parties' interests. There have been several wars where weapons of mass destruction were possessed by one side or the other, and yet were not employed, even by the defeated power. In World War II, Germany accepted a total defeat at the hands of the allies without employing its formidable arsenal of chemical weaponry. In the First Gulf War, Iraq suffered a severe defeat but did not resort to the use of its chemical weapons. If this assumption does not hold and nuclear warfare ensues, then the character of the conflict would change so dramatically as to render discussion of major conventional warfare irrelevant. Of course, an Air Sea Battle operational concept and its associated capabilities are intended to deter conventional acts of coercion or aggression, thereby reducing the prospects of a nuclear confrontation.


                  The People's Republic of China recently affirmed its ''no first use'' nuclear weapons doctrine. In other words, the PRC's relatively modest nuclear arsenal is designed to survive and thereby deter a first nuclear strike by somebody else.

                  There appears to be an across-the-board consensus that ASB's assumption that the exchange will not go nuclear is reasonable.

                  The current Chinese nuclear arsenal does not include any announced tactical component, making it unlikely that it would be used in its current form in an ASB exchange.

                  RAND's David Shlapak told Asia Times:


                  Attacking the homeland of any nuclear-armed country is always a fraught undertaking. That said, I'm not aware of any evidence that China is considering developing tactical nuclear weapons as a response to ASB, and I wouldn't expect their nuclear doctrine to change to counter what is after all a tactical concept.

                  If China did change so as to threaten a nuclear response to conventional attack, they'd face a pretty high credibility hurdle. The United States, after all, has enormous quantitative and qualitative advantages in the nuclear realm. The US and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] had a very difficult time making believable escalatory threats in the context of a European war against the Warsaw Pact, even though its nuclear capability was at worst on par with the Soviets'; China would encounter the same dilemma.


                  However, I think this assumption may be too optimistic.

                  The premise of ASB is ''no sanctuaries'', which strongly implies that the area of Beijing - which is clustered with SAM missile sites in addition to its command-and-control significance - would not be declared off-limits to US and Japanese strikes.

                  ASB, despite its efforts to paint the encounter as symmetric (they attack our military targets with conventional weapons, we attack their military targets with conventional weapons, gentlemen come out of your corners at the bell, I want a nice, clean fight) and therefore controllable, really isn't.

                  The war is supposed to be fought all over Chinese territory. Of course, the PLA Navy is welcome to try to sail into the Atlantic Ocean and attack Washington DC in retaliation but this is simply not going to happen.

                  Beijing getting ''shock and awed'' by precision strikes is probably not part of the Chinese leadership's plan for regime survival, so we should not automatically assume that the PRC's only riposte to ASB will be to keep the fight on a mano-a-mano straight-up conventional basis.

                  Where stands Japan?

                  A further complicating factor is ASB's assumption that Japan will be pitching in on the US side (according to the ASB Gotterdammerung scenario, China would simultaneously attack US military bases in Japan, thereby bringing Japan into the war). Japan and the PRC are locked in vicious antagonism that is, up to now, still thankfully verbal. But the flip side to Japanese feistiness with China is its increasing independence from the United States, and the current government's desire to shed the restraints of the pacifist constitution and control its own security destiny.

                  Add to this the nascent, well maybe not so nascent, dream of some in Japan to celebrate its return to full great power status by fielding a nuclear arsenal (Japan's Epsilon rocket, which has virtually no civilian potential and walks talks and quacks like an ICBM, is in the midst of launch tests) [2] and we have the possibility of an independent, aggressive, and nuclear Japan in the mix against China.

                  It is increasingly difficult to imagine that PLA planners are not talking about an alternate future in which tactical nuclear weapons are deployed and a new doctrine announced in order to mix it up with the Japanese as well as deter the massive conventional attack on the Chinese mainland as envisaged by ASB.

                  If Air Sea Battle were put into effect and the Chinese regime decides its security is best served by the threat of air-bursting a nuclear weapon over the USS George Washington instead of pouring more money and development effort into its conventional the carrier-killer missile ... well, hopefully CSBA has another study in its safe dealing with this contingency.

                  In passing, for those of you who have ever looked at a map of the South China Sea and said to yourselves, hmmm, it looks like the nation with the most vital interest in free navigation down there is actually China, so what exactly is the point of the United States' national interest in protecting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea from the Chinese threat, there's this:


                  [T]he US forces could exploit the Western Pacific's geography, which effectively channelizes Chinese merchant traffic. Since direct Chinese commerce with the United States and Japan would cease at the outbreak of conflict, there would be little if any trans-Pacific traffic left to intercept. Most interdiction efforts would focus on ships trying to transit the South China Sea. Traffic bound for China would be intercepted as it tried to enter the southern portions of the South China Sea, ie, beyond range of most PLA A2/AD systems, from the Malacca, Singapore, or major Indonesia straits.


                  And let's not overlook the economic and environmental benefits of legal piracy:


                  Rather than the mass sinkings of merchant ships by German U-boats and their US counterparts during World War II, US and allied forces might conduct maritime interception operations (MIO) against ships bound for China. Economically (and environmentally) it would be far more beneficial to seize (and perhaps confiscate) prize cargos than sink them. The option to use force against noncompliant ships would be retained.


                  In November 2011, the Pentagon set up an ''Air Sea Battle Office'', whose debut was greeted with a flurry of interest and a storm of criticism.

                  As to how this concept got off the drawing board and into the public discourse, it did respond to a genuine and immediate threat - the threat that termination of the Iraq and Afghan wars and the pivot out of the Middle East would bring some major adjustments to US defense spending. The real enemies confronting each other over the contested terrain of the Pacific: US Army vs US Air Force and Navy.

                  A 2012 article in the bureaucrat-friendly Government Executive magazine with the optimistic title ''The Next War'' rather awkwardly framed the matter as one of turning away from essential unpleasantness of Army-type war, with its IEDs, brutalized local populations, and devastating post-traumatic stress disorder issues, to the more sleek and satisfying alternative of men and women in crisp uniforms firing extremely expensive ordinance from fancy ships and airplanes:


                  In this war over the next war, the Air Force and Navy have stolen an intellectual march over the Army with their joint AirSea Battle concept. It is a vision of future conflict well-matched to America's exhaustion with ground wars, its preference for high-tech, long-range engagements and its growing anxiety over the rise of China. ...

                  AirSea Battle and the anti-access/area denial threat have come to dominate the debate, with the Army still struggling to respond. The ground force has no grand concept yet to carry its banner in the inter-service battle over missions, roles and funding. The Obama administration's strategic guidance, issued in January, explicitly swears off the kind of ''large-scale, prolonged stability operations'' that the Army and Marines spent the last decade learning, slowly and bloodily, how to do. [3]


                  As an American taxpayer, I was interested to learn that the centerpiece of the Air Force and Marine's order of battle - and the Pentagon's biggest procurement program, amounting to almost half a trillion dollars - might be the wrong kit for the job by the standards of Air Sea Battle:


                  As powerful as the idea has proved, AirSea Battle poses one big problem for its Air Force and Navy sponsors: The two services' largest program, the Joint Strike Fighter, doesn't actually fit the concept very well. The Air Force, Navy and Marines are committed to buying 2,457 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, also known as Lightning IIs, for an estimated $395.7 billion. ...

                  The F-35 has a combat mission radius - the maximum distance at which it can strike a target and return without refueling - of about 600 nautical miles (not quite 700 statute miles, or 1,100 kilometers). While the aircraft itself is a small, stealthy, agile target, the platforms from which it must refuels are not: Air Force tankers, aircraft carriers and air bases. As adversaries acquire ever longer-range and more accurate missiles, they can make it increasingly dangerous to refuel short-range fighters within 700 miles of their final target.


                  There are always alternatives, of course:


                  [G]iven AirSea Battle's emphasis on long-range strikes, especially over the vast distances of the Pacific, the military is arguably over-investing in relatively short-range fighters and shortchanging long-range bombers.


                  A budget item of $5 billion is reportedly the downpayment on a new long range bomber - enough to pay for designing the landing gear, one analyst joked.

                  The Navy has its own equipment issues, though at $37 billion they are of a lower order of magnitude than those confronting the Air Force:


                  [I]n the seas, the Navy faces a similar square-peg, round-hole problem with the vessel it plans to buy more of than any other - the Littoral Combat Ship. ''These are not large surface combatants that are going to sail into the South China Sea and challenge the Chinese military; that's not what they're made for,'' Adm Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations, said at a Government Executive event in April. ''You won't send it into an anti-access area'' by itself.

                  Greenert's candor triggered a cascade of other Navy leaders insisting that LCS was, indeed, a warship. The service has committed to buying 55 Littoral Combat Ships at an estimated cost of $37 billion, and the program already was under fire for cost overruns, schedule slips and construction defects on the first two vessels.

                  LCS will play a vital role in the future fleet, but a supporting one. Smaller, cheaper and significantly less damage-resistant than the standard Arleigh Burke-class destroyer ...


                  The first LCS, the USS Freedom is forward-deployed at Changi in Singapore (to be followed by three more ships by 2017), one of the first fruits of the US ''pivot to Asia'' and, potentially, a building block for ASB. The LCS also has a certain camel's nose in the tent significance, because it turns out it needs destroyer escort in order to complete its mission in less than friendly environments:


                  [T]here are no plans to kit out LCS for the long-range strikes at the core of AirSea Battle, a role reserved for the more robust destroyers and the giant aircraft carriers. Indeed, the most survivable strike platform in the face of long-range anti-ship missiles is not a surface ship at all, but a submarine, which the Navy buys at a steady rate of two a year, more than any class of vessel except the LCS itself. But submarines can't shoot down incoming missiles. So if Littoral Combat Ships go in to hunt subs and clear mines close to the coast of a well-armed enemy, they will need destroyers to escort them. [4]


                  So, in addition to its other problematic elements, we can add to the dubious virtues of Air Sea Battle that it will require a U-turn on existing armaments and several decades and hundreds of billions of dollars for the military to bring its capabilities in line with the demands of the doctrine.

                  By 2013, Air Sea Battle seemed to be in retreat.

                  The Air Sea Battle Office issued a concept summary in May 2013 that did not mention the C word - China - and downplayed ASB as ''not a strategy'' and ''a limited but critical component in a spectrum of initiatives'':


                  ASB is a limited objective concept that describes what is necessary for the joint force to sufficiently shape A2/AD environments to enable concurrent or follow-on power projection operations. The ASB Concept seeks to ensure freedom of action in the global commons and is intended to assure allies and deter potential adversaries. [5]


                  Recently, Defense News reported rather disbelievingly on assertions that ASB was ''not about China'' despite the existence of dozens of pages in the 2010 CSBA report describing details of protracted war with the PRC - complete with maps showing Chinese missile facilities, including factories, that would be recipients of the US military's special attention.

                  Admiral Roughead (now retired), one of the progenitors of ASB, deployed his iPhone to rebut charges that it targeted - well, sought to ''contain'' - China:


                  ''There is a sense [among the Chinese] that it is aimed at China. My answer is, it's not,'' he said. ''Their perception is that it is aimed exclusively at them, that it's there to contain them.

                  ''My point is: We're not containing China. If we were containing China, why do I have an iPhone'' assembled in China ''on my desk?''

                  To divine the concept's true intent, Roughead pointed to its origin.

                  ''I set up a director of warfare integration,'' he said. ''Then [General Norton Schwartz] came in'' with the Air Force piece, and Air-Sea Battle was born. [6]


                  Equally embarrassing was the allegation, difficult to prove or rebut but at the same time rather plausible, that the announced US interest in ASB had actually accelerated China's A2AD efforts:


                  Some critics have charged that the Air-Sea Battle concept is driving China to increase its A2AD capabilities, often pointing to recently fielded weapons that could threaten US aircraft carriers. [Jan] Van Tol [one of the authors of the CSBA report] scoffs at the notion that such developments are driven by Air-Sea Battle.

                  ''China has been trying to field those capabilities well before ASB,'' he observed. ''Interest in ASB did not trigger Chinese interest in fielding these systems.''


                  One of those critics, Georgetown University's Amitai Etzioni, begged to differ:


                  The Pentagon, when explaining Air-Sea Battle, increasingly speaks about interservice cooperation and coordination rather than offensive capabilities. Etzioni has noticed the trend.

                  ''It's true that they're now walking it back, because it's really very escalating,'' he said. ''The Chinese keep pointing to it as a reason to escalate.''


                  Currently, ASB appears to be out of vogue, judging by the key Pentagon metrics - budget, staffing, an exciting mission, and institutional heat - as reported by Defense News:


                  Within the Air-Sea Battle office itself, the discussion - at least to outsiders - today centers on the interservice cooperation and integration the concept is attempting to foster. ...

                  Only 17 officers are assigned to the Air-Sea Battle office, which has no specific budget. The officers are counted as part of the Plans, Policy and Operations offices from their respective services.

                  The database of military assets is not a completed work, [Navy Captain Philip] Dupree said, nor will it be finished soon.

                  ''You're right, we are creating a database. But the database is not like we worked it all out,'' he said. ''This is a process that is going to take years. It is a lot of capabilities that we are tying together.''

                  The real work of the office, Dupree said, ''is to facilitate the conversation ... ''


                  However, there are serious issues pertaining to the military positions of the People's Republic of China that ASB attempted to address, sometimes haltingly and sometimes indirectly, by evoking new norms under the guise of establishing a new doctrine - or concept.

                  The first is to reaffirm absolute US military dominance (and not just military parity or maintenance of a credible deterrent) as an existential necessity, even as the technological and financial costs threaten to become prohibitive.

                  The US Navy and Air Force are accustomed to sailing and flying wherever they want without fear of suffering a devastating attack. In a decade or two, China might have the capability to A2/AD the United States, maybe just in the near-shore areas, maybe out to the first and second island chains.

                  It's understandable that the United States wants to be No 1 militarily everywhere. Nobody likes to be Number 2, even though the 150+ other nations that make up the rest of the world have dealt with being Number 2 with varying degrees of success for the last 70 years.

                  For the United States to maintain its hegemon status in the Western Pacific as China ''rises'' will require a truly massive investment. Since the PRC is not an overtly hostile power, it's difficult for a democratic government which already has some serious budgetary problems to find the money and political will to fund that contingency.

                  ASB tries to justify that investment - and preclude an alternate future in which pursuit of a balance-of-power parity between the United States and China in the West Pacific keeps war off the table - by imagining a future in which the PRC would initiate an attack. If ASB is in place, the can US fight back and wins. Without ASB, our forces get chased out of the West Pacific Theater of Operations or WPTO per the jargon.

                  Enter Taiwan

                  The second issue involves the accepted scope of military operations protecting Taiwan. The inconvenient truth about defending Taiwan is that the PRC's aggressive deployment of surface-to-surface missiles means that a PRC attack can only be thwarted by strikes against Chinese missile bases deep on the mainland - a dangerous, escalating tactic.

                  In 2011, Raoul Heinrichs wrote in The Diplomat about the Taiwan element of ASB:


                  The officer, a senior leader in US Pacific Command, looked down, fumbled with his papers and shifted uncomfortably in his seat. It was 2009, and he was answering a question about whether, in a Taiwan Straits crisis similar to that which occurred in the mid-1990s, the United States could confidently respond by again deploying aircraft carrier groups around Taiwan. 'No,' he conceded after a long pause, 'and it's the thing that really keeps me up at night.' It was a telling response.

                  ... new doubts are emerging about the credibility of certain US strategic assurances, particularly in relation to Taiwan, which other US allies use as a barometer of Washington's regional commitment. [7]


                  ASB implicitly puts conventional warfare against the PRC mainland (with a crossed-fingers hope that the exchange doesn't go nuclear) on the Taiwan agenda and, for that matter, on the Senkaku agenda, and asserts a new norm meant to blunt the advantage that the PRC enjoyed if hostilities were restricted to the vicinity of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait: no sanctuaries, meaning that the arena of controlled aggression and mutually managed escalation, at least as defined by the United States, includes the entire Chinese mainland.

                  Taiwan independence offers the most plausible occasion for direct conflict between the United States and the PRC, since the Chinese leadership maintains its absolute claims to sovereignty over the island and has trumpeted its resolve to deny independence by any and all means. However, for obvious reasons the United States does not wish to go on record that it will barrage the entire Chinese mainland on behalf of Taiwan in order to regain military parity on behalf of Taiwan independence advocates.

                  The third norm relates to defining the People's Republic of China as a first-strike military threat against US forces. Up until now, the PRC, like other nations that found themselves the object of US hostility, has been extremely canny about asymmetric counter-programming against US military superiority.

                  To date and for the foreseeable future, in its maritime arguments with its neighbors, the People's Republic of China has eschewed direct military confrontation for deployment of civilian elements such as maritime surveillance vessels, coast guard vessels, and whatnot. A major purpose of this strategy is to deny the US military the opportunity to place its currently sole-hegemon thumb on the scale.

                  However, as America's adversaries have learned to their terminal chagrin, carefully modulated defiance and careful appeals to international law and the authority of the United Nations butter no parsnips once the United States has decided it wants to drop the hammer on a nettlesome adversary.

                  ... and enter Vietnam

                  For an illustration of how a US naval force engaged in routine patrol exercising its rights to freedom of navigation near an adversary's waters was disrupted by an unprovoked surprise anti-access/aerial denial attack, which the US countered with a rapid, coordinated deployment of a broad spectrum of military assets (in ASB speak)

                  ... or parlayed a confrontational stance into the dreaded Land War in Asia (in history speak)...

                  ... we can look beyond this September of Syria and consider the Gulf of Tonkin incident of 1964.

                  In 1964, the Lyndon Johnson administration was acutely aware of the shaky status of the South Vietnamese regime under its current bossman, General Nguyen Khanh, and was eager to secure a congressional resolution that would enable the provision of more direct US aid.

                  There was considerable interest in achieving a casus belli - a direct outrage against US military forces that would justify escalation of US military action. The goal was obtained with the August 4, 1964, Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which two destroyers with an NSA Sigint mission - which involved trespassing into North Vietnamese territorial waters in order to provoke and record radar and radio responses - were supposedly attacked in international waters by a swarm of torpedo boats.

                  As a trickle of declassified documents has made clear, there was no attack on the night of August 4. There was, instead, a considerable amount of confusion and, perhaps, its inglorious doppelganger, panic, aboard the two destroyers, the Maddox and the Turner Joy as they sailed in circles evading non-existent torpedoes and then interpreted the sonar signal of their own propellers bouncing off their own wakes as more torpedoes. Over an hour and a half, hundreds of rounds were fired and fighter planes were summoned to bombard the empty ocean.

                  The heightened nervous tension aboard the two vessels was a product of the fact that, two days earlier, there had been a real attack, in which North Vietnamese torpedo boats chased down the Maddox in broad daylight and exchanged fire before fighters from a nearby US aircraft carrier plastered the boats.

                  And the reason that the North Vietnamese were so aggressive was because they had conflated the two destroyers with an apparently unrelated slice of US provocation: attacks on North Vietnamese targets by South Vietnamese special forces in Norwegian vessels (known as ''Nastys'') arranged by the United States, whose missions were subject to White House approval and under the direction of the US Military Advisory Command Vietnam to escalate pressure on North Vietnam with unprecedented direct attacks on North Vietnamese territory in order to get the Vietcong to ease off their campaign against General Khanh.

                  In fact, the August 2 attack had been triggered by a Nasty attack against Hon Me, a strategic Vietnamese island that was also a North Vietnamese PT boat base near the patrol area of the Maddox. On August 4, the US Navy was even more on edge because that night the Nastys had, for the first time, shelled the North Vietnamese mainland.

                  The NSA (whose voluminous sigint concerning the incident underwent considerable suppression and distortion in the weeks after the incident) then made its own modest but signal (pun intended) contribution to the emerging ****-up by misinterpreting intercepted North Vietnamese radio traffic as evidence of PT boats massing for an attack. The Maddox and the Turner Joy received a message warning of the danger of an attack. They demanded US jet fighters from the Ticonderoga and Constellation overhead at all times, and not just 15 minutes away. [8]

                  The two vessels bravely continued with their near-shore missions because of the importance of upholding the principle of freedom of navigation (the official reason):


                  1. Termination of DESOTO patrol [the cage-rattling Sigint mission] after two days of patrol ops (operations) subsequent to Maddox incident as planned in Ref A (this was basic instruction for patrol), does not in my view adequately demonstrate United States resolve to assert our legitimate rights in these international waters. ...

                  The above patrol will: (a) clearly demonstrate our determination to continue these operations.


                  Or, according to the jaundiced view of a secret report prepared by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1968:


                  It says clearly that CINCPACFLT was disappointed with the results of the mission thus far - that is, the United States had not yet ''demonstrated'' its resolve to assert its legitimate rights in international waters. This seems to mean that we had not as yet had the opportunity to demonstrate this forcibly.

                  ... Although the administration described the patrol of the Maddox and Turner Joy as routine but prepared for attack, there is considerable evidence that the objective of the patrol was to provoke the North Vietnamese and then to bloody them if they responded to the provocation. [9]


                  Later on August 4, US personnel at the scene quickly backed away from apocalyptic narrative they had been feeding their superiors during the supposed encounter. However, it was too late to stop the roll toward launching a retaliatory raid - for whatever reason; it was followed by an address to the nation and passage of the Tonkin Gulf resolution, which LBJ approvingly characterized as ''like Granny's nightgown; it covered everything''.

                  The question has been asked why the White House ignored the dubious nature of the August 4 action, and the reasonably prompt caveats issued by officers on the scene, and did not wait for daylight and a survey of the surrounding ocean to see if the US fusillade had actually hit anything before ordering the retaliatory raids against North Vietnamese boats and ports which - since the North Vietnamese PT boats had not been engaged in any actions on August 4 and were unaware that a ''red line'' had supposedly been crossed - caught them completely napping.

                  In 2009, Gareth Porter made a compelling case that secretary of defense Robert McNamara knew the case was weak, but decided to issue the executive order for the attack and get the Vietnam War ball rolling instead of sharing his doubts with LBJ. [10]

                  In the secret 1968 staff investigation (only declassified through the efforts of John Kerry in 2010), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee determined that secretary McNamara had misled the committee by stating that the North Vietnamese had fired first on August 2 (the Maddox had fired first as the boats approached at high speed and clearly unfriendly intent), by characterizing the August 4 attack as unprovoked and in international waters (given the provocation of the Nasty attacks and the fact that the Maddox's mission involved sailing inside North Vietnamese territorial waters and the fact, unearthed with some difficulty by the staff, that the US Navy knew about the Nasty missions.

                  On the even more sensitive question of what personnel of the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, were doing aboard the destroyers the night of the incident - and the coastal raids - the committee apparently chose not to go there).

                  This exercise in near-shore assertiveness gives an idea of how quickly an incident can turn into a war, especially when the desire to start a war is barely disguised.

                  The commander of the Navy task force in charge of the Maddox and Turner Joy sent out the message (page 71 of the report) that reads like the distant but direct ancestor 21st century Air Sea Battle fear-mongering:


                  It is apparent that DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] has thrown down the gauntlet now considers itself at war with the United States. It is felt that they will attack US forces on sight with no regard for cost. US ships in Gulf of Tonkin can no longer assume that they will be considered neutrals exercising the right of free transit. They will be treated as belligerents from first detection and must consider themselves as such. DRV PTS [patrol craft] have advantage, especially at night, of being able to hide in junk concentrations all across the Gulf of Tonkin. This would allow attack from short range with little or no early warning.


                  Tonkin 1964 looks a lot like ASB 2030: hostility and hair-trigger reactions in an adversary's near-shore waters under the flag of ''freedom of navigation''.

                  Of course, ASB can deter war, if the destabilizing escalation it engenders is managed by men and women of infinite wisdom and with the best of motives; but extrapolating from the 1964 precedent, in other hands, it can simply make provoking a war easier.

                  Considering that ASB needs the plausibility of the PRC launching an initial attack to justify itself, that should be enough to make people nervous.

                  In 1968, digesting the staff report in executive session, the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ruminated on the implications of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and the war resolution it enabled:


                  Senator CASE: Mr Chairman, I think one of the suggestions, I do not know that it has quite been put into these words, is that the Defense Department, for purposes which it considered most patriotic and necessary, decided that the time had come to stop shillyshallying with the commies and resist, and this was the time, and it had to be contrived so that the President could come along, and that the Congress would follow. That is one of the things.

                  Senator HICKENLOOPER: I think historically whenever a country wants to go to war it finds a pretext. We have had 5,000 pretexts historically to go to war. [page 97]


                  5,000 pretexts for war. Make ASB the five thousand and first.

                  Notes:
                  1. See csbaBonline, Air Sea Battle Concept, May 2010.
                  2. See Shisaku, What is in fact ICBM, August 2013.
                  3. See Govexec, Next War, August 2012.
                  4. See Govexec, Next War, August 2012.
                  5. See Defense.gov, ASB Concept Implementation Summary, May 2013.
                  6. See Defense News, Defining Air Sea Battle, July 27, 2013.
                  7. See Diplomat, America's Dangerous Battle Plan, August 17, 2011.
                  8. See NSA.gov.
                  9. See GPO.gov.
                  10. See Therealnews.com.

                  Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection with US foreign policy.


                  in related news . . .


                  The Navy’s biggest-ever destroyer, the USS Zumwalt, sailed from a Maine port on Monday. The stealth warship is the first of the DDG-1000 class of destroyers, a controversial line of three ships to be deployed to the Pacific during the next three years as sentries to China’s burgeoning naval might.

                  The USS Zumwalt is big: It is 610 feet long, has an 11,000-square foot flight deck, and displaces 14,564 tons of water. That’s about 100 feet longer than other destroyers, as well a water displacement about 50 percent larger than the next biggest destroyer on the water, the Military Times reported.

                  Despite its colossal size, Zumwalt is also stealthy, with concealed antennas and an angular frame that makes it much less detectable to radar than are current warships. It also packs a punch. Its “Advanced Gun System” fires warheads at a range of about 63 miles with impeccable precision, three times farther than current destroyers can fire, CNN reported. Its massive electrical capabilities are also expected to support future laser weapons.

                  But, as precedent suggests with ships of unprecedented size, there’s a problem: Engineers aren’t quite sure if Zumwalt ships are capable of weathering giant waves, according to Defense News. A single sizable swell that hits the ship’s back end might take the ship down, engineers have said. That’s because these ships sport a new, downward-sloping hull that primes the ship to move stealthily, but not necessarily stably; traditional ships have upward-flaring hulls.

                  The ships are controversial for more than just their Achilles hull: They are expensive – the most expensive Navy ships ever built, to be exact.

                  Zumwalts began as a dream of the 1990s, imagined as part of the 1991 21st Century Destroyer program, the news website Medium reported. What if a ship could avoid radar detection? What if it could ply the waters unnoticed, a Loch Ness monster of the open seas? What if the US could sport bigger and badder ships than ever before thought possible?

                  The Department of Defense announced in the 1990s that it would build 32 of the novel class of ships, originally called DD 21 and later DD(X). But the cost of building the ships began to float higher and higher, and, as it did, the Pentagon scaled back the number of behemoth ships it planned to put on the water. In 2003, the Pentagon said it would buy 16 ships. Then, it said seven ships. Then, in 2008, it said three ships.

                  In 2009, the number of ships was almost reduced to no ships at all, when costs ballooned to over $5 billion per ship, a violation of the Nunn-McCurdy amendment, which says that defense projects whose cost per unit grows more than 15% above what was originally estimated must be tabled. That year, to keep the program going, Department of Defense officials dialed back the cost of the first Zumwalt destroyer to $3.3 billion, with subsequent ships costing about $2.5 billion.The most recent new destroyer, the US Arleigh Burke class of ships, cost about $1.8 billion each. The Navy is expected to return to building the cheaper class of ships after production wraps up on the three Zumwalts.

                  All three Zumwalt ships, called Zumwalt, Michael Monsoor, and Lyndon B. Johnson, are due to be based out of San Diego and to be charged with policing the Pacific. Their super structures are constructed at Huntington Ingalls Industries, in Gulfport, Miss., and assembled at Maine's Bath Iron Works, which is part of General Dynamics Marine Systems. The first ship will be delivered to the Navy in 2015, the Washington Times reported.

                  Zumwalt has hit the water, but it is not quite battle-ready, and Bath Iron Works will keep working on the ship in the water for the next few months. The ship had been due to be christened earlier this month with a bottle of champagne smashed against its hull, but the ceremony was postponed due to the government shutdown. The shipyard expects the champagne slinging to happen sometime in the spring, Fox News reported.

                  The class of ships is named for Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., the chief of naval operations in the early 1970s. He is credited with ordering the Navy to end racial discrimination andallowing women to serve on ships.



                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Re: Engelhardt's take on the Military Balance

                    Errr.......is there not something called nuclear weapons thus eliminating the need for massive armies? Is not the relevant question, who would use these? I doubt the USA would unless it deemed the end of it's existance was nigh. Nuclear weapons are a game changer.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Re: Engelhardt's take on the Military Balance

                      Originally posted by DRumsfeld2000 View Post
                      Errr.......is there not something called nuclear weapons thus eliminating the need for massive armies? Is not the relevant question, who would use these? I doubt the USA would unless it deemed the end of it's existance was nigh. Nuclear weapons are a game changer.
                      Are nuclear weapons the chief reason we haven't had another Total War between Great Powers since the last one (WW2)?

                      A note on doubting US use of nucs. On numerous occasions the Joint Chiefs have pushed for a nuclear attack, the US has the most powerful nuclear arsenal and perhaps more importantly, the most diversified - including the so-called tactical nukes. I would say US first-use isn't categorically ruled out.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Re: Engelhardt's take on the Military Balance

                        Yes, but all a ''madman'' has to do is detonate one on Yellowstone National Park and goodbye all.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Re: Engelhardt's take on the Military Balance

                          Originally posted by don View Post
                          Are nuclear weapons the chief reason we haven't had another Total War between Great Powers since the last one (WW2)?

                          A note on doubting US use of nucs. On numerous occasions the Joint Chiefs have pushed for a nuclear attack, the US has the most powerful nuclear arsenal and perhaps more importantly, the most diversified - including the so-called tactical nukes. I would say US first-use isn't categorically ruled out.
                          Categorically ruled out? It's friggin' policy. Has been for decades.

                          Look at the SIOP and the weapons systems that enabled it and tell me that's not a first strike orientation all you want. Look at the papers out of FRUS and the ARRB about the "The Net Evaluation Subcommittee" or just read Jamie Galbraith's piece in the American Prospect.

                          What did LBJ say to Moyers on the way back from Dallas? "I wonder if the missiles are flying?" Why would he say that?

                          And what approach did he use to get Warren and Russell on the commission? "[W]e've got to take this out of the arena where they're testifying that Khrushchev and Castro did this and did that and kicking us into a war that can kill 40 million Americans in an hour..."

                          Now where would Johnson get such an idea?

                          In hindsight, he might deserve almost as much credit for averting WWIII as JFK gets in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Anyway, it's ancient history now and of no consequence to anyone important. And five bucks will get you a bad cup of coffee these days, too. But it's still policy.

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