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This is a scholarly paper, but it reads like a New Yorker article. It was referred to in a recent article that appeared on Alternet.
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwes...&context=njlsp
On July 24, 2008, the Denver Post reported that Coloradans were shocked to learn
that the private contractors that had leased the Northwest Parkway had objected to
improvements on West 160th Avenue and that the contractors had the legal right to
object.
The contractors opposed improvements “because they might hurt the parkway
financially.” Colorado State Representative Frank McNulty declared: “The purpose of
toll roads is to augment state transportation infrastructure, not act as a roadblock to the
construction of new transportation infrastructure in the northwest metro area.”
McNulty was wrong, and his comments came a year too late. Had he read the
Northwest Parkway privatization contract4 he would have learned that under its “adverse
action” provisions, the contractors had the right to object to new or improved roads and
mass transit systems. In addition, the contractors had the right to receive compensation
for lost anticipated revenues if those roads or transit systems were built during the term of
the ninety-nine year contract.5 Most people would be surprised to learn that contracts to
privatize major infrastructure, such as the Northwest Parkway, Chicago parking meters,
proposed Indianapolis parking meters, and proposed Pennsylvania Turnpike contracts
give private contractors these rights.
Moreover, this was the case even though neither McNulty nor any member of the
public could have raised objections to the contract before it was consummated, for the
terms were not released until after the deal was signed.7 Agreeing to multi-decade infrastructure privatization contracts, despite providing no opportunity for public scrutiny of the contract terms or right to object, is not unique to the Northwest Parkway lease.
For example, in 2008, Mayor Richard Daley insisted that the Chicago City Council approve
the seventy-five year lease of the city’s parking meters within two days after council
members first saw the terms of the complex 279 page document.
However, even when contract terms are made public, few people read or
understand their effects. Reporter Steve Katula explained:
Virginia’s contract for the Beltway HOT lanes are not just far from
free to taxpayers and even worse if people carpool. The structure of the
deal ultimately minimizes public outrage until it’s too late, saddling
taxpayers with a high bill and no voice.
. . . .
Most Northern Virginians were completely unaware of the VDOT
“Megaproject” prior to construction, and this illustrates the problematic
nature of complex contracts that promise free stuff.
When taxpayer dollars are (supposedly) not involved, citizens (and
even politicians) retract from the process, especially from boring
contractual details . . . . [T]he supposedly free and complex, “black-box”
nature of the HOT lanes deal served to discourage input and criticism.
Despite VDOT following legally-mandated procedures for public input,
the result was an opaque deal-making process, and a bad deal for
Virginians.
. . . .
But with the cards now on the table, one must ask what was wrong
with the original estimates? Why the promise they could do the project on
a totally private basis, followed by the late-in-the-game change? Why did
politicians, VDOT, The Washington Post, and the public believe the
almost magic promises, and why was there so little reaction when the
nature of the project funding changed, but the reward mechanism to the
private contractor did not?
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwes...&context=njlsp
On July 24, 2008, the Denver Post reported that Coloradans were shocked to learn
that the private contractors that had leased the Northwest Parkway had objected to
improvements on West 160th Avenue and that the contractors had the legal right to
object.
The contractors opposed improvements “because they might hurt the parkway
financially.” Colorado State Representative Frank McNulty declared: “The purpose of
toll roads is to augment state transportation infrastructure, not act as a roadblock to the
construction of new transportation infrastructure in the northwest metro area.”
McNulty was wrong, and his comments came a year too late. Had he read the
Northwest Parkway privatization contract4 he would have learned that under its “adverse
action” provisions, the contractors had the right to object to new or improved roads and
mass transit systems. In addition, the contractors had the right to receive compensation
for lost anticipated revenues if those roads or transit systems were built during the term of
the ninety-nine year contract.5 Most people would be surprised to learn that contracts to
privatize major infrastructure, such as the Northwest Parkway, Chicago parking meters,
proposed Indianapolis parking meters, and proposed Pennsylvania Turnpike contracts
give private contractors these rights.
Moreover, this was the case even though neither McNulty nor any member of the
public could have raised objections to the contract before it was consummated, for the
terms were not released until after the deal was signed.7 Agreeing to multi-decade infrastructure privatization contracts, despite providing no opportunity for public scrutiny of the contract terms or right to object, is not unique to the Northwest Parkway lease.
For example, in 2008, Mayor Richard Daley insisted that the Chicago City Council approve
the seventy-five year lease of the city’s parking meters within two days after council
members first saw the terms of the complex 279 page document.
However, even when contract terms are made public, few people read or
understand their effects. Reporter Steve Katula explained:
Virginia’s contract for the Beltway HOT lanes are not just far from
free to taxpayers and even worse if people carpool. The structure of the
deal ultimately minimizes public outrage until it’s too late, saddling
taxpayers with a high bill and no voice.
. . . .
Most Northern Virginians were completely unaware of the VDOT
“Megaproject” prior to construction, and this illustrates the problematic
nature of complex contracts that promise free stuff.
When taxpayer dollars are (supposedly) not involved, citizens (and
even politicians) retract from the process, especially from boring
contractual details . . . . [T]he supposedly free and complex, “black-box”
nature of the HOT lanes deal served to discourage input and criticism.
Despite VDOT following legally-mandated procedures for public input,
the result was an opaque deal-making process, and a bad deal for
Virginians.
. . . .
But with the cards now on the table, one must ask what was wrong
with the original estimates? Why the promise they could do the project on
a totally private basis, followed by the late-in-the-game change? Why did
politicians, VDOT, The Washington Post, and the public believe the
almost magic promises, and why was there so little reaction when the
nature of the project funding changed, but the reward mechanism to the
private contractor did not?