Cold War Redux?

[don]

or not. If either the US or the USSR had threatened to invade Iraq, perhaps Libya and Iran, nuclear war would have been threatened. Russia and China are both armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles. What's different this time around. Is it the global economy? When the socialist world was effectively firewalled off from the capitalist world, did that make MAD possible? Or not possible today with globalization?

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Cold War Redux?

I actually think the risks of a nuclear weapon being used now unilaterally or between two lower tier participants is higher than during the Cold War.

One similarity I see between the Cold War then and the current global environment is a perceived battle of ideology.

Then it was the PERCEPTION of a battle between communism/capitalism, now it's Islam/West.

Back in the original Cold War there was far more infighting within the global communism/socialism community that the western media gave credit...they hated each other about the same(sometimes more) than they hated the bad guy capitalists.

Same goes within Islam today......Sunni and Shia infighting might equate the the rows between China/Vietnam or Vietnam/Cambodia or China/Russia...maybe worse.

I guess that's what I take away from the Cold War...it wasn't anywhere near as simple as what was marketed to us.....I reckon the same with the current cold war or whatever it is.....there was no united global communist/socialist effort against us...it was a messy patchwork of conflicting interests......maybe somewhat analogous to radical Islam's efforts to oppose the West today.

That...and I think people need to consider that there ARE genuine scenarios where nuclear weapons could be used in our lifetimes......deterrence between superpowers is only one layer of the nuclear equation.

Just my thoughts.

[ASH]

Re: Cold War Redux?

If either the US or the USSR had threatened to invade Iraq, perhaps Libya and Iran, nuclear war would have been threatened.

This is a hypothetical, and so a matter of opinion rather than fact, but my opinion is that nuclear war would not have been threatened in such circumstances. My understanding of the rules of the game are/were that nuclear war is/was only a credible threat when the national survival of NATO/Warsaw Pact countries -- or their ability to retaliate after a nuclear first strike -- were threatened.

Russia and China are both armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles. What's different this time around?

For the reasons mentioned above, nuclear arms don't help much with international competition short of national survival. During the Cold War, Russia had greater economic and ideological heft than it presently wields, and also much more conventional military capacity. China has a more complete tool set, but hasn't developed the conventional military capacity required to operate beyond its borders. So one thing that is different is that no competitor yet exists that has the full set of tools required to compete internationally at the same level as the Americans and Soviets did during the Cold War.

Is it the global economy? When the socialist world was effectively firewalled off from the capitalist world, did that make MAD possible?

Economics is certainly another important factor, but I think the economics of the Cold War actually made non-nuclear hard conflict more likely, but had essentially zero to do with the viability of MAD, one way or the other. Russia is presently irrelevant from the standpoint of global competition a la the Cold War, but China is on a trajectory to become relevant. However, China's strength presently depends upon a mercantilist economic policy that requires freedom of navigation and relatively cordial trade relations with its potential competitors for global influence. Also, it isn't apparent to me that China has any missionary instincts, so unlike the Soviet Union, they seem more intent on "claiming what is theirs" rather than "spreading the Chinese system". So it seems more likely that China will want to increase its influence over international institutions, and decrease foreign influence over areas adjacent to China, but it doesn't seem to me that hard conflict far from China's borders aligns well with either Chinese goals or self-interest. That is not just a matter of their economics, but also an assessment of what a rising China "is about". However, I see the economic factor as being irrelevant to MAD, and more relevant to the issue of whether non-nuclear hard conflict occurs... and I think economics make hard conflict less likely than the Cold War case.

Anyway, MAD is still possible, and still operative for the big players. MAD is the reason Russia and China would not credibly threaten nuclear war to oppose Western meddling in the Middle East, or what have you -- but MAD is also the reason that the US will never threaten Russian or Chinese sovereignty within their borders.

It seems to me that MAD is likely to break down in regions where opposing powers are close neighbors or where geographically small countries are involved, and in a world with a lot of nuclear proliferation. MAD breaks down when missile flight times become very short, and when 100% of a country's ability to retaliate for a first strike can be wiped out in a first strike. MAD also breaks down when attribution of an attack cannot be made almost instantly. MAD only provides stability when mutual destruction is assured, and these geographic and informational factors erode assurance. I agree with Lakedaemonian's assessment that a small-scale nuclear exchange between smaller powers is more likely in this era than previously. They're typically closer to their enemies, smaller geographically, and don't have fully developed early warning systems or a complete nuclear triad to ensure survivability of a 2nd strike capability. Dangerous.

[charliebrown]

Re: Cold War Redux?

i'm trying to work out the dynamics of iran in my head, and I am getting dissonance.

1) I believe the U.S/Israel is waging a secret war in Iran. Stuxnet virus, magnetic car bombs, nuc facilities blowing up etc, then there is the sanctions on Iranian oil., then there is the surrounding of Iran by U.S. forces, and the fotilla of ships all around. Iran is being poked at.

2) Iran threatens to block the straight of Hormuz.

4) high inflation, loss of employment etc pushes Iran to block the straight. Would this not hurt its own oil export business? Immediate $20-$30
jump in world oil prices, economic slow down. Angry voters in upcoming election.


5) U.S. unblocks the straight, this is assumed by strength, and gives Iran the green light to fire on nato naval vessels, I am fairly certain that with Iran's advanced anti ship missiles and torpedos, some real damage is caused to the U.S or nato fleet.

6) This gives the green light to air strikes in Iran to supress its ability to attack Nato ships. Iran will have to be pounded to give up. Regime change? Will the people support a new regime when they are being bombed?

5) this game seems to be a long term loss for Iran, ergo, why play? Will they back down soon? If they do, how much face do they lose?

Is this just a way to destabalize Iran, with the goal of no more striving on becoming a regional power, and developing nukes, years of civil unrest while a new regime rises to the top?
Is that good enough for the West?

[ASH]

Re: Cold War Redux?

Preface all my over-confident declarative statements with "in my opinion"...

1) I believe the U.S/Israel is waging a secret war in Iran. Stuxnet virus, magnetic car bombs, nuc facilities blowing up etc, then there is the sanctions on Iranian oil., then there is the surrounding of Iran by U.S. forces, and the fotilla of ships all around. Iran is being poked at.

This is 100% about the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The issues at stake are Iranian sovereignty and regional influence on the one hand, American regional hegemony on the other hand, and Israeli national security on the third hand. Although the US is engaged in a covert war with Iran, the US is not trying to provoke an overt war. However, some members of the Israeli cabinet are said to favor war because they believe Iran is undeterrable, but Israeli officialdom is still split on the issue. The US and Israel are allied, but Israel doesn't get approval from the US for its security operations. It's more a matter of whether the US participates and provides support or not, and how hard we lobby them not to do something they've decided is in their national interest (but runs counter to our interests). When the US really doesn't want Israel to do something (such as retaliate against Saddam's missiles in the first Gulf War), the US applies pressure, but our domestic politics limit the amount of pressure an American President can apply to Israel -- he could not, for instance, credibly threaten to withhold military aid. As far as overtly attacking Iran goes, Israel has been asking us to do it for them, and we have demurred because the outcome doesn't look good to us. Our objective is to exercise and maintain regional hegemony. Panetta recently articulated our two "red lines" and they amount to exactly that: keeping the Strait of Hormuz open to navigation is an example of our regional role as hegemon (supporting the economic and security interests of client states and maintaining smooth function of the status quo), and keeping nuclear arms out of Iran's arsenal is necessary to maintain the freedom of action required to continue playing that role. We are fervently hoping to achieve our objectives without an overt war, and are concentrating on diplomacy (organizing economic sanctions), sabotage, and intelligence gathering. Here, our objectives align well with Israel, and I presume there is a fair amount of cooperation, although I doubt we're participating in the program of assassination. The intelligence gathering is partly about monitoring Iran's progress, and partly about target identification in case methods short of overt war fail. But right now, the Iranian currency is crashing and there's a lot of triumphal noises coming out of Washington that they think economic pressure is finally bearing fruit. The problem is that Israel's cost/benefit calculation is different from ours. For them, they see Iranian nukes as a matter of national survival, and they may decide to try attacking Iran on their own. (And Iran needs nukes as the only guarantor of its sovereignty in the face of overwhelming American superiority in conventional arms.)

2) Iran threatens to block the strait of Hormuz.

Kind of ridiculous. They'd be shooting themselves in the foot economically at a time of great Iranian economic weakness, and the action would guarantee an air campaign directed at seriously degrading the Iranian government's forces (military, police, and intelligence units) and its nuclear program. The threat to close the Strait is not to be taken seriously, unless the US or Israel move first. Operationally, I doubt Iran's ability to carry through with such a threat for very long, either.

4) High inflation, loss of employment etc. pushes Iran to block the strait. Would this not hurt its own oil export business?

Exactly. The economic pressure inside Iran is in the opposite direction. It won't happen unless we attack them, overtly, first. (Or, rather, unless Israel attacks them first.)

Immediate $20-$30 jump in world oil prices, economic slow down. Angry voters in upcoming election.

Yes, but it won't happen unless Israel decides to attack unilaterally.

5) U.S. unblocks the strait, this is assumed by strength, and gives Iran the green light to fire on nato naval vessels, I am fairly certain that with Iran's advanced anti ship missiles and torpedos, some real damage is caused to the U.S or nato fleet.

Again, won't happen, unless Israel attacks Iran unilaterally. If Israel does attack and Iran tries to close the Strait, maybe we take some damage. But regardless of how much damage we take...

6) This gives the green light to air strikes in Iran to supress its ability to attack Nato ships. Iran will have to be pounded to give up. Regime change? Will the people support a new regime when they are being bombed?

... trying to close the Strait will lead to air strikes on Iran focused at military, security, and nuclear infrastructure. But no one really has the troops to force regime change, and as I understand it, they won't arise internally in Iran, either. So no regime change, but a pretty decent attempt at "regime crippling".

5) this game seems to be a long term loss for Iran, ergo, why play? Will they back down soon? If they do, how much face do they lose?

I don't think they're very committed to playing this game. So far, it's just saber-rattling, right? Instead, they try to keep their economy going in the face of sanctions, continue to fight the covert war (i.e. attempt to raise the cost to the US of waging our covert war), and try to get into the position where they could "sprint" to a small nuclear arsenal in a pinch. That seems to be what enriching their uranium to 20% is about. It takes a lot of time to go from natural uranium to 20% enriched, but relatively little time to go from a stockpile of 20% enriched to weapons-grade ~90% enrichment. So get most of the enrichment out of the way, engineer triggers and delivery systems, and develop the option to go nuclear quickly.

Is this just a way to destabalize Iran, with the goal of no more striving on becoming a regional power, and developing nukes, years of civil unrest while a new regime rises to the top? Is that good enough for the West?

That might be the only play that could either cause Iran to give up its nuclear program (low probability, given that security in their sovereignty is at stake), or which could eventually lead to a new regime in Iran (seems a long way off to me, but what do I know -- I certainly wouldn't have predicted the "Arab Spring"... maybe a "Persian Spring" is waiting to happen, but my impression is that the regime's organs of control are too strong). This strategy is good enough for the US -- a lot better than the alternatives. The problem is... is it good enough for Israel?

[don]

Re: Cold War Redux?

Ash: This is a hypothetical, and so a matter of opinion rather than fact, but my opinion is that nuclear war would not have been threatened in such circumstances. My understanding of the rules of the game are/were that nuclear war is/was only a credible threat when the national survival of NATO/Warsaw Pact countries -- or their ability to retaliate after a nuclear first strike -- were threatened.

I have no inside information but living through the Cold War it seemed that the nuclear deterrent came into play a number of times that did not threaten the existence of the principal parties. An invasion of North Vietnam off the table, the Cuban missile crisis, Berlin, the spheres of influence - the Americas, Western Europe and Japan for the US, Eastern Europe, Cuba, North Korea, etc. for the USSR. In addition to the two camps there was a large and vibrant Third World of neutrals that could often play the two off against each other to their benefit. That seemed possible because of the nuclear standoff between the two major powers. In addition to that they both had Mutual Assured Destruction to ward off a direct attack.

[ASH]

Re: Cold War Redux?

I have no inside information but living through the Cold War it seemed that the nuclear deterrent came into play a number of times that did not threaten the existence of the principal parties. An invasion of North Vietnam off the table, the Cuban missile crisis, Berlin, the spheres of influence - the Americas, Western Europe and Japan for the US, Eastern Europe, Cuba, North Korea, etc. for the USSR. In addition to the two camps there was a large and vibrant Third World of neutrals that could often play the two off against each other to their benefit. That seemed possible because of the nuclear standoff between the two major powers. In addition to that they both had Mutual Assured Destruction to ward off a direct attack.

Nuclear deterrence didn't come up in the accounts of the Vietnam War that I've read; my understanding is that an invasion of the North was never on the table because we were always trying to limit our involvement and practice containment. We didn't get into the Vietnam War with the intention of putting a lot of boots on the ground, conquering territory, or trying to sustain an army of occupation in the North. (For one thing, we initially tried a "comprehensive" solution in Korea, but that ended up being very painful in the end when China involved itself -- 'tis how my father lost his legs.) Once the French were obliged to abandon their fight against the Viet Minh, we hoped that limited advisory and material assistance to the South would tip the fight in favor of the non-Communists. Then we hoped that temporarily committing ground troops in the South, plus bombing the North, would rapidly decide the matter in the South's favor. We were always trying to make the minimum commitment necessary to secure our goals, and were repeatedly forced to either escalate or admit failure, until domestic politics eventually favored failure over further escalation. The doctrine of containment (incorrectly) required that we prevent the North from taking the South, but it didn't require that we occupy the North. It's doubtful that a war plan requiring invasion and a long-term occupation of the North would ever have flown politically, but by the time it became apparent that occupying the North might be the only way to win in the South, it surely wasn't politically viable to escalate to that level. (One of the biggest policy failures surrounding Vietnam was that we fought a war over land that wasn't important enough to our survival to credibly deter via MAD, yet talked ourselves into escalating from a very modest commitment to a huge war effort. Eventually, we were throwing far more resources at the war than the war aims justified. Even if containment was necessary at one point in the Cold War, we were wrong that the line needed to be drawn in Vietnam -- and, indeed, we were wrong that Vietnam really represented expansion of Soviet influence, so much as the natural sovereign aspirations of a formerly colonized people.)

The Cuban missile crisis was about establishing to the Soviets that we regarded the short missile flight time between Cuba and the Eastern Seaboard an existential threat. I think it fits the model of deterrence that I had in mind.

The spheres of influence in Europe are an interesting case. I mentioned that Cold War nuclear deterrence was credible where the existence of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact was concerned. As I understand it, Soviet Russia saw its Warsaw Pact satellites as a vital security buffer between its own borders and Western Europe (having been burned badly by Hitler's Germany in WWII). Therefore, even had the Soviets not built up a superior land army with which to defend their frontier, they would have regarded conventional defeat in the Warsaw Pact countries as an existential threat that they might plausibly go nuclear to prevent. The flip side was the NATO countries facing superior Soviet conventional arms in Europe. Aside from France and Britain developing their own nuclear arsenals to safeguard their sovereignty, America's existential concern about a Soviet Europe was that a Soviet Eurasia would command enough economic resources to dominate the rest of the world, and eventually the US. To make that concern more concrete, we stationed tactical nuclear weapons in Europe to counter the superior Soviet conventional forces. In many respects, the role of these weapons was to serve as a tripwire, establishing that conventional defeat in Europe was a grave enough existential threat to cross the nuclear threshold. (And, for that matter, the main significance of the missile defense installations we want to put in Eastern Europe is that any part of a nation's strategic nuclear capacity is regarded as a tripwire of the same magnitude.) Note that this type of tripwire doesn't work in reverse, and may not really work with missile defense. The Soviet Union blinked in the Cuban missile crisis because stationing missiles in Cuba was not vital to the survival of the USSR, but was an existential threat to the US. It could be argued that if the US is able to deter threats to its existence without missile defense, then the missile defense installations in Eastern Europe don't actually constitute credible tripwires, either. It comes down to a somewhat murky matter of interpretation and intention. However, where deterrence is concerned, there's an incentive to err on the side of caution, so there's often some protective value in strategic ambiguity.

The thing with the non-aligned nations of the Cold War is that both sides were worth playing off against each other. Today, Russia and China both have carrots to offer -- China more so, perhaps, than Russia -- but perhaps not quite the same breadth of tool set that Soviet Russia wielded.

[c1ue]

Re: Cold War Redux?

The thing with the non-aligned nations of the Cold War is that both sides were worth playing off against each other. Today, Russia and China both have carrots to offer -- China more so, perhaps, than Russia -- but perhaps not quite the same breadth of tool set that Soviet Russia wielded.

You're also missing that China and Russia were at best, uncomfortable cube mates for most of the Cold War.

Today the relationship is far more cordial with far more scope for active and willing cooperation - primarily due to economic and strategic interests aligning, where before the interests were solely strategic.

Also as I noted elsewhere, the Soviet Union was almost exclusively a continental Eurasia power. BRICS, on the other hand, is not limited to the interior of one continent no matter how large. BRIIICS in turn would be a very credible counterweight.

[Prazak]

Re: Cold War Redux?

Kind of ridiculous. They'd be shooting themselves in the foot economically at a time of great Iranian economic weakness, and the action would guarantee an air campaign directed at seriously degrading the Iranian government's forces (military, police, and intelligence units) and its nuclear program. The threat to close the Strait is not to be taken seriously, unless the US or Israel move first.

Interesting, though, that the USG is letting slip that it's sending a warning message to Iran not to do just that: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/wo...lines&emc=tha2 . Maybe the Pentagon isn't as secure in the general assumption that Iran is a rational actor. Or maybe this is just spin to turn up the heat.

Operationally, I doubt Iran's ability to carry through with such a threat for very long, either.

DOD seems to have gamed out that Iran very much has the ability to carry through with such a threat. From today's NYT piece: "In 2002, a classified, $250 million Defense Department war game concluded that small, agile speedboats swarming a naval convoy could inflict devastating damage on more powerful warships. In that game, the Blue Team navy, representing the United States, lost 16 major warships — an aircraft carrier, cruisers and amphibious vessels — when they were sunk to the bottom of the Persian Gulf in an attack that included swarming tactics by enemy speedboats.“The sheer numbers involved overloaded their ability, both mentally and electronically, to handle the attack,” Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper, a retired Marine Corps officer who served in the war game as commander of a Red Team force representing an unnamed Persian Gulf military, said in 2008, when the results of the war game were assessed again in light of Iranian naval actions at the time. “The whole thing was over in 5, maybe 10 minutes.”

[ASH]

Re: Cold War Redux?

Interesting, though, that the USG is letting slip that it's sending a warning message to Iran not to do just that: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/wo...lines&emc=tha2 . Maybe the Pentagon isn't as secure in the general assumption that Iran is a rational actor. Or maybe this is just spin to turn up the heat.

They've been very public about their 'red lines' recently. In addition to this supposed 'back channel' contact, they've trotted out Panetta to publicly deliver the same warning. My interpretation is that the US believes Iran is a rational actor, but that rational thinking is only as good as the information that it processes, so they are trying to very explicitly convey our thresholds for military action to Iran.

Some folks describe the Washington Post columnist David Ignatius as "the CIA's unofficial spokesperson"; having read a lot of his columns, I am left with the impression that he is at the very least a good window into the intentions and thoughts of the American security establishment, because he is certainly provided a lot of access. I suspect that his columns are actually used as a form of indirect communication with foreign powers. Anyway, Ignatius's most recent column is all about how US officials fear that the Iranians might do something screwy, because there isn't enough diplomatic contact between Iran and the US, and therefore the two sides might act on incorrect assumptions about either's intentions:

As the United States and Iran move closer toward open confrontation, it’s important that both take quiet steps to avoid the miscalculations and misunderstandings that can lead to an inadvertent military conflict.

It’s been done before: During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, President John F. Kennedy used a back channel to communicate U.S. resolve to the Soviets and also explore a formula for settlement. The key points of contact were his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and the Soviet ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. That exchange helped avoid nuclear war.

Today Washington and Tehran lack any similar means of communication in a crisis. Since the embassy takeover that followed the Iranian revolution of 1979, the two nations haven’t had diplomatic recognition. They communicate indirectly, through the Swiss embassy, which is inadequate.

So here’s a proposal in this period of deepening crisis: The United States and Iran should explore the possibility of direct contact through the sort of back channel that nations use to communicate urgent messages — namely, their intelligence services. Through this contact, each side could communicate its “red lines” in the crisis — for the United States, the insistence that Iran’s nuclear program remain peaceful; for Iran, presumably, an end to sanctions and a recognition that Iran is a significant regional power.

The question as to whether this is a statement of the US's "best offer", or merely the speculation of a well-connected columnist, intrigues me. No Iranian nukes to disrupt the regional balance of power, but economic relief and a sort of promise to respect Iranian sovereignty (i.e. taking 'regime change' off the table -- which is something we can't really make happen, anyway).

DOD seems to have gamed out that Iran very much has the ability to carry through with such a threat. From today's NYT piece: "In 2002, a classified, $250 million Defense Department war game concluded that small, agile speedboats swarming a naval convoy could inflict devastating damage on more powerful warships. In that game, the Blue Team navy, representing the United States, lost 16 major warships — an aircraft carrier, cruisers and amphibious vessels — when they were sunk to the bottom of the Persian Gulf in an attack that included swarming tactics by enemy speedboats.“The sheer numbers involved overloaded their ability, both mentally and electronically, to handle the attack,” Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper, a retired Marine Corps officer who served in the war game as commander of a Red Team force representing an unnamed Persian Gulf military, said in 2008, when the results of the war game were assessed again in light of Iranian naval actions at the time. “The whole thing was over in 5, maybe 10 minutes.”

I recall reading about this war game, and the result. My assumption is that since it has been so well publicized, and Navy planners have had 10 years to mull over the problem it presents, its significance today is low. They probably had to revise their plan for re-opening the Strait, to adjust for their vulnerability to the tactics that were gamed. That doesn't mean they've thought of everything, or that a debacle won't ensue if their plan is put to the test. But what I doubt is the ability of Iran to sustain closure of the Strait for very long, or that the US can be prevented from opening the Strait in the end.

[ASH]

Re: Cold War Redux?

You're also missing that China and Russia were at best, uncomfortable cube mates for most of the Cold War.

Today the relationship is far more cordial with far more scope for active and willing cooperation - primarily due to economic and strategic interests aligning, where before the interests were solely strategic.

Also as I noted elsewhere, the Soviet Union was almost exclusively a continental Eurasia power. BRICS, on the other hand, is not limited to the interior of one continent no matter how large. BRIIICS in turn would be a very credible counterweight.

Excellent points.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Cold War Redux?

I recall reading about this war game, and the result. My assumption is that since it has been so well publicized, and Navy planners have had 10 years to mull over the problem it presents, its significance today is low. They probably had to revise their plan for re-opening the Strait, to adjust for their vulnerability to the tactics that were gamed. That doesn't mean they've thought of everything, or that a debacle won't ensue if their plan is put to the test. But what I doubt is the ability of Iran to sustain closure of the Strait for very long, or that the US can be prevented from opening the Strait in the end.

Good to see you posting again ASH.

I'd agree....with nearly a decade to prepare, the US will be far better armed/equipped/prepared for asymmetric threats.

It's easy to find information about the weapon system load outs of US Navy vessels since the USS Cole incident, that TEWTs Ex, and the counter-piracy mission that has evolved since then....the threat from Iranian "boghammers" is over rated.

While the US Navy may possess far fewer combat vessels since the last time it had to reflag/escort tankers through the PG in the 80's, their level of capability has dramatically improved......while Iran's relative military capability has remained largely static.

However, the asymmetric threat IS real.......my opinion is that mines are a particular threat that deserves substantial focus.

They've been used in the PG before(80's Iran/Iraq War), all it takes is damaging one tanker to see oil prices spike overnight.

They're like maritime IEDs......while IED countermeasure technology and forensics have come a LONG way in the past decade....can the same be said of mine countermeasure technology?

A single mine or two of "questionable" origin causing some damage isn't necessarily a slippery slope to open conflict...where as an anti-ship missile striking a tanker in the Gulf with a missile track to Iran probably is.

I just don't think Iran would be silly enough to attempt to close the Straight.....if it did....then as previously mentioned, they are cutting their own economic throat.

Verbal threats to try and pump up the price of energy.

Possibly some deniable-ish kinetic incidents(maritime IEDs) to spark energy prices.

Possibly some deniable-ish efforts by Iran to undermine/sabotage Saudi/Qatari/Kuwait/Iraqi energy production or government in retaliation for the unconventional war that is being waged against Iran.

I would be quite surprised if open conflict is waged between the parties....my guess is more of the same or an escalation of more of the same....unconventional and economic warfare.

I also hope folks are taking into account MORE than just the US/Iran angle......and incorporate the considerable adversarial relationships and fear that exists between both sides of the Persian Gulf.

It's a weird, weird time and space......where it's more than just possible for Israel and Saudi Arabia to be quietly partnering where it's mutually beneficial to do so in countering Iran.

Just my 0.02c

[ASH]

Re: Cold War Redux?

The US and Israel are allied, but Israel doesn't get approval from the US for its security operations.

I just saw this amusing tidbit about our pals, the Israelis, as it relates to our conflict with Iran:

Buried deep in the archives of America's intelligence services are a series of memos, written during the last years of President George W. Bush's administration, that describe how Israeli Mossad officers recruited operatives belonging to the terrorist group Jundallah by passing themselves off as American agents. According to two U.S. intelligence officials, the Israelis, flush with American dollars and toting U.S. passports, posed as CIA officers in recruiting Jundallah operatives -- what is commonly referred to as a "false flag" operation.

The memos, as described by the sources, one of whom has read them and another who is intimately familiar with the case, investigated and debunked reports from 2007 and 2008 accusing the CIA, at the direction of the White House, of covertly supporting Jundallah -- a Pakistan-based Sunni extremist organization. Jundallah, according to the U.S. government and published reports, is responsible for assassinating Iranian government officials and killing Iranian women and children.

But while the memos show that the United States had barred even the most incidental contact with Jundallah, according to both intelligence officers, the same was not true for Israel's Mossad. The memos also detail CIA field reports saying that Israel's recruiting activities occurred under the nose of U.S. intelligence officers, most notably in London, the capital of one of Israel's ostensible allies, where Mossad officers posing as CIA operatives met with Jundallah officials.

The officials did not know whether the Israeli program to recruit and use Jundallah is ongoing. Nevertheless, they were stunned by the brazenness of the Mossad's efforts.

"It's amazing what the Israelis thought they could get away with," the intelligence officer said. "Their recruitment activities were nearly in the open. They apparently didn't give a damn what we thought."

...

The report then made its way to the White House, according to the currently serving U.S. intelligence officer. The officer said that Bush "went absolutely ballistic" when briefed on its contents.

[lakedaemonian]

Re: Cold War Redux?

You're also missing that China and Russia were at best, uncomfortable cube mates for most of the Cold War.

Today the relationship is far more cordial with far more scope for active and willing cooperation - primarily due to economic and strategic interests aligning, where before the interests were solely strategic.

Also as I noted elsewhere, the Soviet Union was almost exclusively a continental Eurasia power. BRICS, on the other hand, is not limited to the interior of one continent no matter how large. BRIIICS in turn would be a very credible counterweight.

One of those little known incidents in the Cold War:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino–So...order_conflict

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino–Soviet_split

I'd agree that relations between Russia and China today are far better than the trough of 1969, but I'd probably be pretty nervous if I was Russian.

Russia's demographics and conventional military capabilities are going the wrong way(down), while China's desire to feed the economic machine and it's conventional military capability are on the increase.

I don't for a second envisage a conflict between Russia/China......but I could see Russia's Far East at very long term risk of Chinese assimilation.

An old professor of mine has spent a good amount of time on and off through the Russian Far East......and has commented about what he perceives to be a drop in ethnic Russian population and a very noticeable increase in ethnic Chinese.

Probably means little or nothing in the short-term....but if those trends continue for a few generations?

Trillions of dollars in resources locked in there.....with a fast shrinking local population of just a few million.

[ASH]

Re: Cold War Redux?

Good to see you posting again ASH.

Thanks, Lakedaemonian. By the way... I only just caught the historical reference in your handle. Shows how weak my ancient history is.

However, the asymmetric threat IS real.......my opinion is that mines are a particular threat that deserves substantial focus.

They've been used in the PG before(80's Iran/Iraq War), all it takes is damaging one tanker to see oil prices spike overnight.

They're like maritime IEDs......while IED countermeasure technology and forensics have come a LONG way in the past decade....can the same be said of mine countermeasure technology?

A single mine or two of "questionable" origin causing some damage isn't necessarily a slippery slope to open conflict...where as an anti-ship missile striking a tanker in the Gulf with a missile track to Iran probably is.

I just don't think Iran would be silly enough to attempt to close the Straight.....if it did....then as previously mentioned, they are cutting their own economic throat.

Verbal threats to try and pump up the price of energy.

Possibly some deniable-ish kinetic incidents(maritime IEDs) to spark energy prices.

Possibly some deniable-ish efforts by Iran to undermine/sabotage Saudi/Qatari/Kuwait/Iraqi energy production or government in retaliation for the unconventional war that is being waged against Iran.

I would be quite surprised if open conflict is waged between the parties....my guess is more of the same or an escalation of more of the same....unconventional and economic warfare.

That seems a very realistic analysis to me -- especially your point that Iran doesn't have to literally close the Strait to "close the Strait" as it were.