The Giant Spin Machine empties in the Memory Hole

[don]

Dearth of Candor From Japan’s Leadership

TOKYO — With all the euphemistic language on display from officials handling Japan’s nuclear crisis, one commodity has been in short supply: information.

When an explosion shook one of many stricken reactors at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant on Saturday, power company officials initially offered a typically opaque, and understated, explanation.

“A big sound and white smoke” were recorded near Reactor No. 1, the plant’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power, announced in a curt memo. The matter “was under investigation,” it added.

The less-than-straight talk is rooted in a conflict-averse culture that avoids direct references to unpleasantness. Until recently, it was standard practice not to tell cancer patients about their diagnoses, ostensibly to protect them from distress. Even Emperor Hirohito, when he spoke to his subjects for the first time to mark Japan’s surrender in World War II, spoke circumspectly, asking Japanese to “endure the unendurable.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/17/wo...culture&st=cse


Following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, information was conveyed in two ways.

First, the incredible destructive power of a single bomb was widely disseminated. Many historians feel this was the primary goal of the action, to set the stage for the post-world Pax Americana.

Secondly, the post-bombing effects of radiation exposure were denied. It was apparently decided that the weapon need be of enormous immediate value, without any lingering effects.

It remains unclear what American cultural peculiarities led to this decision. Possibly the Hatfields and the McCoys.

[c1ue]

Re: The Giant Spin Machine empties in the Memory Hole

There you go, quoting the NY times again without checking.

Here's some data from the joint US/Japanese foundation tasked specifically with studying the effects of radiation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki:

http://www.rerf.jp/library/scidata/l..._e/rr11-95.htm

Summary
This continues the series of periodic general reports on cancer mortality in the cohort of A-bomb survivors followed by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation. The follow-up is extended by the 5 years 1986-1990, and analysis includes an additional 10,500 survivors with recently estimated radiation doses. Together these extensions add about 550,000 person-years of follow-up. The cohort analyzed consists of 86,572 subjects, of which about 60% have dose estimates of at least 0.005 Sv. During 1950-1990 there have been 3086 and 4741 cancer deaths for the less than and greater than 0.005 Sv groups, respectively. It is estimated that among these there have been approximately 420 excess cancer deaths during 1950-1990, of which about 85 were due to leukemia. For cancers other than leukemia (solid cancers), about 25% of the excess deaths in 1950-1990 occurred during the last 5 years; for those exposed as children this figure is nearly 50%. For leukemia only about 3% of the excess deaths in 1950-1990 occurred in the last 5 years. Whereas most of the excess for leukemia occurred in the first 15 years after exposure, for solid cancers the pattern of excess risk is apparently more like a life-long elevation of the natural age-specific cancer risk. Taking advantage of the lengthening follow-up, increased attention is given to clarifying temporal patterns of the excess cancer risk. Emphasis is placed on describing these patterns in terms of absolute excess risk, as well as relative risk. For example: (a) although it is becoming clearer that the excess relative risk for those exposed as children has declined over the follow-up, the excess absolute risk has increased rapidly with time; and (b) although the excess relative risk at a given age depends substantially on sex and age at exposure, the age-specific excess absolute risk depends little on these factors. The primary estimates of excess risk are now given as specific to sex and age at exposure, and these include projections of dose-specific lifetime risks for this cohort. The excess lifetime risk per sievert for solid cancers for those exposed at age 30 is estimated at 0.10 and 0.14 for males and females, respectively. Those exposed at age 50 have about one-third these risks. Projection of lifetime risks for those exposed at age 10 is more uncertain. Under a reasonable set of assumptions, estimates for this group range from about 1.0-1.8 times the estimates for those exposed at age 30. The excess lifetime risk for leukemia at 1 Sv for those exposed at either 10 or 30 years is estimated as about 0.015 and 0.008 for males and females, respectively. Those exposed at age 50 have about two-thirds that risk. Excess risks for solid cancer appear quite linear up to about 3 Sv, but for leukemia apparent nonlinearity in dose results in risks at 0.1 Sv estimated at about 1/20 of those for 1.0 Sv. Site-specific risk estimates are given, but it is urged that great care be taken in interpreting these, because most of their variation can be explained simply by imprecision in the estimates.

There's a giant spin machine all right.

[don]

Re: The Giant Spin Machine empties in the Memory Hole

The quoted NY Times piece is the spin that Japanese cultural is uniquely construed to be less than candid about a nuclear plant problem.

The US denial of radiation poisoning and any followup health issues was the official position in the immediate aftermath of the bombings and surrender.

At a time when the true effects were still largely unknown.

That was the point.

[flintlock]

Re: The Giant Spin Machine empties in the Memory Hole

Yes, it was my understanding that we really didn't know the total effects of the radiation produced right after the bombs were dropped. And yes, they also wanted the Russians to think we had lots of these bombs, despite having used the only three we had at the time.

Personally I don't believe that at the time, any real "Pax Americana" was cynically planned out like we know it today. The threat of the Soviet Union was very real and troublesome back then. Stalin wasn't exactly known for playing nice during the famous Allied wartime meetings and he was basically very hostile in his attitude towards his "allies". He wasn't trusted, and for good reasons. Letting them know we had the bomb was certainly intended to intimidate the Russians, but Stalin put on a colossal bluff and showed no reaction at all to the news. Which probably only fueled the American paranoia.