Housing
Bubble
Correction Update Geographic
Regions Cascade
Weekly
Commentary - March 29,
2006
We’ve
written three
articles on the housing bubble since 2002. In Yes.
It’s a Housing
Bubble in August 2002, we made the case that the U.S. housing
market
was comprised of a number of regional real estate market bubbles. At
the time, there was still controversy on the topic of whether or not a
bubble existed. Now that many housing bubble markets around
the
country are in decline and are getting covered on NPR and the front
page of the business section of your local newspaper, only the most
dedicated mortgage or real estate broker still claims that no bubbles
existed.
The Fed took the strictly accurate but misleading position at the time
that no national housing bubble existed. True, real estate
bubbles occur within regions – areas of concentration of jobs
or
especially desirable areas where land is scarce, such as water-front
property -- not across the nation as a whole. Housing bubbles
happen wherever there are good paying jobs and monthly mortgage
payments are declining,
not
just low. With mortgage rates at 40 year lows, housing
bubbles
were
happening
in nearly every populated area of the nation that had not experienced
unusual sudden job losses, as occurred for example in manufacturing
industry regions of
Ohio.
Housing bubbles may not be “national” but that
doesn’t make them any
less dangerous for the national economy. Contrary to the
Fed’s
predictions, we expected that the decline of these regional real estate
bubbles was going to put a significant hurt on the U.S. economy,
especially at the point many regional bubbles decline
simultaneously.
We argued that a housing bubble creates its own fuel: employment within
the housing industry itself. Many high tech workers
left
unemployed by the collapse of the technology stock bubble, for example,
moved into the real estate or financial services industries.
In
fact, 43%
of all private sector jobs created since 2001 were related to
real estate.
In an update Housing
Bubbles are not like Stock Bubbles in 2004, we
explained that when a regional real estate bubble ends, it does not
“pop” the way stock market bubble does, with a
sudden collapse in
prices. Instead, the region experiences a collapse in real
estate
transactions. The reason is that stock markets are very
liquid. When investors head for the exits, transaction
volumes
rise and prices can fall rapidly. Bubbles in housing markets,
on
the other hand, become illiquid when they correct. For a town
or
other region that experienced significant real estate price inflation,
long periods can pass when there are no transactions at
all. The more time that elapses between transactions, the
more uncertainty buyers feel about the “market”
price for comparable
properties.
Certainty about price gains is replaced by uncertainty. This
motivates further delays in buying decisions. Market
psychology
shifts to the classic deflationary “I’ll wait to
buy because the price
is likely to fall” decision process, the reverse of the
inflation cycle psychology of “I’d better buy it
now before the price
gets further out of reach.” Deflationary psychology
is especially
self-reinforcing in declining property markets because a home usually
represents the largest purchase a household will make and involves the
greatest leverage as well. The stakes are high.
Our last piece on the housing bubble Housing
Bubble Correction January 2005,
we projected the trajectory of a price decline in U.S. real estate
markets. Using historical rates of home equity extraction as
a
yardstick, we projected a ten to 15 year reversion to the mean for
housing prices, using the rate of equity extraction as our guide.
Housing Bubble
Correction predicts that in housing markets where bubbles
occurred,
prices will go through seven stages of decline, Stage A through StageG as shown
above, over a ten to fifteen year period. So far, anecdotal
evidence indicates that this prediction may have been optimistic with
respect to the
rate of change, and we will not know for many years if our estimate of
the duration of the correction is accurate. Today, certain
markets are at the latter part of Stage
A of bubble growth while others
are at Stage B
of decline and
yet others are at Stage C
or
further.
Here
we offer a theory that explains the variations in regional housing
bubble declines and how they are likely to unfold geographically over
the projected ten to fifteen year period. This applies the
housing bubbles centered in metropolitan areas versus resort
areas. Bubble pricing in the latter is largely driven by
money
generated by participants in the U.S. Speculative Financial System (see
The
Big Bet) and will decline in line with the decline of The
System,
of which, adding to the complexity of an analysis, real estate is
itself a part. Here we will focus on housing bubble markets
tied
to metropolitan areas.
During
the early growth stage of various regional housing bubbles, housing
prices increased first in metropolitan areas, then in the suburbs and
finally in rural areas. (These are admittedly crude
geographic
designations designed to simplify the explanation of the theory without
invalidating it.) Prices cascaded geographically outwards
from areas of high employment (income) and population density (housing
demand) in metro areas to areas of lower employment and population
density in the suburbs surrounding metro areas and finally, once demand
pushed housing affordability to extremes there, to areas of low
employment and low population density beyond the suburbs.
This
process of geographic price cascading took approximately ten years,
from around 1995 to 2005.
The
dynamic that drove prices outward was the need for workers in the
cities and later the suburbs to escape high real estate prices, to move
to where real estate was relatively cheaper and the cost of living
lower, but still within an “affordable”
commute. As
homebuyers traveled farther from metro areas, they encountered lower
real estate prices. At the extreme top of the market in late
2004
and early 2005,
some home owners who bought property in the mid 1990s in market
bubble areas before a housing bubble reached their region, sold
their property at a huge profit, purchased equivalent property in size
and quality in a rural area, and retired on the profit with perhaps a
low wage retirement job. For example, home owners from Boston
and
nearby suburban towns, as well as from new York and Connecticut,
sold their homes and purchased homes in Amherst and surrounding towns,
90
minutes from Boston and have retired using the profit on the
transaction. However, most rural homebuyers who purchased
at the top of the rural market in mid 2005 did so to have a chance to
buy an
affordable home. Of course, as more and more homebuyers
searched
farther away from metropolitan areas, prices increased in outlying
areas as well until property values in rural areas reached historical
peaks and experienced bubbles of their own.
Living
in rural areas and working either in the suburbs or metropolitan areas
increased commute time and expense, but this was affordable with
gasoline under $1.50 per gallon as it was before hurricane
Katrina. But
combined increases in gasoline, heating oil, natural gas and propane
prices plus higher
interest payment on ARMs combined in mid 2005 to pushed many household
budgets
past the tipping point for those living in homes purchased in rural
areas at or near the top of rural market housing bubbles.
Housing
bubbles are driven
by the same psychological factors that drive all late stage asset
bubbles, the popular assumption that prices only rise. A
steady
drumbeat of negative press today, as evidence mounts that the boom is
over, reinforces the negative price expectations, but
nothing gets the fear juices flowing like watching home prices collapse
in a neighboring town, or watching one’s neighbor
lose his or her
home.
This
change in psychology will start to cause housing bubbles around
suburban then metro areas to
decline in a reversal of the process that drove prices from
metropolitan markets outward to suburban and rural
markets.
The trigger, it should be remembered, was rising gasoline and energy
prices and their impact on rural homeowners who purchased at the top of
the market.
After a
year or so,
broad regions covering metropolitan areas out to rural areas that
experienced real estate bubbles will experience simultaneous price
declines. The extent of price decline in any area will depend
on
several factors, but most importantly the diversity of the local
economy. A local economy that is dependent on one or two
industries, and especially one or two employers, is vulnerable to
significant housing price declines. An unusual
characteristic of this housing boom is the extent to which it was
self-reinforcing by producing jobs that in turn drove up
prices.
Declining demand for housing
related employment will further add to the self-reinforcing housing
price deflation dynamic.
On the top of our list are areas at risk are those that depend heavily
on employment from:
Housing
Related
Industries (e.g., construction, realty services, landscaping, building
supplies, etc.)
Financial
Services
(e.g., mortgage
lending)
Venture
Backed High
Technology
Venture
Backed
Biotechnology
Our best
estimate is
that eventual price stabilization will be transmitted from the outside
in, just
as price declines were. This does not mean that prices will
stabilize at the same levels relative to their peak prices in all
areas,
however. Prices will tend to fall dramatically from their
peaks
in rural areas, less so in suburban areas, and even less so in
metropolitan areas, largely as a result of the relative lack of
employment opportunities in rural versus metro areas and relatively
high commuting and energy costs.
Over time, prices will, or course, stabilize and recover to their mean
rate of growth, at more or less the same rate as the rate of inflation.