Average annual gold prices and CPI inflation. Gold went up from $35 to $161 in 1975, a first year after becoming de-monetized. Then gold didn't do much until 1979 when CPI inflation averaged 7.5% and peaked in 1980 when inflation averaged 18%. The gold bubble was short lived, lasting about two years.
In the current instance of inflation, the rise in the gold price has been relatively steady.
No one knows for sure, of course, but my best guess is that if the financial system goes haywire in a disorderly transition off the dollar standard, gold may spike to $2,500 to $3,000 during the event. If the process is more gradual and orderly, the rise will be more along the lines that we have seen over the past five years, and gold may peak at somewhere between $1,500 and $2,000.
The two periods, though, are entirely different. The 1980s gold bubble was the result of floating exchange rate teething pains combined with exceptionally–as distinguished from normally–corrupt US monetary policy. Since then, cooperation among global central banks has been strong, but will weaken in the next crisis.
Quoting again from "Money: Whence it came, where it went" by John Kenneth Galbraith (1975), Chapter 20: Where it Went, Applying policy to where it is needed (Page 313):
"Not much in the history of money supports a linear view of history, one in which the knowledge and experience from one epoch provide the intelligence for improved management in the next. Of those who give guidance on these matters history says even less. Out of the 2500 years of experience and 200 years of ardent study have come monetary systems that are as unsatisfactory as any in the peacetime past. In recent times conservatives have reacted adversely to inflation, though not with great enthusiasm to the measures for preventing it. Liberals have thought unemployment the greater affliction. In fact no economy can be successful which has either. Inflation causes discomfort and frustration for many. Unemployment causes acute suffering for a lesser number. There is no certain way of knowing which causes the most in the aggregate of pain. It was the prime lesson of the thirties that defaltion and depression destroyed international order, caused each nation to try for its own salvation, indifferent to the damage that its efforts caused to neighbours. It has equally been the lesson of the late sixties and early seventies that inflation too destroys international order. Those who express or imply a preference between inflation and depression are making a fool's choice. Policy must always be against whichever one has."
The new US Congress is a vote by the majority that aggregate pain is high, and for relief. The pain is in the poor distribution of wealth and income gains, and redistibution is the implicit mandate. Only in office a week and you can already hear the Lou Dobbsian drum beat of protectionism, the anti-China "too much savings" and "yuan too strong" pedanticism.
Ka-Poom is mostly a political bet that the lessons of monetary history have once again been collectively forgotten by US politicians, that "...the prime lesson of the thirties that defaltion and depression destroyed international order, caused each nation to try for its own salvation, indifferent to the damage that its efforts caused to neighbours" and the lesson that "inflation too destroys international order" need to be re-learned. As a net debtor, the US can no longer act unilaterally in monetary affairs, but for its own internal political reasons–to blunt the pain of unemployment–will try nonetheless.
Bookmarks