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Institutional Risk Analyst on HP & BB

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  • Institutional Risk Analyst on HP & BB

    Very interesting comments from Institutional Risk Analyst:

    We salute Senator Dick Shelby and the House Republicans for digging in their heels and saying no to the ridiculous proposal from Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson. The Paulson Plan, which was vigorously supported by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, never had a chance to work because it starts from a false premise, namely that by allowing banks to swap illiquid assets for Treasury bonds, banks will sell or finance this collateral to make room for new loans.


    Just look at the accomplishments of the team of Paulson and Bernanke ("P&B"), the latter of whom has been the craven lap dog of the former GS CEO from day one. The Bear, Stearns fiasco was bad enough, but failing to find a smooth transition to the troubles at Lehman Brothers makes a complete mockery of Paulson's claims to be trying to restore liquidity to the US financial system. Indeed, with friends like Paulson, Bernanke and Barney "Napoleon" Frank (D-MA), why should the American people be afraid of Al-Qaida?
    You see, when P&B let Lehman be forced into a bankruptcy filing last week, more was lost than just thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in losses to shareholders and creditors. These losses are, at the end of the day, attributable to SEC Chairman Christopher Cox and the happy squirrels at the FASB. As our friend Brian Wesbury from FT Advisors in Chicago wrote:
    "It seems clear that much of the current crisis has been exacerbated by mark-to-market accounting, which has created massive, and unnecessary, losses for financial firms. These losses, caused because the current price of many illiquid securities are well below the true hold-to-maturity value, could have been avoided. The current crisis is actually smaller than the 1980s and 1990s bank and savings and loan crisis, but is being made dramatically worse by the current accounting rules." Amen brother Wesbury.
    When Lehman failed, what was left of the CP market, mostly paper issued by prime borrowers, got flushed down the dumper as well. We hear from the channel that once Lehman filed, nearly every prime CP issuer in the US hit their standby lines of credit with various commercial banks. So much for recapitalizing the banking system. We expect that when the Q3 data from the FDIC is released, it will show a precipitous drop in unused credit lines at some of the major domestic and foreign banks domiciled in the US. You think P&B understand this? Dream on.
    But there is more. We also hear from some very well-placed sources on Capitol Hill that when the Fed's Board of Governors was presented with an $80 billion price tag for supporting Lehman the day before the bankruptcy filing, there were not five votes at the big Fed table to support the loan. When the Board does not take action, there is no record of the meeting, no transcript, no tape. Several member of the House familiar with the details reportedly will be calling for a forensic investigation of the Fed's internal records, phone and email regarding this non-decision by the central bank. But they key fact is that Ben Bernake could not make the other governors take necessary action to forestall the uncontrolled collapse of Lehman. Recalling the "leadership" role played by every Fed chairman since Arthur Burns, what use is a Fed chairman who can't get five votes when absolutely required?
    As a result, it is further suggested, when JPMorgan Chase (NYSE:JPM) presented an ultimatum to Lehman management that weekend, the only choice was bankruptcy. We hear that JPM told Lehman that if they did not file, then JPM was going to put them out of business by closing down their clearing account. To get a sense for the conversation which reportedly occurred between JPM and the doomed broker dealer, recall the scene from the film The Godfather when Robert Duval gives an imprisoned capo under federal protection the option of picking the manner of his own death. Unfortunately and unlike the movie, as JPM eliminated a major investment banking competitor by compelling the suicide of a long-time clearing customer, no surety was provided for the members of the Lehman family.
    The tragedy of the failure of Lehman is that by failing to obtain Fed support for an expenditure of $80 billion needed to manage an orderly sale or bank holding company conversion of the still-solvent broker dealer, P&B have created the very crisis of confidence that they now seek to solve via a $700 billion bailout of truly insolvent financial institutions. If this very public act of grotesque incompetence is not sufficient reason for President Bush immediately to demand the resignation of both Hank Paulson and Ben Bernanke, then what actions would be sufficient? How much more damage must P&B commit before President Bush and the republicans in Congress demand their heads?



    From: http://us1.institutionalriskanalytic...ry.asp?tag=311




  • #2
    Re: Institutional Risk Analyst on HP & BB

    Oddlots,

    You should spend time to watch the entire hearing, and also see some of Elaine Supkis' commentaries on the prehearing, and hearing -- it is folksy, but well worth reading.

    You can access the video below

    ECONOMY IN CRISIS: Fed Chief Bernanke Full Congressional Hearing

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: Institutional Risk Analyst on HP & BB

      Hey Rajiv,

      Thanks for the link to both Supkis and the hearings. Find Supkis's take interesting but a bit opaque (maybe advanced?) but I share some of her bias.

      But just thinking out loud, I feel like I'm getting some traction on what's gone so badly wrong in the more recent actions of the CBs and in a less politically over-determined way than is normal for me care of the IRA and some interesting posts at Yves Smith's Naked Capitalism. (In a way this is simply a way of fleshing out the incompetence argument from the brilliant Wile E Coyote video above, but a lot less fun than watching same.)

      For example, I thought this was a convincing take (from a Naked Capitalism thread.)

      "Yves sez [re. the spike in interbank lending rates]: "Banks have quit lending to each other because they know they can go to their friendly monetary authority instead." Tacticly, the emergency auction facilities were a good idea and a success, but their deployment was strategically stupid and has backed the credit system into a corner risking catastrophe. The point of those auctions was to effect _a temporary stabilizing action_ while concurrently seizing and taking out insolvent firms. Which latter actions is exactly what Hank and Ben DID NOT have the balls or brains to effect. Hence the result is exactly what Yves says: rather than accept a quanta of risk or more to the point rather stiff short rates against crap assets no one wants the Big Boys can sally on down to the Fed and get cheap quality for mid-term against spoilt trash in a program without an expiration date. In short, a significant part of the present credit spike is _self-induced_ courtesy of Hank and Ben because they signed the chit without getting control of the outcome. _This_ will be the central criticism of their actions prior to Sep 08.

      We need, more than anything, to get the insolvent banks out of the credit pool. WaMu's boo-hoo is only a year overdue. And it takes all the capital they raised over that term down the drain with them. Let's get ON with this."

      London Banker's comments at Brad Setser's blog:

      "I’ve been speculating all week that the pressure being used on the Congress to pass the Paulson Plan is the threat of Fed illiquidity. As of two weeks ago, the Fed had lent out more than $600 billion of its $800 billion balance sheet Treasuries against crap MBS collateral. The Paulson Plan would have allowed the banks to unwind the repos putting the Treasuries back in the Fed, get cash for the crap MBS, and get more Treasuries from the issues financing the $700+ billion funding of the Plan. As a bonus, the Paulson mark-to-maturity price becomes the implicit Level 3 price for capitalisation of all the firms and banks in the system, giving them some breathing room to stay in business. Everyone wins except the poor American taxpayer.
      The Fed is very close to being illiquid. That is the fear factor we are seeing at work, and the reason no one will discuss why the bailout is needed - only emphasise the urgency."

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