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  • The Controversial Person by GM Fletcher

    http://www.wattpad.com/219396-the-co...by-gm-fletcher



    The Controversial Person by GM Fletcher

    1


    Contents p.1
    Introduction p.2
    Part 1: What is this thing we call a person p.4
    Introduction...................................... .................................. p.5
    Etymology and History of the word "person".................. p.5
    Modern usage of the word "person"................................. p.11
    Political correctness, Language and the 'person'............ p.14
    Conclusion of Part 1................................................. ........... p.18
    Part 2: Law and the "person" p.19
    Introduction...................................... ................................ p.20
    The language of law............................................... ........... p.20
    The legal definition of 'person'....................................... p.22
    Jurisprudence and the 'person'....................................... p.23
    Rights, Duties and the 'person'....................................... p.23
    Natural persons vs. Legal persons.................................. p.26
    Corporations as Legal Persons........................................ p.27
    The Rights of a 'Person'.......................................... .......... p.29
    A 'person' in the history of law........................................ p.31
    Is a Person a Human Being in Law?................................ p.33
    Part 3: The Laws of Britain p.36
    Introduction...................................... ................................ p.37
    The two divisions of English law..................................... p.37
    Common law..................................... p.37
    Statute law..................................... p.39
    Statutory Definition of the "Person"............................... p.40
    The Interpretation Act 1978............................................. p.41
    Statutory Construction and Interpretation................... p.48
    Statutory Interpretation and The Interpretation Act... p.51

    Conclusion: Is a Human Being a Person? P.55
    Bibliography
    Appendixes A,B,C

    2

    Introduction


    We are now living in a rapidly changing world, which seems to be moving at
    an exponential rate. An ineffable amount of changes just within the past 150
    years have created a different world now to one that was known before. Some
    changes have been beneficial, some catastrophic and some things haven't
    changed at all. This is the way the world works. Yet it is seen more and more by
    an ever increasing mass of people that something just isn't quite right. Some of
    these changes are so blatant that none could miss it, even if their eyes were
    closed. On the other hand some changes are so subtle that they pass before our
    eyes unnoticed like the air we breathe. It is about one of these subtle changes on
    which this piece of work is going to focus.
    What is that subtle change that affects our lives so deeply yet we are
    unaware of it? The answer lies in a word.
    What we are presented with before us is but one simple word. That's
    right; one word. A word so common, so ubiquitous that one would be surprised
    at the mischief, confusion and debate it has caused. It is a word that has evolved,
    over thousands of years, corrupted from its original form, undergoing a
    transformation that would be analogous to a single seed becoming a mighty
    forest. Unlike many parts of our language which wither away and are forgotten
    in antiquity, or others that enter and leave our language in but a single
    generation, this slippery little word continues with us like a chameleon adapting
    itself to a hostile environment.
    So what is this pernicious little word that has created such
    pandemonium? Laughingly it is but the ridiculously commonplace word
    "person." That's it!
    One may even ask the question, "why would a paper need to be written on
    such a seemingly banal and insipid part of our language?" It must be one of the
    most commonly used words in the English language and at the same time the
    most misunderstood. Yet it is because it is a part of our language, a part which
    affects everyone in the English speaking world, that it is our duty that it must be
    questioned, analysed and understood.
    A resurfacing of the nature of this word is now being contested in many
    areas, none more so than in the area of law, and if there is one area of life that
    touches the lives of everyone to a greater or lesser extent, it is that of the Law.
    Innocent people are convicted wrongly on the use of this word. It restricts our
    lives covertly in so many ways, and yet we are ignorant of this. Certain people in 3

    power abuse this ignorance of the word's meaning and use it to their advantage
    causing hardship and distress to the common man or woman.
    So does it not behove us to look more closely at this problematic little
    part of our everyday speech. Can we now dare to put an end to this
    bewilderment that affects all men and women alike? Can clarity be achieved?
    Because what it comes down to is one simple question "Is a human being a
    person"
    It is the aim of this work to provide clarification on this word; to elucidate
    its encroachment into some of the more important spheres of our lives and what
    the upshot of this is to us, the people. This will be achieved by firstly looking
    into the common definition, combined with the etymology and usage of the
    word "person." Then we will look at how this word is used in the area of law,
    delving into the world of "legal persons," and the idea of a "legal personality." In
    the final part we will look more closely into the laws of this country and the
    interpretation of our contentious little friend or foe, for it has yet to be decided
    whether it is an ally or the enemy, or neither or both.
    A little disclaimer must be added here. To avoid confusion I will be using
    the word man to avoid the commonly used word "person." There are no sexist
    connotations to this, as when I write man, I mean man, woman, child, boy, girl
    and human being. Do not be offended by the usage of the word man it is simply
    a tool to avoid any misunderstanding and absurdity in this work. Furthermore
    nothing in this work represents legal advice, it is solely a piece of research on a
    word which touches on topics in law.









    4











    Part 1


    What is this thing we call a "person"










    5

    Introduction

    The simplest way to begin this enquiry is to state the obvious. What is the
    obvious? Simply put, we use the word person to refer to a Human Being. If we
    look to any Standard English dictionary we see the primary definition of person,
    i.e. the first in the list of definitions, as a human being; nothing contentious in
    this. This is what the common man believes and is told, taught, shown and
    indoctrinated into believing, as a child, what a person is. Yet this is from where
    the confusion or obfuscations, whatever you want to call it, arises. From this
    perturbation a lot of misunderstanding and injustice is born. A quote from
    James Mitchell sums up the situation quite succinctly:
    "And what is this person or persona of which we hear so much? Most people are
    now inclined to adopt the view of Max Müller. Nothing can be more abstract: it is
    neither male nor female, neither young nor old. As a noun it is hardly more than
    what to be is as a verb. In French it may even come to mean nobody ; for if we ask
    our concierge at Paris if anyone has called on us during our absence he will reply
    "Personne, monsieur!" which means "Not a soul, sir !"
    1



    Etymology and History of the word "person"

    So, now I think it is incumbent on us to look to the origins of the word before
    we begin to elaborate on the other various definitions of the word "person." To
    do this we will look in to the etymological history of the word and its evolution.
    Basically, etymology will give us an account of the conception of a word and its
    original use, as sometimes old words were just compounded to form a new word.
    This will become more apparent as we journey further back in time, and of
    course with word time travelling we must also take the epochs into account how
    the word was used.
    First we must recognise that the words person and persona in today's usage are
    intimately related of a sort, for they arise from the same mother, and are
    brothers of a kind. It is documented that these words person/persona have their
    origin in Latin, which in turn is borrowed from the Greek equivalent.

    1
    Significant Etymology by James Mitchell (1908), footnote, William Blackwood and Sons. P.237‐239
    6

    Of course, all this began within the world of theatre in Greece where "religion
    was the cradle of Drama."
    2
    The Greek triad of their history, religion and culture
    was represented in the theatre with the actors representing the various roles.
    However to do this disguises were needed and so became an integral part of the
    relevant depictions were, and as Hastings (1901) says:
    "...the most important part of the disguise was the mask, by means of which the
    actor's countenance could be distinguished at a distance, and which made it
    possible for the same person to play different parts by making repeated changes.'
    This device was particularly apt for men who had to play the part of women."
    3

    Thus the mask was a vital feature needed for the representation of the
    appropriate character. But what importance does this have to our inquiry? Well
    it is the Greek word for mask that is important. The word used for mask was
    prosopon. This simply is translated as 'what is before the face', pros meaning
    before and opon meaning face.
    Now as time passed the Romans slowly adopted the theatre into their own
    culture, translating many Greek works into Latin. Yet there were differences, for
    example, the Romans did not wear masks at the genesis of their theatre, but,
    after time the wearing of masks was adopted. That which was not adopted was
    the Greek word for mask. Instead the Romans named their mask 'persona',
    which is the combination of two words, the first being 'per' meaning 'through or
    by means of'; and 'sono,' which meant to sound. Thus the word personare
    literally meant through‐sounders
    4
    . The reason behind this definition was that
    because these masks, both in Greece and Italy, used some apparatus which lay
    behind the mask, which helped channel and augment the volume of the actor's
    voice, which was entirely necessary in an open amphitheatre.
    Thus the word persona was born. Later it was to become the mother to various
    children. Yet, as a noun, a persona was simply a physical mask made from thin
    wood or clay, made into various countenances, nothing more, and nothing less.
    If it had stayed that way then this work would not be necessary, nevertheless it
    has changed and evolved into more than what it used to be.
    So now we have the origin of the word and with a little history to back it up,
    yet we must see why it came into use in England. For it was the roman
    occupation which, began in 55 B.C., that planted the seed for Latin to move into

    2
    The theatre, its development in France and England, and a history of its Greek and Latin origins by Charles Hastings (1901)
    Duckworth & Co. P. 1
    3
    Ibid,.16
    4
    Significant Etymology by James Mitchell, 1908, footnote, William Blackwood and Sons. P.237‐239
    7

    the language of Britain. However the Romans were not to stay forever in the
    land of Britain, but as H.M. Scarth has said in his work Roman Britain.
    "The most enduring record of Roman times, and the change wrought by Roman
    conquest throughout the civilised world, is the adoption of the Roman letters
    of the alphabet, which have been used ever since."
    5


    It was language that was the legacy of the Roman Empire, and as well as a few
    ruins and roads, but one significant part of the legacy lies in this simple word
    person. Naturally with the Norman Conquest and the introduction of French
    into England we have a reinforcement of another Latin based language adding to
    the richness and complexities of the English language itself, a language that was
    in the process of evolving. But as we see in our quote from James Mitchell above
    the word personne in French is translated as nobody into English.
    Now we have two words in our language today person and persona. It is clear
    these two words are related and from where the relationship stems. Yet it is the
    word persona that hasn't strayed far from its original form, but it does give us a
    clue as to why person has changed so much. Persona as we define it today simply
    means a role or character we assume in certain situations. For example, a boss
    must adopt a persona when he works, which can be completely different from his
    personality at home. In such situations people adopt these personas to help
    them accomplish something, or protect themselves from something. A persona
    is something we put on and take off when necessary, as was the case with the
    masks in Ancient Greece and Rome.
    So we can see a simple shift in the meaning of persona, originally as mask, to
    its current meaning of a role or character; a shift is so subtle most people in
    society are totally oblivious to it. This is also so shown by the phrase dramatis
    personae and Persona non grata, which are still used today. Is it not easy to see
    how this could happen? Yet when we turn to person we have a more difficult
    time of tracking its changes through the ages. It is now that we turn to the
    works of the etymologists to provide clarity. Etymology, as mentioned above, is
    simply the study of historical linguistic change, and from their hard work we can
    begin to look more into the history of the person.
    First we must diverge somewhat from our theme and look into various themes
    of etymology that will provide us with some clarification. Greenough and
    Kittridge in their work 'Words and their ways in English speech'
    6
    give us some

    5
    Roman Britain by H.M. Scarth, p. 178
    6
    Words and their ways in English speech by Greenough and Kittridge, (1902), Macmillan and Co.

    8

    clues on how words change in relation to their original meaning, yet keep their
    connection to the original source of meaning. One of the concepts they use is
    called radiation, which means at the core is the original meaning of the word and
    its subsequent words are off‐shoots, like rays from the sun. They are all
    connected to the source yet they are not the source. A good example of this that
    Greenough and Kittridge give of this is the word power. The word originally
    comes from the Latin 'potere', which means 'to be able', and of course in modern
    Italian the same word is still used. From this the old French word pouer (the
    modern French is pouvoir) from which our word power comes, probably from
    when Old French became an important language in the British Isles. One can
    look to other Latin based languages and see the similarities, for example in
    Spanish 'poder' is the equivalent of the English 'to be able' or 'can' in its verb
    form but as a noun it means power. So for example the Spanish sentence "poder
    tener el poder" literally means 'to be able to have the power.' Now all derivations
    of the word power all come from the source meaning, which is to be able to do
    something or have the capacity to do something. This is how radiation of a word
    works.
    The next clue Greenough and Kittridge give us to how person has changed is,
    in their words, thus
    "the next process that we have to study, in which a word moves gradually away
    from its first meaning by successive steps of alternate specialization and
    generalization until, in many cases, there is not a shadow of connection between
    the sense that is finally developed and that which the term bore at the outset."
    7


    To try and put this in the simplest of terms, we have a word with a meaning
    which we will call (A) which is modified by a slightly different usage, which we
    shall call (B). Thus,
    "...a word may get a new meaning by the addition of a modifying idea (expressed or
    implied) to the old one."
    8

    This is where can begin to see how person has changed, with a successive set
    of different usages. Greenough and Kittridge show how person started off by
    meaning a mask until it came to mean a parson (a member of the clergy), by
    using this method of successive steps of usage. They provide an enlightening
    method of showing the steps, which are laid out below.


    7
    Words and their ways in English speech by Greenough and Kittridge, (1902), Macmillan and Co, p. 259
    8
    Ibid, p. 265
    9


    1. A A mask
    2. A+B character indicated by mask
    3. B character or role in (play)
    4. B+C one who represents a character
    5. C a representative in general
    6. C+D a representative of church in Parish
    7. D Parson
    9



    From this illustration we can see the source of person as a mask (A) and because of
    this usage in theatre, the character and the mask (A+B) joined themselves in
    meaning. We in modern English often use the word mask to mean that someone is
    concealing something, which is what the Greek actors did by assuming a character
    with the mask. This then evolved in to person meaning a character or role(C), in
    which the word persona we still retain this definition. However person morphs once
    again into the one who represents the character (B+C) until we are left with just a
    representative in general(C). Of course this meaning (C) can be used in many
    different ways as we will see later in this work. But to follow on with Greenough and
    Kittridge reasoning we now see person being used to mean a representative of church
    in a parish (C+D) which naturally leads to a person being called a parson. We can see
    this usage if we look into John Cowell's Law dictionary entitled 'The interpreter of
    words and terms' (published in 1607) where if we look up the word person we see the
    words 'See Parson'. So it was not but some 400 years ago that in English person
    meant parson, not the human being as we know and recognise the word today.

    Hopefully you are getting a clearer idea of the changing nature of the word person
    and its interesting evolution. Yet the most important aspect we can take from
    Greenough and Kittridge's work is that person at the core revolves around
    representing something. For the mask represents a specific character, a character
    represents a certain figure, be it real or mythical; a parson represents the church.
    This we can see by Greenough and Kittridge's theory of the radiation of a word.

    Of course the story does not end here we have another somewhat 400 years of
    evolution of the person to explain away. We have seen the development from its
    original meaning of mask to come to mean parson, so:

    "...we no longer think of masks but of the real characters appearing in a play. After
    all, an actor wearing a mask of the king was for the time being a king, and thus persona
    came to mean the very opposite of mask viz., a man's real nature and character."
    10


    9
    Words and their ways in English speech by Greenough and Kittridge, (1902), Macmillan and Co, p. 265
    10
    Ibid p. 268 10


    There were subtle shifts in meaning, like we saw above, where the fiction has
    become a reality, what was once unreal has now become real. Maybe this can be
    explained by the word character. This was originally taken from the Greek word
    Kharakter meaning an engraved mark, until the meaning was expanded by metaphor
    to mean a defining quality.
    11
    Thus a character became to mean a defining quality
    which was why it was used in theatre to signify the role an actor was playing, and of
    course the mask was definitely a defining quality. This is an important aspect when
    we think of somebody's character nowadays. For it could be a trait by which we
    recognize someone, or the sum of traits that define a man, which we tend to call a
    personality now (yet another intrusion of the pesky person). Now we can see that
    personality is a set of defining qualities that creates an identity. As we all know, Ident
    in Latin means same, and the -ify suffix comes from Latin verb to make, so it literally
    means 'to make the same.' So when we identify with something we make it the same!
    Sounds Strange I know, but look at what happens when a person asks for your
    identification, is it not to make sure you are the same man that you claim to be. To
    make the same, is the simplest definition and our identity is what we have created,
    what we have made to be us.

    Can we not argue now then that when person was in usage as a parson his
    character or defining quality held some prestige? For was not the church at this time
    wielding immense power? The house or office of the parson was called a parsonage,
    which in turn is related to the word personage, which means someone with high
    status or rank. Someone with high status or rank was usually associated to some title
    or office they held, for example, a king or queen. Can we not extend, with some
    liberty on my part, on Greenough and Kittridge's diagram to aid us in tracing our
    flighty friend person?

    1. A A mask
    2. A+B character indicated by mask
    3. B character or role in (play)
    4. B+C one who represents a character
    5. C a representative in general
    6. C+D a representative of church in Parish
    7. D a parson
    8. D+E a parson with high rank or office
    9. E someone with high rank or office
    10. E+F high rank/office has status
    11. F someone with status


    11
    http://www.etymonline.com
    11



    For example, in Booth's Analytical dictionary of the English language he states
    that

    "...the term personage is more applicable to one who is officially raised above the
    multitude. It is, therefore, more select and better fitted than "person" to denominate
    one of the higher orders of society. In the same sort of etiquette the plural, persons rises
    above the word PEOPLE: the latter being always collective, while the former are separately
    considered in the mind. "Twenty people
    "
    are a multitude; but the phrase "twenty persons'
    suggests the idea that each may possess a different character."
    12


    The meaning of the person is subtly shifting and as we are beginning to see the
    changes occurring before our eyes, we notice how the word aligns with its
    historical use. The Meaning shown in E and F are to be taken seriously now, not
    only for their meaning but for their historical use. For it should be known in
    English history by everyone who reads this work that one thing we English are
    known for is its repressive class system. During some turbulent historical times
    the class system has oppressed the mass of the population for the benefit of the
    upper classes. Those people who bore some form of status were persons,
    gentlemen, officials, and the aristocracy, for example. This, however, we will delve
    more into in the second part of this essay.
    Although the word person has more usages in modern English we have for the
    moment traced its historical meaning and evolution enough to be able to explain
    its modern usage.



    Modern usage of the word "person"


    Now we must look to today and how person is utilized in modern English. As
    mentioned when we began to look at the history of the word, our modern and
    primary use of person is to mean a human being. That was what I was taught the
    word meant and I am sure most can concur with my own empirical observation
    regarding this. Below are some of the definitions of the word person taken from a
    dictionary easily accessible to everyone.
    13





    12
    Analytical dictionary of the English language by David Booth, 1835, Cochrane and Co., p. cvi
    13
    http://dictionary.reference.com/
    12


    perڄson -noun



    1.
    A human being, whether man, woman, or child: The table seats four
    persons.
    2. A human being as distinguished from an animal or a thing.
    3.
    Sociology. An individual human being, esp. With reference to his or her
    social relationships and behavioural patterns as conditioned by the
    culture.
    4. Philosophy. A self‐conscious or rational being.
    5.
    The actual self or individual personality of a human being: You ought not
    to generalize, but to consider the person you are dealing with.

    6.
    The body of a living human being, sometimes including the clothes being
    worn: He had no money on his person.

    7. The body in its external aspect: an attractive person to look at.
    8. A character, part, or role, as in a play or story.
    9. An individual of distinction or importance.
    10. A person not entitled to social recognition or respect.
    11.

    Law. A human being (natural person) or a group of human beings, a
    corporation, a partnership, an estate, or other legal entity (artificial
    person or juristic person) recognized by law as having rights and duties.
    12.

    Grammar. A category found in many languages that is used to
    distinguish between the speaker of an utterance and those to or about
    whom he or she is speaking. In English there are three persons in the
    pronouns, the first represented by I and we, the second by you, and the
    third by he, she, it, and they. Most verbs have distinct third person
    singular forms in the present tense, as writes; the verb be has, in
    addition, a first person singular form am.

    13.
    Theology. Any of the three hypostases or modes of being in the Trinity,
    namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. 13




    We have thirteen definitions of the word person not one as generally
    perceived, because if you ask most people what a person is you find that they will
    give the first definition in our list. So how do we get from something meaning a
    mask to meaning a human person, well this will be explained in the second part of
    this work.

    Let us look to our second usage which is 'a human being as distinguished from
    an animal or a thing.' We can suggest here that the notion of person is used in the
    sense of a defining quality, simply meaning not an animal or thing. The placing of
    the words human being is irrelevant in the meaning, for if you are not an animal or
    a thing (including nature under the class of things) then what are you?

    Definitions 3 and 4 I will not discuss as they come under fields not entirely
    relevant to this work.

    The fifth definition given 'The actual self or individual personality of a human
    being,' does not refer to the physical human being but to a something more
    transient, more ephemeral. Our personality is not a fixed quality it changes over
    time. Ask this question to yourself, "Am I the same as I was when I was a child, a
    teenager, a young adult, a middle aged adult, etc." What would your response be?
    I think most of us realize that we evolve and change our personality. The qualities
    that define you come and go, sometimes they stay and are repressed, and
    sometimes they evolve. The important point to take from this is the use of the
    word personality.

    Definitions 6 and 7 can be looked at together as they are related. The sixth
    definition states that person can mean 'The body of a living human being,
    sometimes including the clothes being worn.' This is a strange way to define
    person but, if we look back to the previous section on the history and etymology of
    the word person, we can see how this may connect to the original few meanings. A
    body in religious terms is often seen as a mere vessel for the soul, self, atman,
    whatever you want to call it. As Shakespeare says:

    "All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players. They have
    their exits and their entrances; and one man in his time plays many parts"
    14



    14
    As You Like It by William Shakespeare, 1599, Act II, Scene VII
    14

    Many people in the past, and still do today, have viewed the body as a vessel, a
    thing that embodies the soul, like the actor embodies the character he plays, which
    again brings us to the notion of the person being a mask or character. As to the
    clothes, well these can be recognised as part of the mask or character. All this
    applies to the seventh definition of 'The body in its external aspect.'

    The eighth definition 'A character, part, or role, as in a play or story,' should be
    self explanatory by now so I will not comment on this.

    The ninth definition, 'An individual of distinction or importance,' we can see by
    looking at my extension of Greenough and Kittridge's diagram that person
    developed into someone of status, thus an individual of distinction and
    importance. You can now see how some of the definitions connect by subtle shifts
    in meaning or radiate from the original meaning.

    Looking at the tenth definition we might be puzzled by as to why person can
    come to mean 'A person not entitled to social recognition or respect.' It would be
    my supposition that this comes from the phrase persona non grata, where it was
    first used by diplomats who were not welcome in the countries to which they were
    sent. Of course the phrase was then extended to a person of some group who were
    not welcomed by some action the performed and thus were stripped of any social
    recognition or respect. But again this is just a supposition on mt part

    The eleventh definition we will be looking at in part II of this work so it is not
    expedient for us to review this definition here.

    As for the last two definitions these have no bearing on the subject at hand, for
    this work does not seek to clarify grammar or theology.

    So now we have looked at some standard definitions and to some extent have
    looked at them in parallel with the etymology of the word person. Hopefully we
    have a better understanding of the how the word began and its evolution.

    The only other thing we must mention here is from the family of the person,
    which is another ubiquitous word and that is personality, which is mentioned
    above. Although we will not be looking into it more thoroughly as was done with
    the word person, it is something that is intimately related to the concept of a
    person. We can see that this noun comes from the adjective of personal, which
    simply put means pertaining to the person. Personality therefore is an expansion
    on the adjective form, which again, simply put is the characteristics which pertain
    to the person. Characteristic is used in the sense of defining qualities as we have
    mentioned above.
    15

    The story does not end there though as another insidious concept must be
    raised to explain modern usage; the issue of political correctness.

    Political correctness, Language and the 'person'


    Now it is not for me to judge the merits and pitfalls of political correctness, but
    since the phrase contains the word 'political' one must be dubious of its intent. It
    has been a trend in this movement of political correctness to turn the common
    words into terms we must avoid using so as not to cause offence. Person is one of
    these new terms of the political correctness movement. Person is used place of
    words such as man or woman, boy or girl and even Human Being, to avoid using
    such offensive language. Thus the word person is perfect for the advocates of
    political correctness, for as we quoted before:

    "Nothing can be more abstract: it is neither male nor female, neither young nor
    old"
    15


    But what is the concept of political correctness and where did it come from?
    There seems to be no single consensus on the definition of political correctness,
    but some say it stems from the Frankfurt school and cultural Marxism and has its
    birth around the era of the First World War,
    16
    whether this is true in is not for me
    to debate. But a definition by Atkinson is quite illustrative:

    "Political Correctness (PC) ... was a spontaneous declaration that particular
    ideas, expressions and behaviour, which were then legal, should be forbidden by law,
    and people who transgressed should be punished...It started with a few voices but
    grew in popularity until it became unwritten and written law within the community.
    With those who were publicly declared as being not politically correct becoming the
    object of persecution by the mob, if not prosecution by the state."
    17


    This insidious concept of political correctness is without doubt a political tool
    for as Orwell says:

    "...the decline of a language must ultimately have political and economic
    causes"
    18


    The decline of the English language can easily be recognised by the use of
    political correctness as a tool to control the way people think and therefore act. As

    15
    Significant Etymology by James Mitchell, (1908), footnote, William Blackwood and Sons. P.237‐239
    16
    The Origins of Political Correctness An Accuracy in Academia Address by Bill Lind, 2000
    17
    Political Correctness by Philip Atkinson, http://www.ourcivilisation.com/pc.htm
    18
    George Orwell: 'Politics and the English Language' First published: Horizon. GB, London., April 1946 16

    stated previously the use of the words man, women, boy, girl, female, male, etc, are
    "politically incorrect" because of what they call sexism. So to avoid that this
    wonderful little word person arrives to solve this problem. How convenient! Yet,
    unknown by many, the word person has severe implications in law as you will soon
    see in the next two parts of this work.
    This introduction of politically correct words does not limit itself only to the
    word person. Another example is the use of the word individual, which technically
    is an adjective, but used as a noun it now refers to a person. Orwell describes this
    as pretentious diction and he states that:

    "Words like phenomenon, element, individual (as noun), objective, categorical,
    effective, virtual, basic, primary, promote, constitute, exhibit, exploit, utilize,
    eliminate, liquidate, are used to dress up a simple statement and give an air of
    scientific impartiality to biased judgments."
    19


    You will see much of this pretentious diction in the English language today,
    especially in the field of law. Orwell gives another astonish example of how
    language can be subverted:

    "Here is a well‐known verse from Ecclesiastes:
    I returned and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to
    the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor
    yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all.
    Here it is in modern English:
    Objective considerations of contemporary phenomena compel the conclusion that
    success or failure in competitive activities exhibits no tendency to be commensurate
    with innate capacity, but that a considerable element of the unpredictable must
    invariably be taken into account."20

    Language is a potent force in human culture and the abuse of cannot be
    condoned, for the sake of not offending someone. For what might offend one man
    may pass over the head of the next. This can be highlighted by the eminent
    philosopher of language, Ludwig Wittgenstein, when he says
    "...the meaning of a word is its use in the language."
    21



    19
    Ibid
    20
    Ibid
    21
    Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, Basil Blackwell Ltd, p. 20 17

    This is an important concept and must be recognized in the context of this
    work. As you have seen when the modern definitions were elucidated, there are
    thirteen definitions, or better to say there are thirteen ways in which the word
    person is used modern English. So one can suggest that dictionaries do not define
    word or specify what a word is, rather it show its use in language. Now language is
    a subtle creature where confusion arises easily, this has been explained by the
    thinker Alfred Korzybski with his famous statement of which I am paraphrasing
    'the map is not the territory and words are not the things they represent.' Or as
    Korzybski states himself:

    "If words are not things, or maps are not the actual territory, then, obviously, the
    only possible link between the objective world and the linguistic world is found in
    structure, and structure alone. The only usefulness of a map or a language depends
    on the similarity of structure between the empirical world and the map‐languages. If
    the structure is not similar, then the traveller or speaker is led astray, which, in
    serious human life‐problems, must become always eminently harmful,. If the
    structures are similar, then the empirical world becomes 'rational' to a potentially
    rational being, which means no more than that verbal, or map‐predicted
    characteristics, which follow up the linguistic or map structure, are applicable to the
    empirical world."
    22



    What Korzybski is basically saying here is if some words do not conform to
    how we naturally use them then confusion will arise which in turn can affect the
    minds of people. I use a simple maxim taken from the works of Wittgenstein and
    Korzybski and apply it when necessary, which is:

    "The word is not the thing it represents but gets its meaning from its use"

    In regards to political correctness, it is obvious language is being used for a
    political agenda. Its use of the word person is obviously for some political gain, but
    this will be seen in the next sections of this work. But from the point of view of
    modern usage the word person is being used to outlaw such terms as Human
    being, man, woman, girl, boy, etc. By replacing these words with person it is trying
    to make is into abstract entities; one homogenous group.
    Orwell predicted this control of language in his famous novel 1984, and it now
    can be seen in the form of political correctness. For we must not forget that
    language frames our thoughts which in turn influence our actions as Orwell clearly
    pointed out in his novel, which I recommend highly to anyone who has not already
    read it.

    22
    Science and Sanity by Alfred Korzybski, 5
    th
    Edition, Institute of General semantics, 1994, p. 61 18

    Language, when abused and manipulated, infects the whole of society and to
    isolate to certain fields, as that of law, and change the use of words can only be of
    detrimental effect on people and the society they live in.





    Conclusion of Part 1


    So to sum up this first part of our work the word person is an abstract word, as
    we have seen by its chameleon‐like changes of the centuries. We have seen that
    we have this family of words; person, persona, personal, personality, etc. We have
    seen the birth of the concept of a person and its evolution throughout quite a few
    centuries. We have also seen the modern usages of the words as well as hwo
    political correctness has cemented this abstraction in the minds of many, by using
    the excuse of feminism, ageism or any -ism that applies. We now use the word
    person as a neutral term.


    Yet it still hasn't answered our original question. Why do we call a human being a
    person? Don't worry as this will soon be addressed. This cannot be answered now
    because what has been written so far is just a piece of the puzzle. The following
    centuries leading up to now will begin to give us a clearer understanding.
    However we must veer away from the world of etymology and general language,
    and to do this we must undertake an examination of the word person as used in
    English law.












    19
















    Part 2



    Law and the "person"














    20

    Introduction

    I think to begin this section, which is really the 'meat and bones' of the
    confusion of the use of the word person. I will leave it to Salmond who says it
    best in his work on jurisprudence.
    "It is not permissible to adopt the simple device of saying that a person means a
    human being, for even in the popular or non‐legal use of the term there are persons
    who are not men"
    23

    This is where our confusion begins. Why is it not permissible to say that a
    person is a human being? For in the first section the primary usage of person is a
    Human Being yet now we are being told that it is too simple use it like this in law
    To discover this conundrum we must delve into certain aspects of law. The
    law is a complicated area for any layperson to understand which is why an
    industry has arisen around it, and anyone not privy to the information this
    industry has will be lost in a labyrinth of language that will tie your mind up in
    knots. Many refer to this language as 'Legalese,' and see it as completely foreign.
    Personally I do not hold this view since language is a complex entity and cannot
    be pigeonholed so easily. So let us look first to the language of law to unravel the
    ball of knots it appears to be before we move onto the topic of the person and the
    law.


    The Language of Law

    First we must look at the language of the law as it is language that breathes life
    into the law. Language is used to write the law; to discuss the law; to arbitrate
    the law and finally to define the law. One cannot escape the fact that in these
    days law and language are inseparable.
    As mentioned previously it is said that legalese resembles a foreign language.
    Why do people say this? Well because if one does not understand a language it
    is foreign to them, or a better way of saying it is that it is unfamiliar or strange to
    them. Legalese is better referred to as a technical language. Other technical
    languages can be found in such fields as medicine, science, mathematics,
    engineering, etc. However we do not refer to these languages in these specific

    23
    Jurisprudence and the law by John Salmond, second edition, Steven and Hayes, 1907, p. 275 21

    fields as foreign, just unfamiliar to the layman. It is this unfamiliarity that causes
    all the problems when approaching the area of law. We expect what we read to
    mean the same thing as we assume it means to everybody familiar with the
    English Language, yet this is not the case. Everyday usage of one word can mean
    something entirely different in the eyes of the law, and thus our problem begins.
    It is through this problem that we have these people we call lawyers, the ones
    trained in law, unfortunately a lot of these people are unaware of this technical
    language as well; so more problems arise.
    Why do we talk of such things as legalese? Well simply because the person in
    law is a technical term and a highly controversial one at that. Of course it has
    been argued that because there are law dictionaries then Legalese must be a
    foreign language. But that is just not the case. I think many people think that
    because there is a dictionary then a separate language must be associated with it.
    A dictionary, as we commonly think of it, is merely a chronicle of a language, it
    tells us what a word means and its various usages, if it has them. Without
    language a dictionary would have no meaning. Yet this is just one type of
    dictionary, another is a translation dictionary where the word in one language is
    translated into a different language. Finally there are technical dictionaries,
    which define words used in the specific field it is used for; a law dictionary is one
    of these types.
    We must not be fooled into believing that because we are ignorant of some
    parts of our language, (and by ignorant I mean 'not know something') we cannot
    say that it is a separate language altogether, this would be just too facile to
    assume. We must remember our maxim:
    "The word is not the thing it represents but gets its meaning from its use"

    If one is not involved in the field of law then the language and expressions
    will confuse the most intelligent man or woman. The use of specifically defined
    usage can be explained by the above maxim. If you do not use the technical
    language of law, it will appear foreign to you.
    In this work we will view Legalese as a technical language, and will use the
    appropriate resources for reference to legal terms and not ordinary usage. For, as
    we have seen, the use of words in law can be far different from common usage.
    Whether this is done deliberately or by necessity, we do not know. However
    comparisons will be made between the technical terms and ordinary usage to
    indicate the disparity between the same words. A separate work is indeed
    needed on language and the law, but that is for the future.

    22


    The legal definition of 'person'

    As you saw from Salmond's quote24
    not all persons are human beings and it is
    this division which causes many problems as you will see further on in this work.
    It is this enigma of the word person in law that initiated research into this part of
    our language. The legal definition is slightly different than would be the normal
    assumption.
    As the ordinary meaning of person, explained in the first part, has many
    usages, in law we are met with two usages of the word. The legal definition is
    dual in nature, changed by adjectives. The first definition or usage is what is
    called a 'natural person' and the second a 'legal person,' so you see it is not as
    simple as might think. After all you can't define something by using the same
    word you're trying to define.
    The natural person simply refers to a human being. By adding the adjective
    'natural' it means a person who is of nature, and up until now that has only been
    human beings. Although there is a current debate going on in different places to
    give animals a legal personality; so would animals become a natural person? The
    adjective 'natural' is more of a narrowing down of the definition of person to
    specify mankind. This definition is plain and is probably why we refer to
    ourselves as persons, but we are a long way off from explaining why this is the
    case.
    The legal person, sometimes called an artificial person, is a different matter
    altogether and it will be the major aim of this work to show why. Simply put a
    legal person is a corporation in modern parlance, or as the English calls it, a body
    corporate. Now as you can see this is a big leap from calling a human being a
    person to calling a corporation a person.
    Another word which must be introduced is that of individual, once an
    adjective now a noun, used to refer to a single human being, but also in law it
    can mean a individual legal person. It entirely depends on the context.
    Now you can see how the law divides the concept of the person into two
    distinct entities. However to adopt these definitions is too easy to explain what a
    person in law really is.
    25
    What we must do instead is forget the definitions the
    dictionaries give us and delve deeper into the more general science of law, which
    is called Jurisprudence.

    24
    Jurisprudence and the law by John Salmond, second edition, Steven and Hayes, 1907, p. 275
    25
    A list of Defintions will be given in Appendix A 23

    Jurisprudence and the 'person'

    As explained above Jurisprudence is the science of the law, or sometimes
    called the theory or philosophy of law. Its aim is to help explain what law is and
    its varied constituents. So in this section we will see, from the view of
    Jurisprudence, what a person really is under the eyes of the law.
    First of all Salmond talks of the nature of legal personality26
    before he speaks
    of persons. Now if we remember from above on the subject of personality it was
    said that personality was "the characteristics which pertain to the person." So
    when we talk of legal personality we can assume this to mean the legal
    characteristics that pertain to the person. It is then natural to find out what
    these legal characteristics are in order to elaborate on why a person has these
    characteristics attached to them.
    Pollock states that,
    "Law necessarily deals with duties and rights of persons"
    27

    or as Salmond says:
    "So far as legal theory is concerned, a person is any being whom the law regards
    as capable of rights and duties"
    28

    As two of the leading authors on Jurisprudence have said it seems that duties
    and rights may be some of these defining qualities that might lead us to find out
    the nature of what a legal personality is.
    So we have first to uncover what are rights and what are duties before we can
    proceed to attach these to our controversial person.

    Rights, Duties and the 'person'

    It must be said first that in law rights and duties go hand in hand, they are
    not two separate things that can be divided and investigated without referring to
    each other. So when we speak of a right there is a duty involved. But it must be

    26
    Jurisprudence and the law by John Salmond, second edition, Steven and Hayes, 1907, p. 275
    27
    A first book of Jurisprudence, by Sir Frederick Pollock, second edition, 1904, Macmillian and Co. p. 108
    28
    Jurisprudence and the law by John Salmond, second edition, Steven and Hayes, 1907, p. 275 24

    also noted that rights always have duties ascribed to them, duties on the other
    hand do not always have rights attached to them.
    29

    Before going more in depth in the area of rights and duties there is another
    concept that must be considered first, and that is of wrongs. A wrong is as it
    suggests, a wrong act; it is the same in law as in ordinary life; it's just the details
    that differ, or as Salmond puts it:
    "A wrong is simply a wrong act ‐ an act contrary to the rule of right and justice. A
    synonym of it is injury, in its true and primary sense of injuria (that which is contrary
    to jus), though by a modern perversion of meaning this term has acquired the
    secondary sense of harm or damage (damnum) whether rightful or wrongful, and
    whether inflicted by human agency or not."
    30


    These wrongs as they are known are of two types, moral and legal. A moral wrong
    would be, for example, murder because it is immoral to kill another human being by
    natural law theory. This is shown in our own system of common law. A Legal wrong
    on the other hand does not conform to natural law and comes solely from the minds
    of men. As Salmond says:

    "A legal wrong is an act which is legally wrong, being contrary to the rule of legal
    justice and a violation of the law. It is an act which is authoritatively determined to be
    wrong by a rule of law, and is therefore treated as a wrong in and for the purposes of
    the administration of justice by the state"
    31


    Maybe a good example of a legal wrong would be speeding tickets as it is a
    controversial topic in England nowadays. There is nothing morally wrong with
    speeding, unless it endangers lives; for there are some animals on earth which can
    break the speed limits but I doubt they will be fined. There are many legal wrongs
    which are not morally wrong, but the more laws a country has the more wrongs it
    creates. A wrong is such that if anyone should commit a wrong a punishment will be
    meted out by the state.
    So here we have defined what a wrong is, but what connection does this have to
    rights and duties? Well, a wrong was elucidated because a duty is simply another
    way of saying "don't do wrong," so when you do something wrong, whether morally
    or legally, you have failed to fulfill a duty. As wrongs are divided into moral and
    legal, so too are duties. You have a moral duty, which is not to do a moral wrong,
    and a legal duty, which is not to do a legal wrong. Of course this is a simplified
    explanation for the layman to understand but essentially that is what is meant when
    we talk of duties.

    29
    Elements of Law by William Markby, sixth edition, Oxford press, 1905. p. 92
    30
    Jurisprudence and the law by John Salmond, second edition, Steven and Hayes, 1907, p. 180
    31
    Ibid, p. 180 25

    Now we must turn to rights which are slightly more complicated in nature. But
    Pollock gives a glimpse of what a right is:

    "Right is the correlative of duty. As duty is a burden imposed by law, so right is
    freedom allowed or power conferred by law."
    32


    Or as Thomas in his book, 'A treatise on Universal Jurisprudence' states:

    "A right is that quality in a person which renders it just for him to possess certain
    things, or to do certain things, consistently with the laws"
    33


    Rights following along with duties and wrongs are also divided into moral rights
    and legal rights. A breach of a moral right would result in a moral wrong, and a
    breach of a legal right would be a legal wrong. This shows us how rights and duties
    are connected, and the fact that a right involves some form of freedom, yet with
    conditions attached (the duty).
    All these rights, wrongs and duties are divided up into moral and legal categories
    which make it even more confusing for the ordinary man who knows nothing of law.
    Understanding what has just been written is not an easy task, and what has been
    presented to you is in a highly condensed form to make it intelligible to the layman.
    So why are rights and duties the defining qualities that make up the legal
    personality that Salmond attributes to a person? Well I think Salmond says it best of
    all:

    "All that is right or wrong, just or unjust, is so by reason of its effects upon the
    interests of mankind, that is to say upon the various elements of human well‐being,
    such as life, liberty, health, reputation, and the uses of material objects. If any act is
    right or just, it is so because and in so far as it promotes some form of human interest.
    If any act is wrong or unjust, it is because the interests of men are prejudicially affected
    by it. Conduct which has no influence upon the interests of any one has no significance
    either in law or morals."
    34


    There we have it! As Pollock stated the law only deals with the rights and
    duties of persons, and as Salmond said only a being that is capable of rights and
    duties is a person.
    It is now important to analyse this definition that the scholars of
    Jurisprudence have given us. We will use Salmond's definition as a starting point
    for our analysis. The first term he gives us is 'a being', and of course when we
    hear that we think of something that exists, which does not necessarily mean a
    human being, as a human being is but one type of being. Another way to

    32
    A first book of Jurisprudence, by Sir Frederick Pollock, second edition, 1904, Macmillian and Co. p. 61
    33
    A Treatisse of Universal Jurisprudence by John Penford Thomas, second edition, 1829, p. 21
    34
    Jurisprudence and the law by John Salmond, second edition, Steven and Hayes, 1907, p. 72 26

    describe a being is by the word entity, which is more of a neutral term, for it can
    apply to corporeal and incorporeal things at the same time. Thus we can see
    how there is a division between natural persons and legal persons as both can be
    called entities but not beings.
    The next part of the definition is 'capable of', which if we look in any
    dictionary means "having the ability or capacity for."
    35
    Now having the ability or
    capacity for something implies the choice to use the aforementioned. For having
    something and using it are two different things. For example, everyone has the
    ability or capacity for violence but it is their choice to use it or not.
    So to try and give a more accurate definition to what a legal personality is and
    its defining qualities, in regards to the in law, would be to say that it is 'an entity
    with the ability or capacity to have rights and duties.'
    36
    So according to the
    theory of jurisprudence something or somebody must have these defining
    qualities to be defined as a person in law.
    So now we must turn to what the law defines as persons, namely the natural
    person and the legal person and see if we can match them up to our definition of
    legal personality. We will also look into these concepts with more depth to gain
    a better understanding of what they are. For to truly understand these concepts
    and how they apply to the common man will benefit greatly to finding out if a
    person really is a human being.

    Natural persons vs. Legal persons

    Let's begin with natural persons as this is the least complex of the two to
    analyse. As mentioned above a natural person is said to be a human being, but
    can we really say this? When we use the adjective 'natural' we are adding more
    information to the preceding noun; the noun being person. If we look to any
    dictionary (I use the one provided by the internet because most people will have
    access to this) then we see that natural as an adjective means 'existing in or
    formed by nature.'
    37
    So if we use our definition of legal personality and combine
    it with the meaning of natural we have:
    'An entity existing in or formed by nature with the ability or capacity to have
    rights and duties'

    35
    http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/capable
    36
    This is the defintion that will be used to describe a legal personality in law from now on
    37
    http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/natural ‐ primary definition used out of the 30 or so definitions 27

    This can be said to be the true meaning of natural person. Now as you can see
    a human being is not mentioned in the definition, but can be implied from it as
    we exist in or have been formed by nature. Yet are we the only things formed by
    nature on the planet? No, of course not, but if you remember our last quote by
    Salmond, rights and duties are created by human interests and it is only the law
    that recognises human interests. Under the definition above everything in
    nature should be a natural person, but this is not the case. Yet there are some
    interesting cases when we turn to the issue of animals, pets or work animals, for
    example. When we have a pet, for illustration a dog, do they not have rights and
    duties ascribed to them? For we give the dog a right to security i.e. we protect its
    well being by housing and feeding it and its duty is not to harm us in return and
    to give us company. In this scenario we are the sovereign and the dog is the
    person, so we ascribe rights and duties to the person. And in a nutshell this is
    how things work in Britain now.
    So what we can say about the natural person is that it may include human
    beings is but not limited to them by definition. For if we are to take our meaning
    of natural person to be consistent with what the law says, it would indicate that
    we, human beings, are but one group under a vast class of things.
    Now we turn to the legal person, a more thorny issue at best. As mentioned
    earlier, the modern conception of a legal person is a corporation. Again this is
    just too simple of a device to adopt when talking of legal persons. Let us first
    adopt our definition of legal personality and apply it to the legal person. First of
    all we must find a definition of legal used as an adjective, turning to the
    dictionary used throughout this work we see that legal means 'permitted by
    law.'
    38
    Therefore we can assume a legal person to be;
    'An entity permitted by law with the ability or capacity to have rights and duties'
    This would seem to be a more accurate definition of what a legal person is. Yet
    by its definition its vagueness is apparent. What is an entity permitted by law?
    This usually means a corporation, which is too vague of a device to contemplate,
    so yet again it is incumbent on us to look into the nature of what a corporation
    is.

    Corporations as Legal Persons

    Corporations are known as either legal persons or artificial persons. Here we
    must turn to Blackstone's commentaries on the laws of England to have a better
    idea of what a corporation is. But first it is prudent to point that although

    38
    http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/legal 28

    companies can be corporations, not all corporations are companies, so please
    keep this in mind as we elucidate the concept of a corporation. Firstly as
    Blackstone says:
    "The first division of corporations is into aggregate and sole. Corporations aggregate
    consist of many persons united together into one society, and are kept up by a
    perpetual succession of members, so as to continue forever...Corporations sole consist
    of one person only and his successors, in some particular station, who are incorporated
    by law, in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of
    perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had."
    39


    So we have two divisions of what a corporation is; aggregate and sole.
    Corporations aggregate are what we are more familiar with and is probably why we
    call a company or business a corporation, but as we shall see this is more of a modern
    phenomenon. The concept of a body corporate, as this is how a corporation
    aggregate is more commonly known in Britain, is a much older phenomenon. As
    with our contentious word person we can attribute the idea of a body corporate to
    the Romans. Its first uses came in the form of universities and colleges as Blackstone
    expounds.

    "They were called universitates, as forming one whole out of many individuals; or
    collegia, from being gathered together"
    40


    After this the church also adopted this form of organization, which still goes on
    today. For example, public corporations are what we refer to as municipal
    government, which tend to be towns, cities and boroughs, or as Arnold says


    "A municipal corporation, therefore, is a civil corporation aggregate, established for
    the purpose of investing the inhabitants of a particular borough or place with the power
    of self‐government and with certain other privileges and franchises."
    41


    A corporation sole on the other hand,
    ".... consist of one person only and his successors, in some particular station, who are
    incorporated by law, in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages,
    particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have
    had."
    42



    39
    Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books by William Blackstone, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1893, p. 467
    40
    Ibid, p. 468
    41
    A Treatise on the law relating to Municipal Corporations in England and Wales by Thomas Arnold, Third edition 1863, p. 3
    42
    Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books by William Blackstone, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1893, p. 469 29

    The best example of this would be our very own Queen, or the Crown as the
    corporation is known as. In fact the queen comprises of several corporations sole.
    Some officials also have same status of corporation sole, such as secretaries of state
    and other government officials. I would go as far as to say the prime minister could
    have similar status but that cannot be proven at this time.

    This idea of corporation sole is not widely known and as Salmond says:

    "The chief difficulty in apprehending the true nature of a corporation of this
    description is that it bears the same name as the natural person who is its sole member
    for the time being, and who represents it and acts for it... Nevertheless under each of
    these names two persons live. One is a human being, administering for the time being
    the duties and affairs of the office. He alone is visible to the eyes of laymen. The other is
    a mythical being whom only lawyers know of, and whom only the eye of the law can
    perceive."
    43


    So here we have two variations of corporations both endowed with legal status and
    are thus called Legal Persons, however they do have some dissimilarities to the
    natural person. One of these is immortality, for natural persons die, but legal persons
    do not. This was instigated to facilitate longevity of the corporate entity, otherwise
    the death of the individual members of a group, would mean the death of the
    corporation.

    Unfortunately the field of corporations is too wide to go into any depth here but
    what has been said should clarify the issue somewhat. What it does show is that a
    legal person is, as our previous definition says, an entity permitted by law with the
    ability or capacity to have rights and duties. Now these legal persons generally have
    the same rights as natural persons with a few added perks.

    So far we have defined what a person is under the eyes of the law and the duality of
    its nature into natural and legal. We now know that rights and duties are
    fundamental part of what makes up a legal personality and subsequently a person. So
    would it not be pursuant of us to find out what our rights are.


    The Rights of a 'Person'

    This subject is too deep for a perfect analysis of the rights of a person. But we will
    look at what some commentators on law have to say about the subject. Also you will
    find the human rights acts laid down by law in appendix B.
    Blackstone in his commentaries divides the absolute rights of an individual i.e. In
    this case a natural person into three principal categories which are

    43
    Jurisprudence and the law by John Salmond, second edition, Steven and Hayes, 1907, p.288 30


    1. The right of personal security
    2. The right of personal liberty
    3. The right of private property

    The first right as Blackstone says is:

    "The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted
    enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation."
    44


    As to the second right of:

    "Personal security, the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal
    liberty of individuals. This personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of
    changing situation, or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination
    may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law."
    45


    The final right according to Blackstone is

    "The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which
    consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any
    control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land."
    46


    Now of course this was written in 1753, but they do cover what our basic rights are
    and most other rights elucidated in appendix B will fall under these three categories.
    Of course this is just a cursory glance at what Blackstone writes to be more thorough
    I suggest the reader to read his commentaries which can be easily found in the public
    domain.
    Another author we have used extensively here also has some definitions of what
    our rights are. Salmond's list is as follows.
    47



    1. Rights over material things
    2. Rights in respect of one's own person
    3. The right of reputation
    4. Rights in respect of domestic relations
    5. Rights in the respect of other's rights
    6. Rights over immaterial property
    7. Rights to services.

    44
    Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books by William Blackstone, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1893, p. 128
    45
    Ibid p. 134
    46
    Ibid, p. 139
    47
    Jurisprudence and the law by John Salmond, second edition, Steven and Hayes, 1907, p.188‐190 31



    These are what Salmond suggests our rights are, whether this is true or not it is
    not my place to argue that. Only to elucidate what some authors have to state on
    the subject. As with Blackstone, Salmond's book can be found in the public
    domain if you want to have a deeper understanding.

    So these are our rights, and our duties are not to commit wrongs in accordance
    with these rights. All this is what we say a person has in the eyes of the law. Now
    we must move on to how the person has evolved in the eyes of the law so we can
    connect with the first part of this work and the original question; is a human being
    a person?



    A 'person' in the history of law


    Remember the first quote in this part of the work by Salmond48
    where we
    cannot say that a person means a human being, hopefully the work up until now
    has shown part of why this is true. This section will deal more with how this
    specifically applies to man. But let's begin by a curious quote from Salmond:

    "...in the law this want of coincidence between the class of persons and that of
    human beings is still more marked. In the law there may be men who are not
    persons; slaves, for example, are destitute of legal personality, in any system which
    regards them as incapable of either rights or liabilities."
    49


    So in the past it has been a fact that certain human beings were not
    considered persons under the eyes of the law. So by logical deduction anyone seen
    not possessing rights or liabilities was not a person. A liability here just means
    someone whom is responsible for committing a wrong i.e. he is liable (legally
    responsible) for that act of wrong.

    Slaves as being the prime example of human beings not considered persons.
    Slavery has a long history and is too complicated to go into here. But considering
    when slavery was legally abolished it is not so long ago compared to the length of
    human history. I say legally abolished because although slavery is against the law
    of all nations that does not mean that the practice has stopped, especially in

    48
    "It is not permissible to adopt the simple device of saying that a person means a human being, for even in the popular or non‐legal
    use of the term there are persons who are not men". Jurisprudence and the law by John Salmond, second edition, Steven and Hayes,
    1907, p. 275
    49
    Jurisprudence and the law by John Salmond, second edition, Steven and Hayes, 1907, p. 275 32

    developing countries. In England there has been a long history of slavery dressed
    up in a variety of names. For example:

    "English people was divided after the Conquest
    50
    into two classes, the free and
    the serf."
    51


    The serf was owned by his lord and was basically a slave, of course this
    practice of serfdom eventually faded by the aid of the church and the common law
    of the land (by custom). It also helped that these serfs were countrymen and
    therefore were afforded the rights that an Englishman held. However the next
    form of slavery was one of race. After the British Empire conquered a lot of the
    world many of those who were conquered became legal slaves. This was then
    taken over to America until the time of Abraham Lincoln and the emancipation of
    the slaves. Yet even though they were emancipated a lot of their rights were
    withheld which led to the civil rights movement in America.

    Another group of human beings have also had their rights restricted at various
    times in History and they comprise of half the population at any given time;
    namely women. For a long time women were denied many of the rights of men.
    As was the case with the early catholic church under canon law, as Hecker states:

    "The canon law reaffirms woman's subjection to man in no uncertain terms. The
    wife must be submissive and obedient to her husband. She must never, under
    penalty, of excommunication, cut off her hair, because "God has given it to her as a
    veil and as a sign of her subjection." A woman who assumed men's garments was
    accursed; it will be remembered that the breaking of this law was one of the charges
    which brought Joan of Arc to the stake."
    52


    And as Hecker states in 1914

    "The attitude of the Roman Catholic Church towards women's rights at the
    present day is practically the same as it has been for eighteen centuries. It still insists
    on the subjection of the woman to the man, and it is bitterly hostile to woman
    suffrage"
    53


    Of course, times have changed and the rights of women have improved
    dramatically. For example it was less than 100 years ago that women fought for
    and won the right of suffrage (the right to vote). The subjugation of women has
    always and still is a contentious issue. Like so many topics, we have touched on

    50
    Being the Norman conquest of 1066
    51
    The British citizen: His rights and priviliges, a short history, 1885, E. & J.B. Young, p. 69
    52
    A short history of women's rights, By Eugene Hecker, Second edition, 1914, G.P. Putman's sons, p. 106
    53
    Ibid p. 117 33

    only the surface of such immense issues, but they are used to illustrate that a
    person is not what it purports to be.

    Today women are considered to be natural persons under the eyes of law with
    the equivalent rights that men hold. But this has been through a process of
    evolution like the word person itself.

    Throughout history there has been through some form of suppression of a
    man or woman's rights, and this is no less true today. Yet it is unclear if the
    suppression of some rights strips the man of his legal personality altogether, if so
    then he would no longer be a person in the eyes of the law; but this is merely a
    supposition on my part.


    Is a Person a Human Being in Law?


    It is now we must begin to answer the question that was the impetuous for
    this work. We have seen the history and etymology of the word person, so we now
    know where it comes from and what it was used to up to a certain point. The point
    that left us was that a person was meant as someone with status like an official or
    personage. We then looked at the modern usages of the word, of which there are
    many. A lot of the meanings could be explained by the referring to the etymology
    of the word, others had no relevance to the present inquiry. But nothing explained
    why a person is a human being.

    After this we had to look into law to find the next piece of the puzzle. What
    was discovered was not so simple. For there are persons who are not human
    beings, and there have been human beings who were not regarded as persons.

    A more specific meaning of the word person was given by looking into the area
    of Jurisprudence, which we will restate here.

    Person - An entity with the ability or capacity to have rights and duties

    Law however has seen it necessary to divide this definition by either saying the
    entity is formed by nature or permitted by law, so we are left with the division of
    natural person and legal persons. Yet human being is still not apparent by this
    definition, and as was shown for thousands of years there have been an ineffable
    amount people who had no rights, therefore these slaves in the eyes of law, were
    not considered persons. It was only people of status that were considered persons.
    Thus we have the connection between where we left our etymological study how it
    has been relevant to look into the law. Now since only people of status were
    persons with the according rights and duties, those, by deduction, who had no 34

    rights, were not considered persons. It is only in the last 150 years or so that, at
    least in the western world, that all people have slowly gained all the rights a
    human being should have. This naturally makes them persons in the eyes of the
    law, which is why we can suppose that person (natural at least) means a human
    being. Yet this is technically not true if we follow the logic of language rather than
    the twisted logic of the law.

    Let me try and explain. The first thing that should strike the reader is that
    noun person is used in a specific way. If we can compare it to another word this
    might clarify things, for example the word mammal. Now a human being is a
    mammal, but not all mammals are human beings. Do you see the difference? A
    mammal describes a class of things and not the things themselves; it is a type of
    category like furniture, liquids, plants, etc. A person is a class of things, or a
    category, nothing more. Now if we describe ourselves as a person, you only
    describe yourself as a member of a class of things. You could just as well say you
    are a mammal; a biped; an organism. If we take the example of the class of
    furniture then we can point to a chair and say it's a chair which is the most specific
    noun to describe it, but it is also furniture.

    The problem is that we use the word person like we use the word chair; you
    see a man and women before you and you call him or her a person, a gender
    neutral term, and the word sticks. Another example to illustrate the point is that
    of water. Now water is a liquid, but when frozen it is a solid, when it boils it
    becomes gaseous. In different states it falls under different categories. This is
    similar to the person, when it is natural, something formed by nature; when legal,
    something permitted by law.

    So basically comes down to this. A human being has the capacity to be a
    person if it fulfils the criteria i.e. having the ability or capacity for rights and duties,
    but it is not a human being per se. Just as an animal can be a mammal if it fulfils
    the criteria of being,

    "any vertebrate of the class Mammalia, having the body more or less covered
    with hair, nourishing the young with milk from the mammary glands, and, with the
    exception of the egg‐laying monotremes, giving birth to live young."
    54


    But not all animals are mammals. Again we must refer to our maxim, "The
    word is not the thing it represents but gets its meaning from its use," thus we see
    that the word person is used differently in law than in ordinary modern usage. It's
    just that it seems not many involved in the field either know this or are willing to
    tell everyone this.


    54
    http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mammal 35

    So in the eyes of the law a person is not a human being, it never has been and
    doubtfully will ever be. It is simply a class of things; nothing more nothing less. If
    we really want to be pedantic, person really holds its original use, a mask. For
    rights and duties, supposedly are given to us by our sovereign power, be it God,
    Allah, the state or yourself. You put on these rights, like a mask, which shows
    other people what you are, to be able to move around in a world full of other
    people wearing similar masks. To highlight this development we can use
    Greenough and Kittredges's diagram and extend it more.

    1. A A mask
    2. A+B character indicated by mask
    3. B character or role in (play)
    4. B+C one who represents a character
    5. C a representative in general
    6. C+D a representative of church in Parish
    7. D a parson
    8. D+E a parson with high rank or office
    9. E someone with high rank or office
    10. E+F high rank/office has status
    11. F someone with status
    12. F+G s/one with status has rights
    13. G anyone with rights
    14. G+H any entity with rights


    To sum up this section, we have found a main part of the puzzle, debatable or
    not, that gives at least some clarity to the matter. In the third and final part of this
    work we will see how this applies to the common man by looking into some laws
    of England, seeing how they are interpreted and how this all applies to the person.

    The next section will be the more demanding because we must delve more
    into the language of the law, which always produces a headache. This,
    nevertheless, is necessary to see how this one little word affects your life so
    profoundly.




    36









    Part 3
    The Laws of Britain













    37

    Introduction

    To put this section into context we will first begin by giving a small
    introduction to what the actual law of England is. From this basic understanding
    of how the law works will be of great utility, for the following sections is where
    we will go deeper into actual laws, how they are interpreted and what relevance
    this has to the person. This part will be the most technical of the three because
    we have to begin to introduce legal terms and explain their usage, so patience is
    required from the reader.

    The two divisions of English law

    It is said there are two divisions of law in England. The first being the more
    ancient system we know as Common Law and the second being the more
    modern Statute Law. So it is to these two divisions a cursory overview must be
    given, which we will start with the older of the two divisions: Common Law.

    Common Law

    Common law is generally known as the unwritten law of England (Lex non‐
    scripta) for as Ruegg says:
    "It originally consisted of a collection of unwritten maxims and customs, which were
    supposed to have existed immemorially in this country."
    55


    So Common law is generally known as customary law as it derives its authority
    from the customs of the nation over time, which was never formally written
    down, like an act of parliament. A good example of this would be murder, for
    there is no written rule that murder is forbidden, but as a custom, and this being
    part of common law, it is forbidden to murder anyone. Blackstone divides these
    customs into three types


    55
    An Elementary Commentary on English Law by Alfred Ruegg, 1920, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, p. 12 38

    "This unwritten, or common, law is properly distinguishable into three kinds:
    1.General customs; which are the universal rule of the whole kingdom, and form the
    common law, in its stricter and more usual signification. 2. Particular customs; which,
    for the most part, affect only the inhabitants of particular districts. 3. Certain particular
    laws; which, by custom, are adopted and used by some particular courts, of pretty
    general and extensive jurisdiction."
    56


    These customs or laws were determined by judges, which why the common law is
    often referred to as Judge made law, or case law where precedents are set down as a
    guide for future generations to follow, as Ruegg says.

    "Whether a custom, general or particular, is a part of the Common law of England,
    can only be finally declared by the judges, whose decisions when pronounced are
    afterwards binding upon themselves and all inferior courts."
    57


    Of course this is not to say that everything is not written, but they do not include
    acts of parliament, for as Hale says:

    "...when I call those parts of our laws leges non scripta, I do not mean as if those laws
    were only oral, or communicated from the former ages to the later, merely by word; for
    all those laws have their several monuments in writing, whereby they are transferred
    from one age to another, and without which they would soon lose all kind of certainty...
    But I therefore stile those parts of the law leges non scripta, because their authoritative
    and original institutions are not set down in writing in that manner or with that
    authority that acts of parliament are."
    58


    So Common Law is the oldest system of law of England and continues today. Yet
    how does this connect to the other division of law we have today? Well to see this
    then we must look into the birth of the Parliament as they are the brach which write,
    enact and enforce statutes. Blackstone writes about the beginning of parliament,

    "I hold it sufficient that it is generally agreed, that in the main the constitution of
    parliament, as it now stands, was marked out so long ago as the seventeenth year of
    king John, ad 1215, in the great charter granted by that prince"
    59


    That isn't to say that before this time nothing of the like existed, but with the
    writing of the Magna Charta a general summons was issued to various personages by
    the king. Thus parliament was born and over it long history, which is of such a great
    volume to go deeply into here, we arrive at the state where we are today. Common

    56
    Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books by William Blackstone, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1893, p. 67
    57
    An Elementary Commentary on English Law by Alfred Ruegg, 1920, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, p. 15
    58
    The history of the common law of england by Matthew Hale, 1820, sixth edition, Butterworths, p. 21
    59
    Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books by William Blackstone, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1893, p. 149 39

    Law is a complex entity and cannot be summed up lightly, it advisable to read up on
    the subject, where there are plenty of authoritative works in the public domain.

    What we can say is that it is from common law that our next division of law derives
    its authority, namely Statute law.


    Statute Law


    Statute law is referred to as the written law (Lex Scripta). Since Ruegg puts it best
    we will let him give a concise explanation.

    "Statute law ‐ Since Parliamentary government was fully established Statute law
    means the Acts of Parliament passed by the House of Lords and House of Commons,
    and assented to by the King. These Statutes have always necessarily been in writing or
    print, and thus collectively are called the Lex Scripta."
    60


    So basically Statutes are acts of parliaments, of which there have been thousands
    of in its long history, although many have been repealed, or revised. However a
    statute is not simply an act of parliament. It is known that universities use statutes as
    the rules of their organisation, so it is not the sole domain of Parliament to have
    statutes.

    The first written document to pass laws was the Magna Charta of 1215, this is
    debatable whether it is a statute, but it was the first form of written law. Subsequently
    a different version of the Magna Charta was put on the statute rolls, but not the
    original, which is one of the founding documents of the unwritten English
    Constitution.

    Nowadays it would seem to the common man that Statute Law is the law of the
    land but one must make a distinction here between the law and a law. The law is
    what we think of as common law, whilst an act of parliament is a law, usually given
    the force of law. Statute Law was introduced to provide a remedy for a mischief that
    common law did not provide.

    To make this is easier to understand an analogy might clarify things. Imagine a
    mighty oak tree. Now the roots are the customs and traditions of England that have
    developed over time. The trunk of the tree is the common law, which has grown
    bigger and bigger as the roots (customs) grow stronger. Now the branches and leaves
    can be compared to Statute Law. Simple enough, I hope! Now statutes come and go
    as no parliament can be bound by the previous one, like the branches and leaves

    60
    Ibid, p. 11 40

    which wither away and die when new shoots take over. The problem today is that
    people take the branches and leaves to be the whole of the tree, ignoring the trunk
    and the roots.

    Statutes are the rules of society, which can be changed, and it is the law which
    enforces, or not, these rules. Never mistake the rules for the entity which enforces
    them. An example of this is that there is no statute for murder, for it has been an
    immemorial custom that murder is wrong, therefore it is under Common law.
    However, the "crime" of speeding is a statute law, enforced by common law, for
    driving fast is a new phenomenon, which common law had no remedy for.

    The problem with statute law is that it is open to abuse by corrupt people for
    power, for if one can push through a law that is unjust, common law has to enforce it.
    This is what we are seeing happening today as thousands of new offences have been
    created since the seventies, to the point that every boy or child born in Britain will be
    a criminal at some point in their lives, unwillingly or not.

    It was initially this imbalance of statute law that prompted this enquiry into the
    person.

    This is a very simplistic overview of the two divisions of the English system of Law
    and it would benefit the reader to delve deeper into the subject for a better
    understanding, unfortunately this is beyond the scope of this work. What you do
    have is a simple understanding of how the system works, which was necessary for the
    proceeding part. For now we delve more into the world of statutes and see why it is
    relevant to the person and to the reader.




    Statutory Definition of the "Person"

    If one has ever read a statute, then you will know that when you do so you enter a
    labyrinth of language, consisting of twists, turns and dead ends. The language used by
    the draftsmen of such documents is a science in itself, as is the reading of them an art
    form. For this we have solicitors, barristers, lawyers, judges all to help us (please note
    the irony in this). But why cannot the common man simply read the law and be able
    to understand it? Simply because an industry would collapse, an industry that makes
    a lot of money every year.

    So what does the word person have to do with statutes? The answer is everything.
    For statutes only deal with persons, the type we mentioned in the second part of this
    work; either the natural person or the legal person. All the things the law deals with 41

    lies under these two entities, so when one reads a statute a person will inevitably be
    mentioned or implied. This is the reason that understanding what the word person
    means is essential to the reader, because as will be shown a lot of vagueness arises in
    these acts of parliament which control our lives.

    How then does a statute define what a person is? To do this the government has
    given us a hand in the form of the Interpretation act of 1978, this as the preamble (or
    synopsis) of the act:

    "An Act to consolidate the Interpretation Act 1889 and certain other enactments
    relating to the construction and operation of Acts of Parliament and other instruments,
    with amendments to give effect to recommendations of the Law Commission and the
    Scottish Law Commission."
    61


    Basically it helps out by giving some instructions to how acts of parliament are
    constructed. This is relevant to us because it also provides definitions of words used
    often, person being one of them. So let us delve further into this act and the
    construction and interpretation of statutes.




    The Interpretation Act 1978


    This 1978 act was a revision of the 1889 Interpretation act. It lays some clear
    guidelines on the construction of statutes, and consolidates certain ubiquitous terms.
    This was to aid the legislature in the drafting of future acts. An example of this is this
    provision.

    "Any Act may be amended or repealed in the Session of Parliament in which it is
    passed."
    62


    Or,

    "In any Act, unless the contrary intention appears, -

    (a) Words importing the masculine gender include the feminine;
    (b) Words importing the feminine gender include the masculine;
    (c) Words in the singular include the plural and words in the plural include the
    singular."
    63


    61
    Interpretation Act 1978 (c.30), preamble
    62
    Ibid, Section 2 42


    The most important section to us is the following:

    "In any Act, unless the contrary intention appears, words and expressions listed in
    Schedule 1 to this Act are to be construed according to that Schedule."
    64


    To see the entirety of the act of this act look to Appendix C, but the relevant
    definition for us is hidden away in that schedule 1. The relevancy is that it defines the
    word person and how it should be interpreted, it is as follows:

    "Person" includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate.
    65


    A small definition and concise definition, if we can even call it a definition, for it
    defines itself using the word person in the definition. So can we even call this is a
    definition? It looks more like guidance on how to use the word, not what it means.
    We will compare this with the original "definition" of the 1889 act, which is as
    follows:

    "In this Act and in every Act passed after the commencement of this Act the
    expression "person" shall, unless the contrary intention appears, include any body of
    persons corporate or unincorporate"
    66


    So we see that the original 1889 definition was divided and put in different
    sections.

    First we should already be cognizant of the word person so no explanation is
    needed here, but the second word to appear in the phrase is of definite importance
    and that is the word include.

    This is another contentious word in law and there has been great confusion in its
    use. So it is necessary to clarify this word before we can go on with our
    deconstruction. I think most people believe include means to become a part of
    something, as I did at one point, but this is just the common usage. To give an
    example of a dictionary definition include means

    To confine within; to hold; to contain; to shut up; to enclose;.
    67


    What we see here is the real meaning, which is why we say that it means to
    become a part of something, because the true meaning is 'to confine within.' So

    63
    Ibid, Section 6
    64
    Ibid, Section 5
    65
    Ibid, Schedule 1
    66
    Interpretation Act 1889 taken from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary
    67
    "include." Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary. MICRA, Inc. 01 Jul. 2009. 43

    when someone includes you in an activity you become confined within that activity,
    which is another way of saying to become a part of something.

    In law the word include uses its original meaning, as in 'to confine within,' thus
    when used in a statute it is not the same as ordinary usage. This is one of the
    fundamental guides to statutory construction and interpretation, which are
    expressed in a famous maxim;

    Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (The express mention of one thing excludes all
    others)

    It must be understood that this is a guide to construction and not a rule to follow
    obediently. Saying that it does provide light onto the word include. If we were to
    follow the wisdom of the maxim and see the connection to the standard meaning of
    the word include, we can gain a better understanding. Or as Bennion states:

    "The expressio unius principle is also applied where a formula which in itself may or
    may not include a certain class is accompanied by words of extension naming only
    some members of that class. The remaining members of the class are then taken to be
    excluded"
    68


    For example by applying the above maxim to the phrase "Person includes a body of
    persons corporate or unincorporate" we could say that by expressing that a person is 'a
    body of persons corporate or unincorporate,' which would only imply legal person and
    naturally excludes the natural person. For if we remember in law the word person
    refers to a certain class.

    The other way of saying this is by using the standard definition of include, meaning
    to confine within, to hold or contain, to shut up to enclose. The phrase 'Person
    includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate,' would be interpreted as that
    person is only a body of persons corporate or unincorporate, for the usage is confined
    within the word, enclosed by the very word include. Nothing else may enter it.

    So by clarifying the word include then it can be implied that person in the
    interpretation act would appear to exclude natural persons and only refer to legal
    persons. Now this is interesting because if you look back to the 1889 interpretation
    act, that phrase which was moved in the 1978 act, 'unless the contrary intention
    appears,' would seem to indicate that if a statute referred to the natural person this
    would be the appearance of the contrary intention. Therefore person from 1889 to
    1978 and to date would have appeared only to refer to legal persons unless the phrase
    natural person appeared.


    68
    Bennion on Statute Law by Francis Bennion, Published Longman, 1990, p.201 44

    It has been argued that the word include is expansive, but this comes from the
    common usage, for if you keep including things into something else expansion
    occurs. Many legal scholars try to press forth this point that seems to go against the
    very words they use. For example Wilberforce states that

    "...it has been considered that the Legislature has intentionally given words a more
    extended meaning than they would ordinarily receive. The interpretation clause
    sometimes provides that a certain word shall " include" a variety of things, and it is
    then held that this phrase is used by way of extension, and not as giving a definition by
    which other things are to be excluded."
    69


    However In the very Interpretation Act of 1978, it specifically gives a list of
    definitions under schedule 1
    70
    in the act. The title being 'Words and phrases defined,'
    you will see many definitions because it will say something like "this means that."
    But in three or four cases it uses the words include, like is the case with the word
    person. Now if Wilberforce is right then by using the word include it does not give a
    definition, yet schedule 1 explicitly states that these are words and phrases defined. If
    it were a true defintion then our contentious phrase would look more like this:

    "Person means a body of persons corporate or unincorporate."

    Let us try and apply this idea of expansion to an ordinary sentence, e.g. 'dinner
    includes roast beef and roast potatoes.' The word dinner is to mean a type of meal, so
    really it is like our word person, a class of things and not a thing in itself. Therefore a
    real defintion of the word dinner would be 'a meal eaten at night.' If we use the word
    include then we are not defining the word dinner but describing the constituent
    parts. So our example above basically states that dinner will consist of roast beef and
    roast potatoes. It does not expand on the meaning but elucidates the contents,
    therefore it only expands on what parts of a class of things are going to be used in the
    meaning. Now there are many foods which could make up a dinner so the need to
    elucidate the contents is necessary, but for the class of persons we only have two
    constituents, namely natural persons and legal persons. By this reasoning then the
    word include is not expansive but descriptive. So when we see the a word followed by
    include we are dealing with a class of things and what comes after that is restricting
    the use of the word to what is elucidated. If we were to use the reasoning of the
    judiciary on the word include then a phrase like 'dinner includes peas' would mean
    that dinner means every type of food plus peas.



    69
    Statute law by Edward Wilberforce, 1881, Stevens and son, p, 299
    70
    See Appendix c, Schedule 1 45

    But there are times that the phrase 'includes but not limited to'
    71
    will appear in a
    statute, which also seems to suggest that include is a word of limitation and not
    expansion. Another way of saying what include means might be to say that 'include is
    used with the intention of saying.' For we must reiterate our own maxim for meaning
    which was:

    "The word is not the thing it represents but gets its meaning from its use"

    This small definition given to us by the 1978 Interpretation act seems full of
    contradictions, for even if we look up the word definition we see that it means:

    "The act of defining or making definite, distinct, or clear"
    72


    Now if we look once again to the 1978 acts definition would this be even called a
    definition?

    "Person includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate"
    73


    Clearly by using the same word to define itself is surely not the essence of
    clarity or distinction, not to mention the opposite of definite, which means:
    "...clearly defined or determined; not vague or general; fixed; precise; exact"
    74

    Vagueness seems to sum up the 1978 acts definition of person. Now in every
    act of parliament the word person is to be construed as how they have stated it in
    the 1978 Interpretation act. So this vagueness spread through the thousands of
    acts that the word person appears in multiple times. Could it not have been
    easier just to say that person includes natural persons and legal persons? There is
    another maxim of law that would seem to cover the state of affairs we see before
    us, which is.
    "It is a miserable slavery where the law is vague or uncertain.(Misera est
    servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incertum.)"
    Is this not what we see before us, the law being uncertain and vague, and does
    the current state of affairs reflect this? This is up to the reader to ascertain, for
    where one person agrees another may not.
    Let us now look into the rest of the phrase 'a body of persons corporate or
    unincorporate' to conclude our deconstruction. The first word that strikes us
    here is the term body, but since it is being used idiomatically in the term 'a body

    71
    Examples of this can be seen in such acts as the data protection act; freedom of information act;
    72
    http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/definition
    73
    Interpretation Act 1978 (c.30), Schedule 1
    74
    http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/definite 46

    of persons' we must look towards the idiom rather than the separate words. For
    then it would mean 'as a group; together; collectively'
    75
    or 'A group of individuals
    regarded as an entity.'
    76
    So we have a group of persons and if we refer back to our
    definition of person form the last part.
    Person - An entity with the ability or capacity to have rights and duties
    We seem to have a group of entities with the ability or capacity to have rights
    and duties which is amended by the phrase corporate or incorporate. Now as
    should be known by now that a body corporate can be either a corporation
    aggregate or corporation sole.
    Unincorporate just means they haven't been incorporated and thus can mean
    associations, like charities or member interest clubs or things or their ilk. And
    have separate characteristics, elucidated below
    "An unincorporated association:
     is not a legal entity,
     is an organisation of persons or bodies (more than one) with an identifiable
    membership (possibly changing),
     has a membership who are bound together for a common purpose by an identifiable
    constitution or rules (which may be written or oral),
     is an organisation where the form of association is not one which is recognised in law
    as being something else (for example, an incorporated body or a partnership),
     must have an existence distinct from those persons who would be regarded as its
    members,
     The tie between the persons need not be a legally enforceable contract."
    77



    So by this deconstruction can we not give a more distinct clarification of the
    definition of person in the 1978 Act. The original definition was:
    "Person includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate."
    Our definition would go something like this:
    "Person is used with the intention of saying that it refers to a group of entities
    with the ability or capacity to have rights and duties, namely corporations'

    75
    http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/body
    76
    Ibid
    77
    http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ctmanual/ctm41305.htm 47

    aggregate and unincorporated associations (who do not possess any legal
    personality)
    Now this a lot more complex of an explanation but it gives you an idea of how
    the interpretation act is trying to define the word person. Our definition was
    meant to provide more clarity; well to some extent it clarifies what the 1978
    Interpretation Act is trying to say. But we do not get much clarity for a
    layperson's understanding. For this we can call it vague and misleading and the
    consequences of this can be profound.
    It is generally assumed that because the word person refers to a human being
    as most people use it, but as we have shown this is not strictly true. In the
    second part of this work we described the word person as a class of things in law.
    Now it should be up to the 1978 Interpretation Act to say what it includes in that
    class, and nowhere do you see a natural person. Of course, they will say it is
    naturally implied because of ordinary usage. This is not the case in law, for the
    ordinary usage of person is completely different from the legal usage. Of we were
    to take their idea that person is implied, then how do we know when it refers to
    the natural person or when it refers the legal person? Can you not see the
    vagueness and generality of their use of the word person? Therefore it is a truly
    miserable slavery we live under with such absurdities in these laws which control
    our lives.
    However to understand this absurdity we must look closer into how a statute
    is constructed and therefore interpreted. For this lies at the heart of the problem
    with our word person, because of the regularity it is used with we must
    understand the framework it derives its context.
    This, understandably, will be the most difficult part of this work as statutory
    construction and interpretation is a very technical art form, yet an attempt will
    be made to make it more intelligible to the reader. For if it is difficult for the
    people whose job it is to draft these statutes, then for the common man it must
    be nearly impossible. For as Bennion, one of the leading authorities on statutory
    interpretation, says
    "Modern statute law consists of a set of written texts which (in themselves) are
    difficult to understand if you are a lawyer and impossible if you are not. Yet
    misapprehension will not avail as a shield: ignorantia juris non excusat."
    78


    The Latin maxim he quotes means simply ignorance of the law is no excuse.
    Which for us common folk simply means that it's not their fault if you don't
    understand the law; you only have yourself to blame. So seemingly in the eyes of law
    we must know the essence of what law is, every statute and know what it all means.

    78
    Bennion on Statute Law by Francis Bennion, Published Longman, 1990, p.10 48

    If this was true then what need is there for the legal profession, for if we have to
    know everything then they would not be necessary.


    Statutory Construction and Interpretation

    We must make a clear difference between the construction of a statute and
    the interpretation of it. The construction of a statute is usually drafted by
    someone of the legal profession expressing the will of parliament. The
    interpretation is to aid those who adjudicate the law.
    To go too deeply into the construction of statues is not too necessary in this
    work, but some references from time to time will be necessary. The more
    important and relevant to our argument is how the law is interpreted, thus we
    will look into some general themes of how a statute must be interpreted.
    The English language must be one of the languages of the world most open to
    interpretation, and in essence this is highly subjective, which those who
    adjudicate the law have found out. It is said that nine out of every cases that
    reach the House of Lords, the highest court of appeal, deals with statutory
    interpretation. So you can see this is an important topic, especially in the
    context of this work. However because this has been such a problem some
    guidelines have, over time, been developed to aid in the interpretation of
    statutes, which we will give a brief sketch of now.
    There are many aids that a judge can fall back on. The four primary ones are
    succintly described below.


    The Mischief Rule
    One of the original purposes of Statute Law was to provide a remedy where
    the common law did not cover. This rule lets the judge look at the former
    state of the law to find out the mischief the statute was meant to remedy.
    79




    79
    Backed by Heydon's Case [1584] EWHC Exch J36 (01 January 1584), Smith v Hughes (1960), Corkery v Carpenter (1951) 49

    The Golden Rule
    The golden rule states that if there is any ambiguity in the interpretation of a
    word then to avoid absurdity the court must adopt an interpretation to avoid
    this.
    80


    The Literal Rule
    The literal rule81
    was given by Lord Esher in the famous case of 'R v Judge of the
    City of London Court (1892)' in which he said
    "If the words of an Act are clear then you must follow them even though they
    lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question
    whether the legislature has committed an absurdity."
    82

    This basically sums up the literal rule quite nicely.

    The Purposive Approach
    The purposive approach83
    is to find out the intent of parliament when it
    drafted the legislation. It must me pointed out that this is one of the more
    controversial aids to interpretation. For it has beeen said that:
    "the purposive approach is one used by most continental European countries
    when interpreting their own legislation. It is also the approach which is taken by
    the European Court of Justice in interpreting EU law."
    84


    These are the four main guides by which judges interprate the law, however
    there are more aids that the ajudicators can fall back on. For there are rules of
    langauge, in the form of maxims, and external and intrinic aids. These other aids
    are more specific than the general rules laid out before.
    The rules of language are like the maxim 'Expressio unius est exclusio alterius'
    we introduced before the other two popular ones area as follows:



    80
    Backed by Adler v George (1964), Re Sigsworth (1935)
    81
    Backed by Whiteley v Chappell (1868), London & North Eastern Railway v Berriman (1946)
    82
    http://www.peterjepson.com/law/legislation_cases.htm
    83
    Backed by Notham v London Borough of Barnet (1978), Royal College of Nursing v DHSS (1980), Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd (1997)
    84
    http://openlearn.open.ac.uk/mod/reso...08918&direct=1 50

    Ejusdem generis
    This literally means 'of the same kind,' which means any general word used
    after specific words it assumed that they are of the same class. For example if
    something included lions and tigers and other dangerous animals, animals like
    rabbits or cats would be exluded, as they are not dangerous animals.
    85


    Noscitur a sociis
    This maxim is used to mean 'a word is known by the company it keeps,' of
    course this is not the literal translation but its use in interpretation. Basically it
    means if a word is ambiguous then one must look at the context in which it is
    written i.e. the whole statute.
    86


    Along with the Expressio unius these make the three primary maxims of
    interpretation
    Next we turn to the intrinsic aids of interpretation, which apart form one
    thing will be found in the statute itself. The one thing that is outside of the
    statute is the Interpretation Act, which must be referred to. The parts in the
    statute whic are aids are the following
     The long title - this is to show the general objectives of the statute.
     The preamble - this was supposed to elucidate the mischief that the
    statute was to be the remedy for
     Interpretation sections - Most statutes have their own interpretation
    sections and they must be looked out if a different meaning is intended.
     Other things such as headings and sidenotes and explanatory sections
    (which is a recent occurence)
    External aids on the other hand come from a variety of sources.
     Dictionaries - these are often used for finding the legal meaning of a
    word.
     Works by eminent writers such as Blackstone, Coke, Salmond, et al.
    Although these are not law itself they give a different but authoritive
    perspective to the law.
     Other cases are also an important aid in the interpretation of an act for if
    some judge has deemed a word to mean such and such, then many other
    judges follow the reasoning and use the interpretation.

    85
    Backed by Allen v Emerson [1944] QBD, Evans v Cross (1938), Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse (1899)
    86
    Backed by Muir v Keay (1875), Inland Revenue Commissioners v Frere [1964] HL 51

     Hansaard - these are the words of the house of prliament written down
    and are used to find out the intention of parliament. Before this was not
    allowed but know it is more acceptable.
     Official reports - writings from such organiations such as the law
    commision, the royal commision or other advisory bodies.

    There are probably more extrenal aids but these cover the most important
    devices used in interpretation.
    So now we have seen the help that is given to those who have to interpret the
    maze of words that make up a statute. This of course is a simplistic explanation
    and the reader must take this on board, but there are plenty of works in the
    public domain which go deeper into this subject. An overview is sufficient for
    this work.
    So how do we relate this all back to the person in law? Well what we have
    seen so far is the origins and history of the the word, what the common usage of
    the word means, how law uses the word and finally how statute law regards the
    person. But the more contentious of what we have seen has to be how a person is
    regarded in statute law, since the "defintion" is really no defintion at all. when we
    refer back to how the law regards the person. So we now must look into the
    connection between Statute Law and the person. So can we apply some of these
    to the interpretation statute.

    Statutory Interpretation and The Interpretation Act

    So we have the following phrase:
    "Person includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate."
    Can we now use some of the rules of interpretation and apply it to this
    contentious little phrase. We have already applied the Expressio unius rule and
    according to this our phrase excludes natural persons. We cannot use the
    Ejusdem generis rule because of the nature of the phrase, but we can use the
    other maxim of construction, Noscitur a sociis. With this maxim we must
    consider the whole statute in the interpretation of the definition of person. As we
    quoted above, which we will repeat again.
    "In any Act, unless the contrary intention appears, words and expressions listed
    in Schedule 1 to this Act are to be construed according to that Schedule." 52

    As you can see that all statutes must abide by the defintion of person unless
    the contrary appears. Now the schedule is entitled "words and expressions
    defined," which would indicate that the phrase that follows the word is the
    defintion. So by applying the Noscitur a sociis maxim any word under this
    schedule is a defintion whether or not they use the word 'include' or 'mean,'
    simply by the nature of the section.
    Combine the Noscitur a sociis maxim with the Expressio unius rule and we
    have our word person to mean that it only refers to a legal person.
    If we turn to our interperative aids developed by the judges, namely the
    mischief, golden, literal and purposive rules of interpretation.
    Beginning with the mischief rule we can assume the interpretation act was
    meant to solidify the interpretation of statutes to get rid of the mischief of badly
    constructed statutes by giving some solid guidlines on the construction and
    interpretation of statutes. The reason that person is included in the definition is
    because there must have been controversy with the very word. We can see this
    clearly by our investigation carried out in part 2 of this work, as the person in law
    is not as simple as it seems. So it would seem to suggest that the inclusion of the
    word and its defintion was to remedy the mischief that was being caused by its
    misuse.
    Now we must apply the Golden rule, 'if there is any ambiguity in the
    interpretation of a word then to avoid absurdity the court must adopt an
    interpretation to avoid this.' Well since the interpretation act was crafted to
    avoid any ambiguity, it would seem to be the embodiment of the golden rule,
    since statutes were meant to provide a remedy where common law provided
    none. What other interpretation are we supposed to take if, as mentioned above,
    the interpretation act states '"In any Act, unless the contrary intention appears,
    words and expressions listed in Schedule 1 to this Act are to be construed according
    to that Schedule.' All acts of parliament refer back to the interpretation act if
    there is any doubt. So the golden rule seems to indicate that the definition of
    person is the one to be found in the interpretation act.
    If we now apply the literal rule to the defintion of person we just have to
    accept the interpretation act's defintion. So what we have is that the word
    person only refers to the legal person and bodies unincorporate. So any time in
    any act, unless the contrary appears, even of it leads to absurdity it must refer to
    a legal person. Of course this will lead to absurdity unless the legislature had
    some intention with this strange definition. But as the interpretations says
    'unless the contrary appears,' so we must find the contrary, which would be
    mentioning the natural person. One of the most strange examples, of which
    there are few, is in the human rights act. 53

    "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
    possessions"
    87

    Well this is one mention of the natural person, which in the human rights act
    you might expčct to find. The strange thing is why is a legal person mentioned?
    For they are not human. A conundrum indeed! So if the definition of person in
    the interpretation included natural persons by implication then it would not be
    necessary to say it. There are more instances of the natural person being referred
    to, but they are few and far between.
    When we turn to the purposive approach we must look to hansard to find the
    intentions of parliament to see what they say about the interpretation act.
    Unfortunatley there is very little reference to this clause in the 1978 act and only
    indirect references to the 1889 definition. As Mr Edmund Robertson says in one
    commitee session
    "I have been asked, for instance, if a railway company is a public authority. I do
    not know whether it is meant to be included in "public authority or persons."
    "Person" would be included under the Interpretation Act, because railway
    companies under that Act are incorporations, and "person" includes
    incorporations. "Person," as I understand it, is either natural or artificial, and an
    artificial "person" is an incorporation. But all other groups of human beings who
    are not incorporated are simply collections of individuals"
    88

    Or as MR. A. G. Murray says in the same session.
    "I think the word "person," in the singular, would be sufficient, because, with
    the aid of the Interpretation Act, either in its natural sense or as relating to a body
    corporate or incorporate, it would include every body"
    89

    And,
    "The 19th Section of the Interpretation Act states that in every Act passed after
    that Act the expression "person" includes any body or person corporate or
    incorporate; and, so far as I know, there is no body which is not corporate or
    incorporate."
    90

    These three examples show indirectly how the word person is interpretated by
    some. The problem here is that purposive approach seeks to find the intention
    of parliament but surely the act itself is the intent of parliament, or why would
    an act be written in such a way. The purposive approach is a slightly more
    contreversial approach as it seeks to imitate the continental approach to

    87
    http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk, Human Rights Act 1998, schedule 1, part 2, article 1
    88
    http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/c...990612_HOC_158
    89
    Ibid
    90
    Ibid 54

    interpretation, which are all, except us, civil law countries and so approach law in
    an entirely different way.
    In part two we looked to some of the extrinsic aids, by saying what leading
    authorities have to say on the subject and the conclusion can be found there.
    What we are left with by using some aids of interpretation is some very
    contradictory views on what a person is in the 1978 Interpretation act. We have
    deconstructed the interpretation act and from that it seems that person only
    refers to the legal person. Also by applying some interpretative aids to the act
    most of the evidence seems to point towards the same conclusion that unless the
    contrary appears (as it does in the human rights act or the consumer credit act
    91
    )
    person refers to a legal person.
    I think the question is that lies before us is why is the natural person excluded
    from the definition, if it is well known in the legal world that word person in
    legal knowledge refers to two different types. Would it not be easy to put these
    two simple words "natural person"in the 1978 interpretation act and clear up the
    ambiguity? For at that time the differemce between the legal and natural person
    was a well established idea in law. It does appear suspicious that such a simple
    thing has not been amended and such ambiguity has been allowed to continue,
    but this if this is the legislators will can there be a reason to leave the state of
    affairs as they are?
    So after all that has been seen it is now time to find out the answer to our
    intial question, "Is a Human Being a person?"











    91
    http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ 55












    Conclusion
    Is a Human Being a Person?












    56



    Conclusion

    Can we now begin to formulate an answer to our question? I think it would be
    wise to summarise our findings before we can begin to even suggest an answer.
    To show Greenbough and kittredge's diagram would help us give us a visual
    summary first.

    1. A A mask
    2. A+B character indicated by mask
    3. B character or role in (play)
    4. B+C one who represents a character
    5. C a representative in general
    6. C+D a representative of church in Parish
    7. D a parson
    8. D+E a parson with high rank or office
    9. E someone with high rank or office
    10. E+F high rank/office has status
    11. F someone with status
    12. F+G s/one with status has rights
    13. G anyone with rights
    14. G+H any entity with rights

    In the first part of this work we looked at the history of the word person from
    which we found the original meaning was (A) in our diagram, simply a mask.
    Over the course of centuries this meaning transformed in to a character or role
    (B) which meaning or use we still retain in the word persona. This later
    morphed into a representative (C) as a character was representative of
    something. Our look into etymology then led us to see that at one point in our
    history the word person was synonymous with the word parson. Since the word
    person was related to parson and by extension parsonage and personage are
    related. Thus with the meaning taking on a religious connatation, status was
    introduced into the concepts (see E to F), this was naturally influenced by the
    power of the church and state at that time.
    Next we looked at law and this gave our definitions F to G+H as a person and
    rights are intimately linked, one is irrelevant without the other. So by viewing
    this diagram we can see quickly and easily the evolution of the word, but the 57

    story doesn't end there, we are still left with our question of why we call a human
    being a person. Well this would become defintion H if we carried on our
    diagram, but we first must look at this more logically.
    It is assumed that every Human Being has rights, naturally called Human
    rights, and this can be see in Appendix B in the three documents of rights which
    are applicable to us. And if we remember Salmonds quote above
    "So far as legal theory is concerned, a person is any being whom the law regards
    as capable of rights and duties"
    From this we can say that because all humans have rights and since law
    regards any being with rights as a person. Then logically all Human Beings are
    persons, syllogystically it would look like this
    All Human Beings have rights
    Rights only belong to persons (Under law)
    Thus all human beings are persons
    So to finish our diagram let us add definition H to see the final picture of the
    evolution of the word person.
    1. A A mask
    2. A+B character indicated by mask
    3. B character or role in (play)
    4. B+C one who represents a character
    5. C a representative in general
    6. C+D a representative of church in Parish
    7. D a parson
    8. D+E a parson with high rank or office
    9. E someone with high rank or office
    10. E+F high rank/office has status
    11. F someone with status
    12. F+G s/one with status has rights
    13. G anyone with rights
    14. G+H any entity with rights
    15. H a human being

    This would be seem the source of the concept that a Human Being is referred
    to as a person, because of the evolution of a word throughout the centuries and
    its adaptation into law. It was a slow process, full of iniquities, which has
    brought into the language a word which means one thing in one sphere of life
    and something different in another. Unfortunately these spheres, both law and 58

    ordinary life, do not exist separately. So we have to make distinction between
    these two spheres otherwise confusion is inevitable.
    Common usage of the word person as a synonym of human being has no
    inherent difficulties, it is the laws adaptation of the word that has created the
    confusion and thus the necessity of this work. The creation of the person as a
    vehicle for rights was a slow process and whether this process is still continuing
    we cannot say, but we can say that a concept hundreds of years old is still being
    applied today. It is quite easy to say that not all persons are human beings, but
    rather difficult to say the contrary that not all human beings are persons, yet in
    many periods of history this has been the case.
    However as we found out in Part 2 of this work that the word person in law
    actually referred to a class of things rather than a specific thing. Thus when we
    refer to a human being as a person we are in fact refering to a class humans
    belong to. An example of this would be similar to calling another human a
    mammal. Technically it is correct that all humans are mammals, but not all
    mammals are human beings, which is very much like the situation with the word
    person. So when we read the word person in any legislation it is referring to a
    class of beings in law, not the common usuage of the word, which has probably
    been adapted from law and not the other way round.
    So what is the answer to our question? Is a Human Being a person or not?
    Unfortunately there is no straightforward answer, becuase we can both say yes
    and no, it is entirely dependent on certain conditions. When a human being is a
    person it is because they have the ability or capacity for rights, thus it is entirely
    dependent on the connection between rights and duties and the legal
    personality. Hypothetically speaking. if a human has no rights then they cannot
    be considered a person. Technically speaking, since a person is a class of things
    or beings then a human being is not a person and if we really want to be pedantic
    we are not human beings as this too is a class. We are a man or a woman, a male
    or a female, for this these are the true nouns for both sexes of our species.
    It is because we have all these rights and duties attached to us that we are
    considered to be persons under the eyes of the law. The long struggle for human
    rights created, in law, a persona to which these rights belong, which we see
    mirrored in the concept of the legal person. This fictional entity has no physical
    existence yet it has the same rights and duties that every man and woman
    possesses. But this legal person exists in law equally the same as the physical
    man or woman, and since this is the case we can suggest that being a person has
    very little to do with physical existence but some metaphysical existence that law
    or society has created and maintains. If we were stretch this further it would
    seem that the law is the one that confers these rights and legal personality,
    neither being natural in its strictest sense. For we have seen in Appendix B the
    three fundamental human rights documents have been written to give all 59

    humans rights and because of this all men are persons. But can a human being
    reject these rights and duties and thus strip himself of his legal personality? Or
    is the process auotmatic the moment we are born?
    What we have found out in this work is the central link between rights and
    the person, which in turn must be linked with the society and law a man lives in.
    However we must make a division between the common usuage of the word
    person, which is entirely different from the technical meaning in law. This is the
    point that must be understood and absorbed that words in different contexts are
    used in different ways. It is the hope of this work that people understand the
    difference and what this distinction implies in everyday life.
    In Britain we have looked at the law and how the word person is used, but it
    is filled with ambiguity and confusion which the law abhors, which will naturally
    affect the common man. Whether this is intentional or unintentional it is not for
    me to say, but if one is aware of the difference in its use then it is a useful piece
    of knowledge for us to have when dealing with that are of life i.e. the law. It
    cannot be more strongly emphasised how the law affects our lives overtly and
    covertly. From birth we are under the eyes of law and it follows us to our death,
    so to not put importance of the effect of some of the smaller points of law that fly
    under the radar, just like our controversial word person, is unexcusable. As you
    should have seen by now in this work how the effect of one word has had on the
    evolution of our society, we should realise the effect it is producing now and in
    our daily lives.
    It is up to the reader the importance that is put on this word, but hopefully
    you have a greater knowledge of our little friend and how it is used both in
    ordinary life and in law. What you do now with this information lies on the
    shoulder of the readers. Bibliography

     Significant Etymology: by James Mitchell (1908), footnote, William
    Blackwood and Sons
     The theatre, its development in France and England, and a history of
    its Greek and Latin origins: by Charles Hastings (1901) Duckworth & Co
     Words and their ways in English speech: by Greenough and Kittridge,
    (1902). Macmillan and Co.
     Roman Britain by H.M. Scarth, London, S.P.C.K
    http://www.etymonline.com
     Analytical dictionary of the English language by David Booth, 1835,
    Cochrane and Co.
     As You Like It by William Shakespeare, 1599
     The Origins of Political Correctness An Accuracy in Academia Address
    by Bill Lind, 2000
     Political Correctness by Philip Atkinson,
    http://www.ourcivilisation.com/pc.htm
     George Orwell: 'Politics and the English Language' First published:
    Horizon. GB, London., April 1946
     Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, Basil
    Blackwell Ltd
     Science and Sanity by Alfred Korzybski, 5th
    Edition, Institute of
    General semantics, 1994,
     Jurisprudence and the law by John Salmond, second edition, Steven
    and Hayes, 1907,
     A first book of Jurisprudence, by Sir Frederick Pollock, second edition,
    1904, Macmillian and Co
     Elements of Law by William Markby, sixth edition, Oxford press, 1905
     A Treatisse of Universal Jurisprudence by John Penford Thomas,
    second edition, 1829
    http://dictionary.reference.com  Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books by William
    Blackstone, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1893
     The Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., 1882, Macmillan and
    Co.
     A Treatise on the law relating to Municipal Corporations in England
    and Wales by Thomas Arnold, Third edition 1863
     The British citizen: His rights and priviliges, a short history, 1885, E. &
    J.B. Young
     A short history of women's rights, By Eugene Hecker, Second edition,
    1914, G.P. Putman's sons
     An Elementary Commentary on English Law by Alfred Ruegg, 1920,
    George Allen & Unwin Ltd
     The history of the common law of england by Matthew Hale, 1820,
    sixth edition, Butterworths
     The Judicial Dictionary, by F.Stroud, 1903, Second Edition, Sweet and
    Maxwell Ltd
     Bennion on Statute Law by Francis Bennion, Published Longman, 1990
     Statute law by Edward Wilberforce, 1881, Stevens and son
    http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk
    http://hansard.millbanksystems.com
    http://www.opsi.gov.uk/



    Appendix A

    From Ballentines Law Dictionary, third edition





    From Black's law dictionary first edition

    PERSON. A man considered according to the rank he holds in society, with all the rights
    to which the place he holds entitles him, and the duties which it imposes. 1 Bonv. Inst. no.
    137.
    A human being considered as capable of having rights and of being charged with duties;
    while a "thing" is the object over which rights may be exercised.
    Persons are divided by law into natural and artificial. Natural persons are such as
    the God of nature formed us; artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws,
    for the purposes of society and government, which are called "corporations" or "bodies
    politic." 1 Bl. Comm. 123.


    From Black's law dictionary Fourth edition


    Continued On next page


    PERSON - PERSONAL
    New York. 1 S.Ct. 108, 119 U.s. 111l. 30 LEd 342;
    ancl I llIItUIOI')' rtqulreme.'rt of suoh conditionl
    if not In roIJnkl with ua ",Vlh Am.lllln .. m;
    ~mblna ConooL S. M. " M. Co. v. PeMIIYI<'lU1if.
    8 S.CL 73'1. 125 U.s. 1~1. m. 31 L.Ed. cso.
    II may i~oludl p&MnoWJpo. In .. Jullo)l, D.
    c.ra" 22 F .supp. 9'/. 99. AI.o nrm .. sal< '""
    teL Jouptt R. Peebles Sol\I Co. v. Slale Iloan:l o.f
    Phorma.OY. 127 OhloSL 513. 189 N.Ģ. 447. 448-
    ''P",""",'' ON II ~ klll
    -.1 ... 1 "".- 10 • I ...... btl... It.,,j~oI po._ I ...
    cllillo ... Iiol'
    • ""_, • "'I ......... or tro,."" to whim.". II ..
    .Cltlb.ta .". ...... ., Of ,.. ..... ""'\1 .. ~ tVl'''' '1'1>0
    II" ........ I! ...uklal _. 10 _n,'" 01" '0 •
    IJmll4o\l .. "., , ... , , ..... .,...,[U on ..... ",to Of _
    1>0"""'" 00' .. _ -. Ho .. " • • I)_II. III
    WfO. 1.1. ... 1' . " 100. _
    U IIu _ Mid .... ' ...... tI>o ...... _ 1I •• d I • •
    10,"1011 .. ort. .. ro,", _, WIll M In",.1IM ""lOll.
    ","""r •• OP_ 'n 'hi ......... .-UIo, I, .. 01100 to
    or"Id. 1 _ ... 1110] • •. Wor,..., 1 11< ...... nI .. , • ., ....
    .... or .,." '''' .... ""', ..... 1111; .. , .... "''' .. .,... ..
    ,,_ "'I' ..... _ ",""Ill "'thin " •• '''tull. ""_
    ' ... '."."'" 01 "'. ' ...... lYft ...... "...",. to ,,,,,t,,,,,
    ....... 5trlbb'la. T . 1loU. S IW>\ .. V". 13:>. •
    It. ........ riO""'" " • loW ...... l.O ... _ 00. '.
    TrI
    T. to ""It. ~ NT. 10."'- 11 Am. r_ '15" U. S •. JI'o', go
    U,L.na, " 1.. .... '"", l\>1 _, .. WlW. tb ...... , • • Of.
    ,II'.". OfVYl4lor .... oIt:1'!"' ... 1n •• I11 .. , ....... Io • • r
    • PU"''' _ .... '<10 '"'''' " .. Mr ".....,." ""
    , .. "" •• , M .. " • • . $ .... , M '1'< .. '" ..... ,,", .....
    _to, 0' .......... , ~ .... """ -"" _""
    '.""" lil t 0"" ....,. ""'""" or .... " .. ," (l',.,.p "
    ."" .... "J. <8 1' ." .. ( .. , .. " • _ U.
    I. •. crook,' DIll ...... ...... C .. ,~D.I .... " ... . "."" ....
    .. ""'_ .... , ...... to '" ..... ~ .. 01 _mItUIII "
    rIO, I, ""'lu"","'" WIth whl .. :ntII. 8 ..... , '!'!to
    Bu', .I.C, _ Th ....... 01. l oeo<\
    "'II'. S ..... 101 IH. M.' N.1. ft., I N.B. 1'-\ " """
    !lop 11, . M ,,~ .... tbo . .. tu .. __ tho ow ... 0' ....
    II ..... I .. IIIJWI .. to .. r _, II ...... .,.. I ... _.,
    01 ""'" _ , Brower 0. C .... b, . II G:., •• 10 .... :It' OY'
    ....... tbo ""ull ...,., ........... "" rot .... ~l .. O! 0 ~
    ...... '" _".. bI' ''' • I ....... n _ hol l 1"..11-
    Ŧ ... , to.!>ow , ... , tho do. had _r "'" ... I;OOL
    r"'l t Q,II. 1(ŧ: .... ,",U lI(I" , • .,_ " tbo won
    '" .. "'" "11!ot1 ........... ,. ~BI
    0<1." .. 1I'04t • . H"""L '" Ml
    Wh .... tbo ... tul ........ 'b' ... '.r _ ....... ~."' ..
    h .. _" _" ...... 'ho 1Ar< ....... 11 to oppq
    10 • luIII'. l>o(dl11c....... _. ilvIA." 00. _
    A O!tUd .. _ ..... __ I, >01 • oonon. !)I.,,,,,,,,.
    Nor ...... ..., .. 131 WOI. 14. ~ ..... 1\0,. ~2.' ""t .. I,..
    fu ....... Mr
    d
    ... , I"""" .... S .. loall. l(. 1111 Nou. -Kl.
    tn th.U. , ... 8t_"" ... .,.."'. o
    t._. "'" ,..f' "_""""II "'old. ""' ...... U"'"',_
    .. "... o'>....toe " ........... , """"". _ ........... In4
    """"' .... II. " h .. _, .. , .. ,0/...".,. to "" """","ul ...
    o! ..... _ oro Utr.I. """' ., ... , ,"*1.1 !Doh.d. pot ....
    ,,110 .... [II
    _ , onl ...". ..... <>l tilt "" .. ~ OS QIr .. ..,.. ...
    • f thoU _tl'OlllIIc bOdl ... 01 _. lio... 11 tJ,llCA.
    ..
    "'PI ,u"ltŦ or rutll"." Of w1>loIt tic "'~"" •• ~ d.u ..
    on .
    ho'"" ,''''' "lt lo.", .. "b.t I • ..,..,. .. U . ... """ ... .
    "n. Polloclt. .·'m IIoolt of Jurltor. Uil. er ... N ... ..
    .. . .... , ... of Lo", .". U.
    PERSONA. lAL
    In the clvil law. Cltaratter. in virtue 01 which
    certain nibil btlon. to a man II!Id """1I1n dUI~1
    a~ Im!>Olled UjlM him. Thill 0'"" nun may untt~
    m.o.ny "~.,,... <"",_ .. . ) ,,", lor elample. Ib~
    tMr.Ol",.. 01 loth ... a ..... a ln. Qt muter and lieN
    I nt. Mitckeldltom.Law. I 129.
    tn E:ccl."wlleal Law. Tile ~or 01 a cblll'Cb
    Instituted and Induo:tli'd. lOT hiI OWD Ute. wu
    ~ll'
    con<'enlual body, 10 whom the chun:h wu fort!vt' r
    4pproprtolfd, wu termed .per, ..... 1m_alii."
    ,-"
    I'FA'>ONA C01UlJ:II(;TA IEQlll'A~Anlfl. IN.
    Tll llf:sf;F. J>JŦ)PIIIO. A periOrW """n..:tlon
    [1!letolly •• unllod pt'f1On. unlol wllh a penonl
    if equivalent to on~1 ...... n In le_l: ~amHI 01
    blood II as e<><>d I conolde<&t\on .. one'l own In.
    Ie ..... !. Bat."' ..... 72, Rif.
    PI':JtSC)NA Dt'8IClNATA. A poroon pointed out
    or d9O!'lDild u an individual, U 0\>P0I0!d 10 •
    penon .-rtlllJted " • mem~r
    ftlllnt • partlcuIAt dw-act ....
    I'EIlSONA ~OOJ.l!SLE. "nw Plrwn or ~
    allon 01 the cburdL
    PEIiSONA I!;!jT HOllO CVM SfATV QVODAl l
    OONSII)J:;RATU!. A penon If a tnln eurutlde ••
    ed with 1'Ctel't~ 10 • lIel1&ln 'Iulu.. i!eine<'C.
    Elem. l l, Ul 3. f 15.
    1 'V.asoNA NON GRATA. In lnt ....... Uon.o1 law
    and a lplomaUc Mace •• j)CfW(III not a=ptable (10.
    "'UON pecull;u to him.ell) 10 tbe rourl or ~ov.
    ornment 10 which It If propoled to Ilrrdlt him
    In the characttr ol in amlwaador or mlnlfter.
    PERSOl'fA REGIS MEno lTIJR f'f:RSOl'fA DlJ.
    ell!. JO!nk.c"nl 1110. The j)Cn0lt of duke metres
    In thaI 01 kIni .
    PF.IISOl'fA. STANI)! IN I\Jl)IClo. C.paclt1 01
    01 ~Or In court or In 'ud~m'nT: capacI ty to be
    I PlIny to a:n lotion; capadty or ability 10 'l1li •
    PJ\RSONABLE. Havl11ll the r lrbta and P~rI
    of • per..,D; a~le to hold 01' ""'InIlID a plea IJt
    rourt: at.o "lID1l:!!)' to take a:nY!hInJ: (raJ>ted or
    .,-From the Judicial and Statutory definitions of words and phrases, second edition.


    PERSISTENCE-PERSIST 981 PERSON
    PERSISTENCE-PERSIST
    To satisfy the provl80 of the Act of 1792
    {3 Smith'" Laws Pa. p. 73). "perslMtence," tn
    tbe settlement of pubUc land to IIBve Ita for-.
    tl'ittlt't, "must meaD something real; not
    m"rely the wlshfng or e,en atteropUng to do
    an act Impossible, or so dangeroull that DO
    mun rould be expected to attE'mpt It." Such
    Imn'I!lO only c1tspf'1l11e8 with the forfE'iture In·
    rurred, according to the law, by not making
    a settlement aDd continuing It, wltbtn aDd
    during the time prescribed by the enacting
    (']81111(', and requires that It murt be made 8fI
    soon aA the prevention ceaMlB. Huldekoper v.
    HUrrns, 12 Fed. Cas. 6848, pp. 840, 843, 1
    Wa!lh. 100, U8.
    PERSON
    See Artlacl.l Peraou; Colored Pel'8ODj
    Credible l'erson; Disorderly Penson;
    EdjjtLn, Person; From tbe PenlOn;
    Great Mau)' Persona; Guardian of the
    Person; Injury to FenlOn and Proper-
    ty; In Pel'soD; I..arcen)· from the
    Persoll; Natural Person: No Person;
    Plea to the PerflOll; Poor l'erson;
    Private Person; Proper Person; Pru-
    dent Person; Qualilled PersoDS i Suit·
    able ('ertlOn; Suspicious l'erllOu;
    Tblrd Penon; Wblte Pel'8OD; With
    EveI')' Other PertlOD.
    All persons, see All.
    AOJ' other ptl'8OD, see Anf Other.
    Any peraon, see Any.
    Any person Interested, eee Any.
    Every per80n, Mee Every.
    EXp08ure 01' tbe person, Bee Exposure.
    Other pel'AAns. see Other.
    Such Plel'8On, see Such.
    As used In the statute llmlting actioD8
    upon the penal jjtatutcs, wbere tbe peualty
    goes to tbe state, or county, or "person" su'
    Ing for the M8.me, the word ''person'' meaws
    tllmply any person who sues aa a common Ln-
    1'ormer and not oue bIn-Inc a special Interest
    by l"f"aBOD ot any Injury or jlrlevllnce. Nf"
    bnll'lka Nat. Rank v. Wal!lh, 59 8. W. 952.
    05-1, 68 .-\ork. 431:1, S2 Am. st. Rep. 301.
    The word "person," as ulled In Act Cong.
    July I, 1000, c. 1362, , 22, 32 Stat. 6f3 pro-
    viding that, if al11 person wbose naDle all-
    pears on the ron~ Ilhall die before receiving
    hilS allotment the land to whlcb he would
    Jun-e been entitled shall be aliotted In hili
    lIUlUe, etc., Includes ulemUer., cltlzenlJ, and
    tre-t."(lUlcn. Hon('ock v. : :Uutuai Trust Co.,
    lO:{ I'a(!. 666, Ci6D, 2-1 OkJ. :mI.
    eo .. tra .... plu...J.
    The word '''iJerl4On,'' 88 proTided by Ky.
    St_ f 467, OlaT extelld aud be applied to per-
    N)Il~. Commonwealth ,'. Adams ExpreH8 Co.,
    97 R W. 386, 387, 123 Ky. 710.
    The word "perMn," n!3 used In Laws
    1001, p. 61, ('. 62, ,I, Im)"lOfllng an inberitance
    tax upon property paSllIna: by will or the
    statutes of Inberitance to any penon in trust
    or otherwise, tboulh Importing the siugular,
    Includes the plural. DiXon ". Rickets, n
    Pac. 9-17, 9t9, 26 Utah, 215.
    Tbe word "pef80n," as used In the' stat·
    ute& relating to railroad comml88lonel'8, In-
    dudes persons (Gen. St. 1901, • MWn. Kan-
    8llS City, Outer Belt '" Electric R. Co_ v.
    Board of Railroad Com'n, Sf Pac. 1M, 756,
    78 Kan. 168.
    Re". St f 1024, provldee that when there
    are !leveral chargetl agaLnat any person tor
    the same act or transaction, or for two or
    more connected acts or tr&.nsactloDl!, or 1'or
    two or more acta or tranaactlona in the same
    claM 01' crimea or otl'enRelJ, which may be
    properl,- joined, Instead of bftYln,it several 111-
    dl('tmentl, the whole may be joined in one
    Indlctruent in .everal t'OUDte; and, If t",-o
    or more indictments are found, in IRIcb CStIE'
    tbe court may order them to be consolidated.
    Held, that under eectlon 1, provldlDg that
    word,; importing the sillĢular number may
    apilly to several persoDIi or things, &e<:tlOIl
    10'2-1 waa not limited to IndictmenUJ agaiOlll
    a IJingle penon, bat embraced. coDllOlIdated
    Indlctmente against sneral defeudantl.
    l!:manuel v. United States, 196 Fed, 817, 320,
    116 C, C. A. 137.
    Be". st. c. 28, I 68, relating to wayll, pro-
    videa that wben 8. way Is changed In Irade
    by a road cowmltl::doner or "perSOIl authoriz-
    ed," to the Injury of aD abutting owner, be
    may apply Ln writing to the Illunlctpal omt'erl!
    tor all a!l!lel'ltlmeut of damagee occulonNl
    thereby to be paid by tbe town. Chapter 5.1,
    I 19, relating to street railroads, pro"ldes
    that such rond shall be constructed and main-
    tained In such manner and upon SUCh gradeN
    us tbe municipal omcer8 ot the towns where
    they are located may direct, and when, In
    the Judgment of 81lcb corporation, It shall be
    nece!'l8llry to alter the gradf) of any road the
    alteration shall bf) made at the expense of
    the corporation In at'COrdance with the dlre('-
    tlOD!'! of the munir\pal omcel"llJ. Held, that
    the two f!eCtiOIlS should he construed togeth-
    er, aDd under Rev. St. c. I, I 2, rule8 2 and
    14, by whlcb thf) word ''Pf>rson'' may include
    a corporation and fillnjlu)ar words InClnde
    plural, wh('re a grade WR8 e8f:abl1shed by
    municipal officers lit the request ot a rail-
    road l'Ompany, It must be deemed to have
    been done hy a "perllOD authorized" within
    tbe mE'oning of section 68, nod though sec·
    flon 68 provid~ thot thE' damages "hall be
    ollsessed hy the munlclpnl officers to be paid
    by the town, sud N>f' t1on I!), that the altenl-
    tions shall be at the ex[lt!ulIe of the corpora-
    tion, yet the word "expentle" tn sectiou 10
    will Include the unlllngE'!! to landowllerM,
    which, If paid by the tOWll, are a part of the
    expense of the alteration, and Sf\! recover-
    able by the tOWD from the rllilroad corpora-
    PI!:RSON 982 PERSON
    tton. Borley T. InhabUants of South Thom-
    aston, 74 AU. 734, 136, lOtS Me. SOL
    OoJutrwed. .. wttae ..
    Under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. MI, 1
    fl, 30 Stat. 566, providtoa: that certaln acts
    committed by aOJ' "person" before a referee
    In bankruptcy 8hall constitute a contempt ot
    court, the word "person" 18 not limited to the
    bankrupt, but extends to a wltne88 gullty ot
    perjury betore the reteree. In re Bronstein,
    182 Fed. 349, 358.
    Code Clv. Proc. 1 870, provides for the
    examinatIon of a party, and aect10n 871 an-
    thorizes the examlnatlon ot a ' 'person not a
    party" to the action. Held, that the word
    "person" In eeetlon sn mean8 a person who
    can testify as a wltnese: and hence 8uch lee-
    tlOD did not authorize the examination ot
    olDcen of a corporatlon before tri8l, where
    the corporation was Dot a party. Chartered
    Bank of India, Australia, and China v.
    Nortb Rher Ins. Co., 121 N. Y. Supp. 399,
    400, 1~ App. Dlv. 646.
    Baakrapt
    Bankr. Act 1898, I 29b, provides that a
    "penon" shall be punished by Imprisonment
    on conviction of havlng concealed property
    belonging to his estate In bankruptcy. Sec-
    tion 1, cl. 19, pro\'ldee that "persons" sball
    luclude corporations, except where otherwise
    specified. A careful readIng ot this clause,
    tn connection with the terms ot section 29b,
    convinces tbat It can bave no effect to extend
    the terms or broaden the true Interpretation
    ot the latter 8ubsectlon. All who are punlah-
    able under this subsection 29b are persons
    who are or who bave been bankrupts. Bence
    1I0ne ot those whom the word "persons" Is
    made to Include under aectlon 1, eI. 19-no
    officers, partnerships, women, participants In
    forbidden acta, agents. officers, or memLJers
    ot any board. ot directors or trusteee-can be
    &nitty ot the otrenae speclfl.ed in tb1a subsec-
    tlOD, unleu they are eUher bankrupt. when
    theJ conceal tbe property or bave beeD such
    and have obtained tbeir dlllCharl88 before
    that tlme. Present or pUt bankruptq' t. an
    eesenUaI attribute of evef7 peraon wbo may
    be an offender under this etatute. Field v.
    United Statal. 131 Fed. 6, 1, tI9 C. O. A. ft68,
    Bankr. Act July 1. 1898, c. &41, I 29b, 30
    Stat. G54, provides that a person shan be
    punished on couvictlon ot having l-oucealed,
    whIle a bankropt, or after his dIscharge,
    from his trustee, any ot the property Lelong-
    Ing to his estate. Held, that though there
    can be no oJfense unless the concealment is
    accomplished wbile there is a persuo 10 bank-
    ruptcy, or atter his discharge, not only the
    bankrupt, but otbera aiding and abettJug III
    tbe concealment, are punishable. Uuited
    States v. Youoa: 6: Bolland Co., 170 Fed 110-
    112.
    B~ of penoaa
    The provl.lons of eeetlOD 21M. Code a,.
    Proe., direetlng that "each penon upon_bolD
    a writ of certlorari1s aerved • • • 1D'QIl
    IIlake a return," etc., 1a not In confUct w1th
    tile view that the return ot a body or bol1d
    IIlay be made by a .ID.Iljorlty of Ita membttt.
    b
    denote any person or legal entity to wbom a
    writ Is dIrected. People ex rei. Lester t.
    Eino, 68 N. E. 868, 810, 116 N_ Y. 513.
    The use of the word ''person'' ill CoDlt.
    U. S. Amend. It, providing that DO .... Ie-
    sllall deprive an,- perSOD of ute, llbert7. or
    p: roperty, without due procellB ot 111.., tD-
    c!ludes the natural persona who compoe a
    corporation, and wbo are the benelclaJ owa-
    el rs of all Us property, the tecbnical aDd •
    Blal title to whlcb Is in the corporation. SUtt-
    v . . Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., .7 South. tII9.
    9:~ 66 Fla. 617, 32 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 63:9.
    In view ot Rev. 8t. 1009, 110,100, de-
    Ing the word "persona" 88 Includlug • bod.!
    o: t penona whether Incorporated or not, UD-
    der sections 2528 and 8881, respectlvelJ'. pro-
    v-tdIng that if any penon dlsobey an 1nJuc-
    Uon, the drcn1t court to ",hleh It 18 returDed.
    o: r any judge In vacation thereof. ahall I.IIW
    an attachment for the contempt, aDd that
    every court of record shall bave power tG
    punish a8 for criminal contempt, peraora
    g-ullty of willful dlsobedleD<'e ot any order,
    tile clreuit court has power to punlsb a cor-
    poration tor ch11 contempt. Fiedler v. Bam·
    brick Bros. Conet. Co., U2 S. W. 1111, Illt
    1162 Mo. App. ~.
    .,..,....
    Code 1897, I 2419, prod&. that it U1
    o)mmon cartier or pel'8(ln, or _OJ' ODe ..
    a. gent or employe! thereot, eball tranaport to
    any penon within the state 8.DJ' IntoxicatiDI
    liquors without ftrst being tnrn1abed with •
    certificate that the con8lgnee 1a tbe bolder
    o : t a permit to 1811 intoxicating liquors lD
    Ute county to which the 8hlpment .. made-.
    Irocb carrIer or person than on conrlet1Oll be
    fined, etc. Held, that the WOM ''penon.'' u
    used In sucb section, meane a public or pr!-
    v. ate carrier, and did Dot Include 008 whO
    tn-anaported eeven.1 Interatate abtpmentl or
    liquor from the raUroad compaQ'. depot ..
    the con81cnee'8 place of ree1dence .. a mer"I'
    gratuity. State v. Wignall, 128 N. W. __
    Q31, 100 Iowa, 660, M L. R. A. (N. S.) GOT_
    0Jdl
    The word ''penon," as 1l88d In • statate-
    forbidding persona to walk aJooa: railroad
    tll'aeka, should not be construed to lDduck
    <.lb.Udren 80 young as to be tncapable of Ŧm-
    tJrtbutory negl.l.gence, under the rule that
    vvhere a statute ee:eka to cb.aDp aD ezlst:tna
    Sltatua ot a portion ot a COIDIDQD1t:J. 1M
    e tlange must be made in laquap 10 dear
    S.8 to unm18takllbl1 ma.n1test such leclJIlati,..
    purpose. Erie R. Co • .,. Swldenkl. Ufj Fed.
    621, 524, 111 C. O . .A.. 11.
    PERSON
    01_
    Tbe word "penou" In the utradttloD
    treIlt;J between the UDited: Staa and Ita17.
    eJltered Into in 1888 (15 Btat. 629) and
    amended 1n ~ (24 Btat. 1001), proYidlD&'
    tor the InlTilllder of pel'llOnB charged with
    enumerated cr!IDeII, 11 ea1II.dently broad to
    embrace dtlzeu ud nbJecte ot tbe con-
    trarltq parUee, and a citizen of the United:
    Stetee, who wbUe tn Italy commit. an ot-
    tenll8, and who then lIeee to the Untted
    States., :la within tbe tre-.t7 and may be ex-
    tradited thereunder, thoup Italy hall alwaJ'l
    eoDl'tnled the word to .. not to Include ita
    elt1sena and IIDbJectI. lDI parte Chariton,
    185 Fed. 880, 884.
    eutoa .... 8'
    8ect1on ~, Rev. St., reJatine to "el'8l7
    pel'llOn" who aida in eft'ect1n1J the 1lI~1 eo-
    trJ of import&. wh11e ordlnartlJ not Intended
    to applJ to tho. lndJvldual. (custOmll otH·
    t!'en) covered. by the precedtD& llectlon of the
    law, does oot exclnde an oOleer of the eemoe
    It the fads brlng him within the deftn1tion
    of the "pel'flOO" at wbom tble prov1!flon 111
    aimed, aDd lJ1Q theretore include a customa
    weigher who aids In the way prohibited.
    United Statetl v. Meecall, 164 Fed. 587, M8.
    Dill ......... _ •• tate .t deetliUed
    Ii-"·
    A cor:pee II not a Mpel'llOn." That which
    eonatituteI!J a person Is separated from the
    body by death. Brooke v. Boston a: N. St.
    Ry. Co .• 91 N. m. 760. 211 lila. 277.
    A. '"Penon" inelude. a corporation and
    a Jo1nt-atock company, but It does not In-
    clude an estate, or where an action la
    brought by the reprelJentative of an estat~ or
    tnu;t .a Inch; for the estate or tbe trust,
    and Dot the penon who repreeenta It, 111 real·
    J7 the party. Cole v. Manaou, 85 N. Y. Supp.
    1011. 42 MJ..ec. Rep. 149.
    Prtmar;r Electlon Law (Left 1903, C.
    4(1) • 18, anbd. I, Pl'OTldee that the penon
    recelYing the greatest number of votes at a
    primary .8 the candidate ot a party tor aD
    oftlce ahan be the candidate ot that party for
    such office, and h1a name BI aucb candidate
    Bball be placed on tbe oftldal ballot at the
    followloi: election. Reid, that. dead man La
    not. "penon" wtthln the statute; BUCb word
    meaning a HYing hUman belnc. State ex reI.
    Bancroft v_ Frear, 128 N. W. 1068, lOn, 144
    Wta. 79, 14.0 Am. St. Rep. 992_
    Lawa 1904, No. 80, I 81, p1"01'1des that
    certain eectiODil pertaining to taxe8 upon per.
    SODII rece1vin, property pal!lB1ng from dece.-
    dents sball al80 apply to all "peraons" dying
    before the pasaage of tbe act. but whose e&-
    tates ehall not have been at that time de-
    creed or d1Btr1buted, etc. Held. tbat "per-
    sona" retera to decedent. mentioned In that
    lJeCt1on. and not to the beneftciaries. In re
    Howard'a ERate, 68 AtL 613, 514, 80 Vt. .ag.
    PlCB80N
    Where a wile loaned her huaband IDODe,'
    wblch w.. made paJ'able on demand. and
    they both dJed: witbout the wite baving de-
    manded, or reeetved the money, her e.tate
    was a eredltor of h1I eetate, and a "peraon"
    within Rev. St. 1898, t 8840, providing for an
    order within wblch credltora shall present
    their cle.lma and section 8844, providing that
    every persoD haYing a claim, who allan not,
    after notice given, exhibit It within the time
    Umlted, allall be forever barred. BarrJ v.
    Mlnaban, 107 N. W. 488, 491, 127 WIL 610.
    Zapl.".,
    A mere ticket taker at a theater It not
    within Pen. Code, I 200, providing for the
    punlllbment of any "person" who admit. to
    any tbeater, museum, or Rknting rink, or any
    place where wines or l1quol'1l are kept, any
    cblld und.er the age of 16 years, unless accom·
    panled bJ Its parent or guartliRn. People ex
    reI. Jacques v. Sh(>rUf of Kings County, 100
    N. Y. Supp. 387, 54 Misc. Rep_ 8.
    FHa ...... • ..... t
    A torwardlng a~ent ia a "penon" within
    the meaning of Interatate Conuuerce Act Feb.
    4, 1887, Co 104, I 2, 24 Stat. 379, torblddlDl"
    preferences and discrimination In rates. In-
    terstate Commcrce Commission v. Delaware,
    L. & W. R. Co., 81 Sup. Ct. 392, soo. 220 U. B.
    23, fiG L. Ed_ 448.
    Iataat o • .tao..
    A child of Immature and tender yettl'll la
    a "person," within Rev_ Codes N. D. 1905, •
    7686, authorizing an action tor the deatb of a
    "peJ'lJOO" by tile wrongful act ot another_
    &beret' v. Bcblaberl, 122 N. W. 1000, 1006. 18
    N. D. 421, 24 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 520.
    Under the bantruptq act provldlns that
    anJ Datural peJ'lJOn mBJ be adjudged ao In-
    voluntary bankrupt, the word "person" does
    not tnclude an Infant. In re Kehler, 153 Fed.
    2M,281.
    BBnkr. Act Ju111, 1898, c. 1541, 11, aubd.
    11, 30 StaL 1544, provides that "debt" shall
    Include any debt, demand, or claim provable
    in bankruptcy; section 4 declares tbat any
    "person" wbo "owes debts," except a corpore.-
    tion, 8ball be entitled to the beneflt8 of the
    act as a voluntary bankrupt; and aect.lon as
    declaretl that debts ahflll be a ftxed liability,
    abaolutelJ owing at tbe time of tbe flUn, ot
    the pet1UOD, ete. Held, that the worde "OW88
    debts" mean an obligation for wblcb a debt-
    or 1.8 legally liable, and beDCe Ute bankroptey
    act Includes an infant, wbere he OWeil debta
    for wblch h1ll property Is legally chargeable.
    In re Walrath, 175 Fed. 243, 244-
    laJaaWtaat
    An InhabItant ot tbe province of Ben-
    goel, In tbe PhlUpplne 18landa, W8B. "per-
    son," within OrgBJllc Act July 1, 1902, Co 1369.
    providing tbat 00 lawl ahall be enacted In the
    IlIIaooa which ahall deprlve anJ "pereoo" of
    Ute. Uberty, or property witbout due pr~
    PER80N
    of law; or deny to any . penon therein tbe
    equal protection of the laws. carino"f". In-
    lIolar Government of Pblllppine Ialands, 29
    Rup. CL 384, 336, 212 U. S. 449, 63 L. Ed. 694.
    L ... tt • .
    Under tbe bankruptcy act providing tbat
    any natural person may be adjudged an in·
    voluntary bankrupt, the word "person" does
    not Inelude a lunatic. In re Kehler, 168 Fed.
    283.237.
    _01
    Where defendant u!l(>(} loud and offen-
    tlve language In a coDl'ersation with a vtuftjfe
    marshal, as one ot a crowd engtlged In diR'
    turbing tbe peace, and the marsbal neglected
    to restrain defendant or pre>;erve order, he
    was 1I0t. "person" whose pen<>e culd be dill-
    turbed, wltbln a 1'IlInjre ordillan<'e pro\'ldlug
    that, If any person IIhall n1l1fully disturb the
    peace of any otber IJenwn b)' loud aud un-
    ulNa! noise, loud and olTenslve com'el'>iatiou,
    etc., be shall be atljudl/'d gullt~· of a mlHde-
    lU('auor. ymage of Salem v. Cot!ey, 88 S. W.
    772, 113 Mo. App, 6715,
    Koare.td •• t
    "In tbe statutf'l'l authorizing ls~unnN" of
    garnl~hmeut on th(l appllcatloll of nuy 'rwr-
    lIOn,' tbe word 'pel'lŦ)n' hlt~ b(>(>n lipid to In·
    clude all Indl"f"lduuls, uOllr(':
    as resldente, CQr!)()J'at10118. untl s(j\·prell/:lltleR."
    DlRCOnto GeflellS<'hatt v. l:whrf'lt, 106 N. W.
    821, 828. 127 WLs. 601, 15 I •. R. A. (N. S.)
    104(j, llG Am. St. Rep. 100.1 (dll!.l:
    Ion by CaSllOday, C, J.).
    The U8e of tbe .. 'ord "perK()D," In Laws
    1003. p. 126. c, 105, UIIIl'lIdlult R('\·. Rt. 1898,
    c. 2948. by adding tbe Ilro"hdoll that If there
    be Done of sucb pel'8OUB In the state. and the
    detpudllot corporation ba~ or holtlM U8e1! out
    all bavlng ao oWce or place of buaduet-ltl III the
    !ltate, or does [lusloes". tben sen'ice may be
    made upon the per!K)n doing fluch blllllne~'1 or
    In coorge of 8111.'11 oftl<'e or pilwc of bu~luP'l!l,
    the word "peMion" ~howlI that tll(> I.cglslutnre
    In,t('nded to relll -h a claslI not ('o\·t>n'tl by the
    word "ag('uti''' ns{>() eist>where tn tilt> !l('cUOU,
    but it Is not hroad euough to Include one
    UlE'r('iy temJlonlrliy In the IItntC'. to whom
    tbouJ:h not colllI('('tt>ll with tbe hll:
    Intnlstt'Ci for roUt><'tion a btIJ due a furel!,;11
    roflJOrntion. I1oll('flop ~nll. &. ~fII1. Co. v.
    T('Ilf'rllay J:l;tM'I Pipe &: Tank Co., 88 Pac. 9,
    11, :11 nah, 326.
    O.o.r of _ ...... U-
    The president ot a corporation I .. a '"per-
    son," wit bin Compo La .. 'ff. t 4Mŧ. dpclarlnl
    tilat any pel'l!lOn, agent, mana~er, or derk of
    a corporation, with wbom any llIoney IIbaJl be
    d('IKlldted or tntnL'Ited, wbo Kban appropriate
    It to his own UlM!, Mball be f(UIIty ot embt>zzle-
    lUeot. Ktate v. Weber, 100 l'ac. 411, 41:!, 31
    Xe\'. 3815.
    Baut. Act July I, 1!?98, C'. 5-'1, t I, cl.
    T.30 Stat. 544. proTide. that tbe tenu "court"
    PERSON
    sball include a referee, and clanae 19 tlHt.m
    that the word "perSOD8" tDClndM corpon.tlQIbI
    Uld otllcera. By sectlon 2, cl. T, bankrupt(1
    caorts are invested with aucb Jur1MIlctfoe ID
    law oud 10 equity 811 wUl enable them to f'l'
    erd(((' original Jorl8dJ.ct1oD in lJankruptcr ~
    ceedings to caUtle the estates of bainkrurt'" to
    be collectl"d, reduced to Dloney aDd dbJtrtbut·
    ed, and to detE.'rmine rontro\'erBiM in noll·
    tiOD thereto, eX("e()t sa ot.benrl.e pro.ldM.
    BOld ~'UaD 23. par. "a," confel'lJ jurll'dl
    on. tbe rnlted States Circuit Courts 1D CPrtIln
    ciJr('uDistall('('s over controTendH ~tWf'f'll
    tl"lustees and adverae clalmanu ronl."ernla!'
    property <'Iatlned by the truatee, ex('('pt a!' ttl
    proc."ee(1iult8 10 bankruptc)', jurhtdktfon 1.Jl"f·r
    ",llI<'l1 r('!Cf " excJu8i"l'ely In bankruptC'y roortll.
    nnd h,\' )larRjrraph "b" aults brought by tbE.'
    tf'lu!lttt'. except tboee to ~"f"er property UD-
    der e<'tions of tbe act. ('tIJn
    be brougbt In the bankruptcy court anly h!
    <'OnM'nt of the propo~ defE.'n,lant, lipid.
    th. at a l'l'tert'e In bankrupt!'y bad ,urtlldl('tj"n
    of • proeN!c:llnl to conl~1 tbe oIII('H'II( of •
    corporation to pay over tbe pl'OCt'f'd.ll; of 1Ittrl:
    sales al1E'1f'd to belong to tbe corporation. Ibd
    allto to pay ao amount alli8eMed atra1nst: t!wlll
    fo: r unpaid Abares. In re Korolt lira:. ('o~
    19:2 Fed, a92, 394.
    :P6.ri:aenlilp. ..... ..~, ...... ,.
    jomt-.toolr. co_...,., or .... ti ..
    .A. "!Jenoo" include. a 'olnt-stOt'tt ('\IW'
    pany. Cole v, ltaneoo,. 86 N. Y. Sopp. 1011.
    42 :MillC. Rep, 1.9.
    A partnerflblp 18 an entity dhctllK't from
    tbllt of Its membe"" and 18 I'f'COI(Uiud bt ta..-
    ns a "Jleul.Jn." Clay, RobillalUD ok ('0. f.
    nouglu. Couoh', 120 x. W, G-lS, 549, SS X",b.
    36;3, AtlU. (AlII. I912R, 7156,
    A partnership <'annot aue, for It I, DOt
    a :08t1l1'81 or artU'Idal "peraon:' rhlUtpe"l'.
    IIClimea, 61 Soutb. tt!5, 626. I~ A\.n. 200.
    A partnprflhlp Is a '"penoou" In tb • .,0.
    In "'hleb thllt term t8 ueed 10 the- tMel'll
    balllluuptcy act (Act ('.ong. Ju~ 1. IHI8. ~. MI.
    I 1, 8ulM;l, 15, 30 Stat. 60&4). In re E".r!·
    body'a Grocery 1\ Meat Warket. 173 Ffd. W.!.
    Laws 1A92, p. l-IK7, f'. 677, 15. dpftDf'(ll tboo
    tE'r1l1 "1lt'n
    joint flAAO("\aUon, "'8 well a!ll a natul'IIl J","r·
    !W'In. People V. Taylor, 85 N. E. T.!D. ':Wl,
    19'!! N. Y. 398.
    The word ''per~lD'' ar "Jlf"r1M>Dl'I" aIlali I ...
    hC'J:d to Inclnde ftrlll8, oompRnlf'l'l. aDd a._ ... .-i-
    RUonA. Re\,pnue l..o.w (Acts lR9S.. No. 1';0. p.
    340, t 91). Natloual nre Ins. Co. "f". BN.f"l1
    ot AM('MOn, 46 South. 117, 118, 121 La. 10'\.
    120 Am, St. Rep. 313; General EIt'drV .. ', ..
    v. : 8ne.rd of AS!Il'fI(IOr .. 46 South. J.22, 123. 12l
    La . . 116.
    TIJf> word '"[K>l"SOn," 8. provided br Ky.
    ~t. t -1157, mfly e:xtE'nd and be appllfd r,.
    hodlp~ politic and corporate, 8OdeC:ieII. (~
    umnlUf'l'I, and thE' public teoorally. IS '-t"1I
    u.s indl vlduala, ~I'I!IO", and Jolnt-etoct (.'Om-
    PERSON PERSON
    panlCII. CoUUUOII\\·H.lth T. AMma J!lxp. Co., to the state between lIareb let and. Septem-
    97 S. W. S86, 387, 23 Ky. 720. ber 18t, moving perllOnal propert)o Into the
    The word '"(Icl'8On," aa ulK!d In the stat- atate that acqlllrea a aitul tbereln before
    n lf'S relotluJ.': to r.atlroad rommltJ81onera, In- September 1st, said property ahatl be a~
    clud" lŧlrtnenililP8 or jolnt-Btoet companies. ed and taX" thereon rollpcted tor the cur-
    (ifoll. St. 1001, I ::1007. KaDf~as City. Outer rent year, nohtithfl tandlog one member ot
    Belt .\ F.lect rtc R. Co. v. Board ot Ratlroad the tlrm was a re8ldent ot the atate betore
    Com·n. 84 Pac. 75::1, 1::16, 13 Kan. 168. , the 18t day ot Ma rch, and the other member
    WaI, and ball been at all timetl, a reeldent
    ot anotber "tate. Blrtn. A Carroll v. BIni,
    121 Pac. 1080, 1081, 81 011:1. 286.
    Under tbe bankruptcy act ot July I, 1898,
    a partnership Is Imloh'f'o t it the partner-
    IIhlp property Is inautnclent to pay the flrlll
    debu, because It Is a "per-soo" (secUon 1
    1101 , c. 5011, 80 Stat. 501::1), because any "per·
    son" Is Insoh'ent unde r that act whose prop-
    crty Is Insufficient to pay Ita debu (section 1
    [Uil, e. MI. 30 Stat. M4), and the only Prol)-
    lluder Coll!!t . art. 9, 118, glvllll'C the Cor·
    llOmtion Commlg,'doll power to regulate all
    Intn.\C ml-'l !loll COlll llOlllel' doing bu~lne88 In tbe
    "tate In all mntttoril relating to the perform-
    IIl1l~ ot their lmhllc duties and their cbargee
    tbf'retor, Anti section" 34, providing that tbe
    term "tl'allallllllllioll company" Rhall Inl.'lude
    Iny compa ny or other perMOD bolding or op-
    prating tor hire any telegraph or telephone
    line, and tbat the terw "person" aballinl.'lilde
    Indlviduale, palrtnershlps, and corporations,
    tbe Corporation Comml9ll10n b ... 8upervLAlon my a partnership baM or can aPllly to Ibf
    ot • telepbone campou)' owned solely by IlD I debt!'! Is tbe ftrm property. and tbe unly
    ! debta It OWeR are tbe ftrm debtll. In re
    Individual and operated tor hire In aU mat- l8erten8baw, 1::11 I'ed. 36.1, 368, 8 C. C. A. 61,
    tf'rs relating to tbe perforlllftoce ot ita pub- 11 L. R. A. (N 8) QG.
    lie dutlel' and chant·eII. Hlne v. WadUnpon, I . . ocv, nn. s. .
    109 Pac. 301, 26 0"1. 380. Neither the judicial ~rnltlon by tbe
    _ room ot a state ot the partnership entity,
    La"" 1001, p. 19, c. 3, making It un- nor tbe provlllllon8 ot the bankruptc)' act.
    lawtul to pennlt minorA In Mloona, etc., 111'0- whlcb define a partneM!hlp to be a .. ..
    \'ldeM I~tlon 7l that the ""OM "person," 88 within tbe meaning ot the art, and a~r:~ u!led tn tbe act , .flball be deemed to mean it to be adjudged a banlilrupt (BaBkr. Act JIl-
    firm or COr(l()rlltion, all WE'll 8S natural per- I,. I, " 1898, c. !:WI, H la L19J, 68, 80 Stat. M-:I,
    lIOn, and the person managIng tbe business ::141), work a change ot the establlsbed. rule
    ot such firm or l'Or poratlon ShRII be ua~, l~ to tblng the IlUbetantlve rilhts of creditonl
    the penalties preeertbed by tblt! a~_ Jerrl- ret!pectlvely, ot the partnenblp and ot Ita
    tory v. Church, 91 Pac. 120. 721, 14 N. M_ 226. I Individual members. In re 'I:elter, 184 Fed.
    Wblle It la true that I8Cf:lon 69 ot the 1 224, 226, 100 C. C. A. 366.
    Ban.lr:rupt Act contalos the onlJ.' provislou ot I ......... ___
    the act expreaal,. detintng who may ftle a pe-
    tition to have a debtor adjudged an lnvol. Lewa Del. vol. 1" p. ~28, c. 2!M, I 2 (Re'·.
    uDtary bankrupt ADd tbat that IJrovl8l.0n Is Code 1862, amended In 1898, p. 930), make" It
    l'OnOned to cretiuorfl, IUld IeCUOD ::I, read a crime tor any pe:tIOn to administer to or
    wltb aect10D 69, aeews to C(lDHue the right to advltle a pregnant "olna~, with iutent to pro·
    creditors, Jet .ectlon 48 declarea that aOJ' cure a mllcarr1age, or to aid, aMllilt. or coun·
    "per80n" owlDa: debts excel)t a l'Orponltion, tiel auy person 80 !utendlng to procure a
    sball be entitled to tb~ benetlt ot this act &8 wlacarrlage." Beld, that the word "penon,"
    a VOIUDt&r1 bankrupt, and eeetion 1 dedaree in the quoted dauae, meana ItOIDe peraoD oth-
    that tbe ,, 'ord "per80uII," unletB lncowd.atent er than the pregnant WOID8D, and au In-
    with the contut, ahaU IDelude partnership&. dktment under such danae, cbargiq: det'eDd-"
    lD. re J . M. Ceba.II08 ,I; Co., 161 l! 'ed. 445 448. anta with hartng counseled a pregnant woo
    • man wbo wae intending to lirocure her own
    An untnoorporated allsoctation Is not a miBCorria"e, ill bad. Stllte v. Parm (Del.) 60
    "Pf'l-son," and bas not the power to sue or be At!. 971, 918, ::I Peunewlll, 5::16.
    RUed: but when It baH been orpnized and
    l"Ontln<.'ted tor " proftt It ,viII be treated as a
    partnership, and Ita members held liable all The worde '
    J)Ul'tUt'"'- SlAughter ,.. American Baptist ! cludee corporations. 10 re Charge to Grand
    l'ublt('ltt!OD Soclety (Tex_) 160 8. W. 2'.24, 2'26' 1 Jur1, 161 l!'ed. tI:U, 8t6: Cole v. Yauaon, 85
    Th
    -> " "In U 2 ., N. y, 8upp. 1011, 42 Misc. Rep. 149.
    e WOn. llenon, sec on ,art._,
    ot the general re\'enue I\ct npIJrO\'ed !lIa rch A cotl.>oratioll by both the cI"n and com-
    10, 1000, pro"ldln; that "8 Iler::lOn wovlng In- mon law Is a~ "persoll," an artlnetal per-aon.
    to tbtM .tate trom tl.lIotber state hetween Vavoust ". City of Alamf'da, 8i PIlC. 760,
    Murch 16t D " nd liclltE'Ulhcr 1st IIball URt bls 761, 149 Cal. 00, f'i" L. R. A. (N, S.) M6, 9
    Jlerl!lOu.o.l I'ropert)' IIcqull'hlg an actual altua Ann. CftA. &17.
    tberetn before September lst I\nll tbe same A corporation fa Included to the term
    .hull be aMessed aDd I l\aC'ed npon the tox "perROn" as used 10 tbe IItututes. Ooldzler
    roll nJld the taxes thereon collected, etc.," ". Ccut rul n. Co. ot ::'Iiew J erlley, 88 N. Y.
    lncludea a drm; and where a firm. IDovea in- Supp. 214, 215. ~ Mile. Rep. 667 (cltt.ng
    PERSON
    prl, ..... te corporations not poueeaed by indh1.d-
    uan or Pl-rtner'llblps," a atate I.a a pereoD,
    and under I8Ctlon Mb (6) I, entitled to prtor-
    ity tor a debt due It trom the eetate ot a
    bankrupt wbleb 11 gt.en priority by 1m own
    In.alYene, law. In re Western Implement
    Co .. 166 Fed. G76, 682.
    Law. ~, p. 370, e. 175, tn amendment
    of Code Ct.: Proc. 1 1391, authorbdDg an
    execution agalnst the wages or aalal"J ot the
    judgment &!btor, and makin, It the duty ot
    &.D3' peraon or corporation, municipal or oth-.
    e!'Wlse, to whom the execution shall be pre-
    sented, and who sball be indebted to the judg·
    rueut debtor, to pay over to the omeer tbe
    amount of the debt, doee not autborize the
    iMuance ot an execution agatnst tbe salal"J
    ot a state oflleerj the ,tate bein, neither a
    pel'llOn nor a corporation nor a municipal cor-
    poration. Osterboudt T. Keith, 117 .e. Y.
    8upp. 809, 810, 133 App. DI •. 83.
    'l'be cbamperq act (1 BeT. 8t. p. 739 [W
    EeL] p. 2, c. I , tit. 2. 1 U7) provide. that
    "e.ery grant ot land aban be abeolute17 .old,
    It at the time of tbe del1.er1 thereot, web
    l.o.nda eball be 10 the actoal poseetI81on ot a
    pereon c1a1m1nc under a title adTerae to that
    ot the JI'Ultor." 8ect1oo G of the lltatutory
    conetruct.ion law (Law, 1892. p. 1487, Co 677)
    provldet: that " the term 'person' Includes a
    corporation and a Joint-etock a88Odation,"
    and wben oeed to deelgnate a pttrtJ wboae
    propert, may be the mbJeet ot any otl'enae,
    the term "pel"lOO" aleo includes tbe JJtate.
    H eld, that the etate could therefore onll'
    be included as a "pereon" when the statute
    relates to any ot III property which may be
    the IUbJect ot an otl'eaee, aad bence the
    Champerty act dOe! DOt apply to the P08881-
    ,Ion of the .tate, and that, if the to~t
    oomml8ldon Could be resarded aB in actaa.l
    PQMe8IIion tor the lJtate, it wonId not render
    the statute applicable a. It 11 no more a ' 'per-
    8On" thin 18 the state. Saranac Land & TIm-
    ber Co. T . Roberta. 109 ~. Y. Supp. 547, l2!5
    App. DlT. 333 j Id., 88 N. E. 753, 760. 195 N.
    Y. 303.
    a...-Valt.a .tau.
    The United State. Ia not a "penon" with-
    In the mee.ntng ot Bankr. Act Jnly I, 1898. C-
    MI, , st, 80 Stat. 563. Title Guaranty "
    SuretY 00. Y . Goaranlee TItle • Trut Co.,
    174, Fed. 38(), 387, 98 O. C. A. 606.
    .. teet __
    Under Gen. 8t. 1902, I 2067, autborlzlnc
    pel"1lODB Intereeted In alterlDJ; bighw&7B to re-
    monstrate ag,lDet the report of the oommlt-
    tee aB8t'8B1ng bene8te and damages, and em-
    powering the conrt to order a jury and "grant
    reUet to the person or penOns matiDl' web
    appUcation," wben constr'ned In connection
    with eectton 20'1'0, proYiding that, If the re-
    port of the JUI"f Bball not Increase the dam-
    -aM allowed Or dJm1n18b the a8llet:Brnent ot
    beDe8t.e, the court shall order tbe appllcabt
    for the JU7. to pa7 the COIIt. ot tile appUca-
    PEnSON CAUSING EXCAVATI0~
    tIoD, etc., the court. In proceedlnp to __
    damacee aDd benetlt. tor the dlaace of tile
    crade ot a h1a:bway, m&.7 DOt order a ,...,.
    to make a re&lHIIImeat of damaa- aDd lIeIIf.
    tit. on the application ot the town b7 ita.
    lectmen; tbe eelectmen not be1q ref'eaed to
    by the word. ''perlOn or peraou." 1n die
    quoted clause. Selectmen ot Town of MO D t·
    TWe Y. Alpba )(lIle Co., 81 AU. 1051. 1062. as
    Conn. 1.
    Wo ...
    A woman Ia a "pel'8On" witbID. tile c..
    tempIaUOD ot Colllt. U. B. AmeDCL 14., f I,
    and entitled to the equal protectlOD 01. the
    lawL Carrithers Y. City ot Sbel.b7nlk-. llU
    B. W. 1ft, 746, 126 Ky. 169, 17 1. B. A.. IX
    S.) ill (dtl.ns Santa Clara Count7 •• South-
    ern Pae. R. Co .• 18 Fed. ~.
    1' ... 0. AOOILLIiVED
    Bee Aurteved.
    ..... O • ............ufG O~ -..00 .. Aa
    OWR:z:a
    See Owuer of Reeord.
    1'BaSO. AlUI.IVIRO IX 'nIB a_liD
    8TATB8
    TarUr Act Jul, ~, l891'. Co It. I t. FIft
    Ust:. par. 887, 80 BtaL 202, pro'richa f. '"per-
    tonal etrecta of perIODS arrtYin, in the l"Dit-
    eel Statea," witb a prol'iao relatlnl to "rHl-
    dentB ot the Unltecl 8tatal returDIDJ" (l'0III
    abroad." Held. that the tint proTbioa is
    only tor 1mm1p-ant., and that the pl'O'fU.O
    conef:roe AmerIcana only. United 8tatea ".
    Bernaylt 168 Fed. 192, 194., 86 C. C. ~ 5!.
    I'IZIUO ......... IID
    Bee. al." AI8eBL
    Assignor'll In a common·law - lUIdpment
    tor the t-eneftt ot credlton to the ~ in
    trust to pay preterred claim, locludiD&: tax ....
    are the ''persons ueeeeed" tor taxea wl.tbiD
    ReT. Law. 1002, Co 13, 182. author1.z1o&". tu
    collector to collect a tax b, ad:1OI1 aplO!Il
    the "perton8 asaetlBed," and tbe, &re prop-
    erl, made partJ..M defendant In an attl~D
    for taxea ... the penone primarU, llabk-
    therefor. Boston Y . TurDer, 87 N. E. s:u.
    637, 201 Mau. 190 (c1t1n1 Rldru Y . B~
    28 N. ID. ~, 1M Ma-. ..ao).
    PEBaO. AU'l'IIO.JZJI!D
    Bee Authorised b1UWj Aatbodaed IV-
    - .... 0. .":arJOIAJ.oI.T I."."
    U ......
    Bee ~da1l1 Interested.
    PBaaO. BBKIIFJ'I'IID
    ... -" PBIUJO. o.&U8orO D ........
    See Cauee (nrb).
    PIa8O. OAVIIDI'G -.s:04'YA'I'JCd'
    See Qa .. (~), From Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, first edition


    PERSON.-Prim4 facie the word 41 Person," in & public statute,
    .includes a Oorporation 88 well as a Datul'lll perBOn. (per· Selborne, L.· C.,
    Plw.rmauulical &ell. v. Lond. J: Provin.;al Supply Aun., 49 L. J. Q. B.
    786 ; ~ App. Ca. 8~7 : VI. os. 2, 19, Interp. Aot, 1889).
    U The word I Penon' may very well include both a natural peraon (a
    human being), aud an artificial penon (a corporation). I think that in. an
    Act of Parliament, uoleea there be BOmething to tbe contrary, probably.
    (1 would not like to pledge myself to that) it ought to be held to include
    both. I have equally no doubt that in common talk, in the language of
    584 PER
    - - ---- . - - - . - --- - -
    men (not speaking technically), · a • Person' dooo not inclnde a corporation.
    Nobody in common talk, if he wcre asked who i. the richeat person in
    London, wonld answer, The London and North Western Ry. Co. . It is
    plain tbat in common speech' Person' would mean a natnral person. In
    technical language it may include tbe other, but whioh meaning it h .. in
    any particular Act, must depend on tbe context subject-matter. I do not
    think tbat the preaumption that it inclndes an artificial person,_ Corpor-
    ation,-(if 1M prewmption do.. ariH)-ia at aU strong. Circumstanoes,
    and indeed very alight circnmstanoea, in tbe context might sbow wbioh way
    the word is to be coustrued in an Act of Parliament. And I am quite clear
    about tbis, that whenever you can ... the object of the Act requires that
    • Person' shall have the more extended sense or the 1 .... extended eenee, then
    you ahould apply the word in that eenee and oonotrne the Act accordiugly ..
    (per Ld. Blackburn, lb.).
    The case from which the de6niOiono just given have been taken aboWB
    that .. Person" .. need in ... 1 and 15, Pharmacy Act, 1868 (81 & 82 V.
    c. 121) does not include a Corporation. . .
    The Attorney-General, acting IZ ojJieio, is not a .. Penon" within the
    Statute of Limitation, 8 & 4 W. 4, c. 27 ; buL an action by him on behalf
    of tbe poor of a pariah may be statute barred, .. Lh_ conatitute .. a claM
    of persona" within s. 1 (A.·G. v. Magdalen Coli., 28 L. J. Cb. 844 ;
    18 Boa. 228 ; Magda/m Coli. v. A.·G. , 26 L. J . Cb. 620; 6 H. L. 0a.189).
    The Ecclesi .. tical Commro. are .. persons" within 88. I, 2 of the Act just
    cited, except in C&868 where they claim (by virtue ofo. 67,8 &; 4 V. c. 118)
    through an Eccleoi .. Lical Corporation (Ecdu;a&tical Commn. Y. &W',
    49 L. J . Q. B. 771 ; 6 App. Ca. 786).
    A Corporation ia noL a .. Person" within Lhe Mortmain Act, 9 G. 2,
    c. 86, s. 1 (WalA
    so .. Lo beoome & Commou Informer (St. lMnard. Shorodikh v. Franklin,
    47 L. J. C. P: 727 ; 8 C. P. D. 8i7).
    By Lhe Melbourne Harbour Trust Act a " Person" includes a Corpor.
    ation, and this WB8 held to include Commiaoionera appointed under Lhe Act
    (Union SlMmuhip 0,. v. X./b{Jurm Harb. CommT8., 68 L. J. P. C. 59 ;
    60 L. T. 887; 9 App. Ca. 866).
    So wbere trnoteeo of a Will had po,.er to grant 1 ..... to" any person or
    persons" they ahould think fit, Chitty, J., held thatthis authorized them to
    grant a leaee to a Limited Company (& Jef!eo
    So where a Railway Act provided tbat .. auy person" acting in pursuance
    of it ahould be entitled to Notioe of Action, iL was held the Compeny
    iteelf was included (Boyd v. Lond . .t Croydon Ry., 7 L. J. C. P. 241 ;
    4 Bing. N. C. 669; 6 So. 461) .
    .. Person" in I . 20, 'l'mateo Act, 1860, does not mean person beneficially
    enLitled (& INkIon, W. N. (72) 228) .
    .. Persons belonging to a Ship; .. V. BELONGINU .
    .. Person by whose act, &c.," Nuioance arieel; V. By WH08E ACT. Appendix B

    Human Rights Act 1998
    1998 CHAPTER 42

    Rights and Freedoms
    Article 2 Right to life
    1 Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
    intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a
    crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
    2 Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article
    when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
    (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
    (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
    (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
    Article 3 Prohibition of torture
    No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
    punishment.
    Article 4 Prohibition of slavery and forced labour
    1 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
    2 No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
    3 For the purpose of this Article the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include: (a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according
    to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional release from such
    detention;
    (b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries
    where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service;
    (c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well‐
    being of the community;
    (d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.
    Article 5 Right to liberty and security
    1 Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his
    liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
    (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
    (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non‐compliance with the lawful order of
    a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
    (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him
    before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
    offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an
    offence or fleeing after having done so;
    (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or
    his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
    (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious
    diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
    (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised
    entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to
    deportation or extradition.
    2 Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he
    understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.
    3 Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of
    this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to
    exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release
    pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4 Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
    proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court
    and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
    5 Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the
    provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
    Article 6 Right to a fair trial
    1 In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against
    him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
    independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced
    publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the
    interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the
    interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the
    extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
    publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
    2 Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved
    guilty according to law.
    3 Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
    (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the
    nature and cause of the accusation against him;
    (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
    (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he
    has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests
    of justice so require;
    (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
    examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against
    him;
    (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
    language used in court.
    Article 7 No punishment without law
    1 No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission
    which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the
    time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that
    was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 2 This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or
    omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the
    general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.
    Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life
    1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
    correspondence.
    2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
    such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
    interests of national security, public safety or the economic well‐being of the country, for
    the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
    protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
    Article 9 Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
    1 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
    includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
    community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
    worship, teaching, practice and observance.
    2 Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as
    are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public
    safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the
    rights and freedoms of others.
    Article 10 Freedom of expression
    1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to
    hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
    public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
    requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
    2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may
    be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by
    law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
    territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
    protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
    preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
    authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
    Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association 1 Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association
    with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
    interests.
    2 No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are
    prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
    security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
    health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article
    shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
    members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
    Article 12 Right to marry
    Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family,
    according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.
    Article 14 Prohibition of discrimination
    The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured
    without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
    political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
    property, birth or other status.
    Article 16 Restrictions on political activity of aliens
    Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting
    Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens.
    Article 17 Prohibition of abuse of rights
    Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person
    any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of
    the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is
    provided for in the Convention.
    Article 18 Limitation on use of restrictions on rights
    The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall
    not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.
    Part II The First Protocol
    Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No
    one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
    conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
    The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to
    enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with
    the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
    Article 2 Right to education
    No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it
    assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of
    parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and
    philosophical convictions.
    Article 3 Right to free elections
    The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by
    secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the
    people in the choice of the legislature.
    Part III The Sixth Protocol
    Article 1 Abolition of the death penalty
    The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or
    executed.
    Article 2 Death penalty in time of war
    A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts committed
    in time of war or of imminent threat of war; such penalty shall be applied only in the
    instances laid down in the law and in accordance with its provisions. The State shall
    communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the relevant provisions of
    that law.




    CONVENTION FOR PROTECTION OF
    HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
    Rome, 4.XI.1950

    Text completed by Protocol No. 2 (ETS No. 44) of 6 May 1963 and amended
    by Protocol No. 3 (ETS No. 45) of 6 May 1963, Protocol No. 5 (ETS No. 55) of 20
    January 1966
    and Protocol No. 8 (ETS No. 118) of 19 March 1985

    The governments signatory hereto, being members of the Council of Europe,
    Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General
    Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948;
    Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and effective recognition
    and observance of the Rights therein declared;
    Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity
    between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is
    the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms;
    Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the
    foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by
    an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and
    observance of the human rights upon which they depend;
    Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are like‐minded and
    have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take
    the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the
    Universal Declaration,
    Have agreed as follows:
    Article 1
    The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights
    and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention. SECTION I
    Article 2
    1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his
    life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his
    conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
    2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article
    when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

    a in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
    b in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully
    detained;
    c in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
    Article 3
    No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
    punishment.
    Article 4
    1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
    2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
    3. For the purpose of this article the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not
    include:

    a any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed
    according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional
    release from such detention;
    b any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in
    countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory
    military service;
    c any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or
    well‐being of the community; d any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.
    Article 5
    1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived
    of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure
    prescribed by law:

    a the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
    b the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non‐compliance with the lawful
    order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by
    law;
    c the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing
    him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
    committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his
    committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
    d the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational
    supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the
    competent legal authority;
    e the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious
    diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
    f the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised
    entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a
    view to deportation or extradition.
    2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he
    understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.
    3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.c of
    this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by
    law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time
    or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for
    trial.
    4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to
    take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided
    speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
    5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
    Article 6
    1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
    against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
    time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall
    be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part
    of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a
    democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private
    life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the
    court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of
    justice.
    2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved
    guilty according to law.
    3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

    a to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of
    the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
    b to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
    c to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if
    he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
    interests of justice so require;
    d to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the
    attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions
    as witnesses against him;
    e to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
    language used in court.
    Article 7
    1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
    omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or
    international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty
    be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was
    committed.
    2. This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act
    or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.
    Article 8
    1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
    correspondence.
    2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
    except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
    society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well‐
    being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
    health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
    Article 9
    1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
    includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
    community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief,
    in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
    2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
    limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
    the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals,
    or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
    Article 10
    1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom
    to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
    interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not
    prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
    enterprises.
    2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
    may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
    prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
    national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
    disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
    reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
    received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
    judiciary.
    Article 11
    1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
    association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
    2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as
    are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
    national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
    protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
    others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the
    exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the
    administration of the State.
    Article 12
    Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family,
    according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.
    Article 13
    Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall
    have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation
    has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.
    Article 14
    The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured
    without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
    political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
    property, birth or other status.
    Article 15
    1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any
    High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under
    this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
    provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under
    international law.
    2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts
    of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.
    3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the
    Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it
    has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General of
    the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the
    provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed. Article 16
    Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting
    Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens.
    Article 17
    Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person
    any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of
    the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is
    provided for in the Convention.
    Article 18
    The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall
    not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.















    Universal Declaration of Human Rights
    PREAMBLE
    Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
    members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
    world,
    Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which
    have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human
    beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
    proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,
    Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to
    rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the
    rule of law,
    Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,
    Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in
    fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the
    equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and
    better standards of life in larger freedom,
    Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co‐operation with the
    United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights
    and fundamental freedoms,
    Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest
    importance for the full realization of this pledge,
    Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL
    DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all
    peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society,
    keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to
    promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and
    international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both
    among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories
    under their jurisdiction.

    ^ Top Article 1.
     All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.They are endowed
    with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
    brotherhood.
    ^ Top
    Article 2.
     Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
    without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
    political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
    Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,
    jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person
    belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non‐self‐governing or under any other
    limitation of sovereignty.
    ^ Top
    Article 3.
     Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
    ^ Top
    Article 4.
     No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be
    prohibited in all their forms.
    ^ Top
    Article 5.
     No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
    or punishment.
    ^ Top
    Article 6.
     Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. ^ Top
    Article 7.
     All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal
    protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any
    discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such
    discrimination.
    ^ Top
    Article 8.
     Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
    for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by
    law.
    ^ Top
    Article 9.
     No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
    ^ Top
    Article 10.
     Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent
    and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of
    any criminal charge against him.
    ^ Top
    Article 11.
     (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent
    until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the
    guarantees necessary for his defence.
     (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or
    omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international
    law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed
    than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.
    ^ Top Article 12.
     No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home
    or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has
    the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
    ^ Top
    Article 13.
     (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
    borders of each state.
     (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to
    his country.
    ^ Top
    Article 14.
     (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
    persecution.
     (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising
    from non‐political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of
    the United Nations.
    ^ Top
    Article 15.
     (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.
     (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
    change his nationality.
    ^ Top
    Article 16.
     (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or
    religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal
    rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
     (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the
    intending spouses.
     (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled
    to protection by society and the State. ^ Top
    Article 17.
     (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with
    others.
     (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
    ^ Top
    Article 18.
     Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
    includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
    community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief
    in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
    ^ Top
    Article 19.
     Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
    freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
    information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
    ^ Top
    Article 20.
     (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
     (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
    ^ Top
    Article 21.
     (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
    through freely chosen representatives.
     (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
     (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this
    will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
    universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free
    voting procedures. ^ Top
    Article 22.
     Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to
    realization, through national effort and international co‐operation and in
    accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic,
    social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of
    his personality.
    ^ Top
    Article 23.
     (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and
    favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
     (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal
    work.
     (3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration
    ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and
    supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
     (4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
    interests.
    ^ Top
    Article 24.
     Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of
    working hours and periodic holidays with pay.
    ^ Top
    Article 25.
     (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well‐
    being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
    care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
    unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood
    in circumstances beyond his control.
     (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All
    children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
    ^ Top Article 26.
     (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the
    elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.
    Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher
    education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
     (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality
    and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It
    shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or
    religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the
    maintenance of peace.
     (3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to
    their children.
    ^ Top
    Article 27.
     (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the
    community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its
    benefits.
     (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests
    resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the
    author.
    ^ Top
    Article 28.
     Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and
    freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.
    ^ Top
    Article 29.
     (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
    development of his personality is possible.
     (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to
    such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
    recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the
    just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
    society.  (3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes
    and principles of the United Nations.
    ^ Top
    Article 30.
     Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or
    person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the
    destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.
    Interpretation Act 1978
    CHAPTER 30
    ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
    General provisions as to enactment and operation
    Section
    1. Words of enactment.
    2. Amendment or repeal in same Session.
    3. Judicial notice.
    4. Time of commencement.
    Interpretation and Construction
    5. Definitions.
    6. Gender and number.
    7. References to service by post.
    8. References-to distance.
    9. References to time of day.
    10. References to the Sovereign.
    11. Construction of subordinate legislation.
    Statutory powers and duties
    12. Continuity of powers and duties.
    13. Anticipatory exercise of powers.
    14. Implied power to amend.
    Repealing enactments
    15. Repeal of repeals.
    16. General savings.
    17. Repeal and re-enactment.
    Miscellaneous
    18. Duplicated offences.
    19. Citation of other Acts.
    20. References to other enactments. c. 30 Interpretation Act 1978
    Supplementary
    Section
    21. Interpretation etc.
    22. Application to Acts and Measures.
    23. Application to other instruments.
    24. Application to Northern Ireland.
    25. Repeals and savings.
    26. Commencement.
    27. Short title.
    SCHEDULES:
    Schedule 1-Words and expressions defined.
    Schedule 2-Application of Act to existing enactments.
    Part I-Acts.
    Part Il-Subordinate legislation.
    Schedule 3-Enactments repealed. ELIZABETH II
    Interpretation Act 1978
    1978 CHAPTER 30
    c.30 1
    An Act to consolidate the Interpretation Act 1889 and
    certain other enactments relating to the construction and
    operation of Acts of Parliament and other instruments,
    with amendments to give effect to recommendations of
    the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.
    [20th July 1978]
    B
    E rr ENACTED by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and
    with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and
    Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament
    assembled, and the authority of the same, as follows:-
    General provisions as to enactment and operation
    1. Every section of an Act takes effect as a substantive enact- Words of
    ment without introductory words.
    enactment.
    2. Any Act may be amended or repealed in the Session of
    Parliament in which it is passed. or repeal in
    same Session.
    3. Every Act is a public Act to be judicially noticed as such, Judicial
    unless the contrary is expressly provided by the Act, notice.
    4. An Act or provision of an Act comes into force- Time of
    (a) where provision is made for it to come into force on a
    commence-
    particular day, at the beginning of that day;
    (b) where no provision is made for its coming into force,
    at the beginning of the day on which the Act receives
    the Royal Assent.
    B 2 c. 30 Interpretation Act 1978
    Interpretation and construction
    Definitions. 5. In any Act, unless the contrary intention appears, words
    and expressions listed in Schedule 1 to this Act are to be con-
    strued according to that Schedule.
    Gender and 6. In any Act, unless the contrary intention appears,-
    number
    (a) words importing the masculine gender include the
    feminine;
    (b) words importing the feminine gender include the
    masculine;
    (c) words in the singular include the plural and words in
    the plural include the singular.
    References to 7. Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be
    service by POSt. served by post (whether the expression "serve" or the expression
    "give" or "send" or any other expression is used) then, unless
    the contrary intention appears, the service is deemed to be effected
    by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing
    the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been
    effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the
    ordinary course of post.
    References to & In the measurement of any distance for the purposes of
    distance. an Act, that distance shall, unless the contrary intention appears,
    be measured in a straight line on a horizontal plane.
    References to 9. Subject to section 3 of the Summer Time Act 1972 (con-
    time of day. struction of references to points of time during the period of
    1972 c. 6. summer time), whenever an expression of time occurs in an
    Act, the time referred to shall, unless it is otherwise speciücally
    stated, be held to be Greenwich mean time.
    References to 10. In any Act a reference to the Sovereign reigning at the
    the Sovereign,
    time of the passing of the Act is to be construed, unless the
    contrary intention appears, as a reference to the Sovereign for
    the time being.
    Construction 11. Where an Act confers power to make subordinate legisla-
    tion, expressions used in that legislation have, unless the contrary
    legislation.
    intention appears, the meaning which they bear in the Act.
    Statutory powers and duties
    Continuity of 12.-( 1) Where an Act confers a power or imposes a duty it
    powers and is implied, unless the contrary intention appears, that the power
    duties.
    may be exercised, or the duty is to be performed, from time to
    time as occasion requires. Interpretation Act 1978 C. 30 3
    (2) Where an Act confers a power or imposes a duty on the
    holder of an office as such, it is implied, unless the contrary
    intention appears, that the power may be exercised, or the duty
    is to be performed, by the holder for the time being of the
    office.
    13. Where an Act which (or any provision of which) does Anticipatory
    not come into force immediately on its passing confers power exercise of
    to make subordinate legislation, or to make appointments, give
    notices, prescribe forms or do any other thing for the purposes
    of the Act, then, unless the contrary intention appears, the power
    may be exercised, and any instrument made thereunder may
    be made so as to come into force, at any time after the passing
    of the Act so far as may be necessary or expedient for the
    purpose-
    (a) of bringing the Act or any provision of the Act into
    force ;
    or
    (b) of giving full effect to the Act or any such provision at
    or after the time when it comes into force.
    14. Where an Act confers power to make- Implied
    (a) rules, regulations or byelaws; or
    (b) Orders in Council, orders or other subordinate legisla-
    tion to be made by statutory instrument,
    it implies, unless the contrary intention appears, a power,
    exercisable in the same manner and subject to the same con-
    ditions or limitations, to revoke, amend or re-enact any instru-
    ment made undei the power.
    Repealing enactments
    15. Where an Act repeals a repealing enactment, the repeal Repeal of
    does not revive any enactment previously repealed unless words repeal.
    are added reviving it.
    Without prejudice to section 15, where an Act repeals General
    an enactment, the repeal does not, unless the contrary intention savings.
    appears,-
    (a) revive anything not in force or existing at .the time at
    which the repeal takes effect;
    (b) affect the previous operation of the enactment repealed
    or anything duly done or suffered under that enact-
    ment;
    (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,
    accrued or incurred under that enactment;
    (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred
    in respect of any offence committed against that enact-
    ment;
    B2 4 c. 30 Interpretation Act 1978
    (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in
    respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability.
    penalty, forfeiture oc punishment;
    and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may
    be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty,
    forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the repealing
    Act had not been passed.
    (2) This section applies to the expiry of a temporary enact-
    ment as if it were repealed by an Act.
    Repeal and 17.-(1) Where an Act repeals a previous enactment and
    re-enactment,
    substitutes provisions for the enactment repealed, the repealed
    enactment remains in force until the substituted provisions come
    into force.
    (2) Where an Act repeals and re-enacts, with or without
    modification, a previous enactment then, unless the contrary
    intention appears.-
    (a) any reference in any other enactment to the enactment
    so repealed shall be construed as a reference to the
    provision re-enacted;
    (b) in so far as any subordinate legislation made or other
    thing done under the enactment so repealed, or
    having effect as if so made or done, could have been
    made or done under the provision re-enacted, it shall
    have effect as if made or done under that provision.
    Miscellaneous
    Duplicated 18. Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two
    offences.
    or more Acts, or both under an Act and at common law, the
    offender shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be liable to
    be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those Acts
    or at common law, but shall not be liable to be punished more
    than once for the same offence.
    Citation of 19.-(l) Where an Act cites another Act by year, statute,
    other Acts. session or chapter, or a section or other portion of another Act
    by number or letter, the reference shall, unless the contrary
    intention appears, be read as referring-
    (a) in the case of Acts included in any revised edition of
    the statutes printed by authority, to that edition;
    (b) in the case of Acts not so included but included in the
    edition prepared under the direction of the Record
    Commission, to that edition;
    (c) in any other case, to the Acts printed by the Queen's
    Printer, or under the superintendence or authority of
    Her Majesty's Stationery Office. Interpretation Act 1978 c. 30 5
    (2) An Act may continue to be cited by the short title
    authorised by any enactment notwithstanding the repeal of that
    enactment.
    20.-(1) Where an Act describes or cites a portion of an References
    enactment by referring to words, sections or other parts from to other
    or to which (or from and to which) the portion extends, the
    enactments.
    portion described or cited includes the words, sections or other
    parts referred to unless the contrary intention appears.
    (2) Where an Act refers to an enactment, the reference, unless
    the contrary intention appears, is a reference to that enactment
    as amended, and includes a reference thereto as extended or
    applied, by or under any other enactment, including any other
    provision of that Act.
    Supplementary
    21.-(1) In this Act "Act" includes a local and personal or Interpretation
    private Act; and "subordinate legislation" means Orders in
    etc.
    Council, orders, rules, regulations, schemes, warrants, byelaws
    and other instruments made or to be made under any Act.
    (2) This Act binds the Crown.
    22.-(1) This Act applies to itself, to any Act passed after the Application
    commencement of this Act and, to the extent specified in to Acts and
    Part I of Schedule 2, to Acts passed before the commencement
    Measures.
    of this Act. -
    (2) In any of the foregoing provisions of this Act a reference
    to an Act is a reference to an Act to which that provision applies;
    but this does not affect the generality of references to enactments
    or of the references in section 19(1) to other Acts.
    (3) This Act applies to Measures of the General Synod of
    the Church of England (and, so far as it relates to Acts passed
    before the commencement of this Act, to Measures of the Church
    Assembly passed after 28th May 1925) as it applies to Acts.
    23.-(l) The provisions of this Act, except sections 1 to 3 Application
    and 4(b), apply, so far as applicable and unless the contrary inten-
    to other
    tion appears, to subordinate legislation made after the commence-
    instruments.
    ment of this Act and, to the extent specified in Part II of
    Schedule 2, to subordinate legislation made before the com-
    mencement of this Act, as they apply to Acts.
    (2) In the application of this Act to Acts passed or sub-
    ordinate legislation made after the commencement of this Act,
    all references to an enactment include an enactment comprised
    in subordinate legislation whenever made, and references to the 6 C. 30 Interpretation Act 1978
    passing or repeal of an enactment are to be construed
    acoordingly.
    (3) Sections 9 and 19(1) also apply to deeds and other instru-
    ments and documents as they apply to Acts and subordinate
    legislation; and in the application of section 17(2)(a) to Acts
    passed or subordinate legislation made after the commencement
    of this Act, the reference to any other enactment includes any
    deed or other instrument or document.
    (4) Subsections (1) and (2) of this section do not apply to
    1946 c. 36. Orders in Council made under section 5 of the Statutory
    1972 c. 22. Insiruments Act 1946, section 1(3) of the Northern Ireland
    1974 c. (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972 or Schedule 1 to the Northern
    Ireland Act 1974.
    Application to 24.-(1) This Act extends' to Northern Ireland so far as it
    Northern
    applies to Acts or subordinate legislation which so extend.
    Ireland.
    (2) In the application of this Act to Acts passed or subordinate
    legislation made after the commencement of this Act, all
    references to an enactment include an enactment comprised in
    Northern Ireland legislation whenever passed or made; and in
    relation to such legislation references to the passing or repeal of
    an enactment include the making or revocation of an Order
    in Council.
    (3) In the application of section 14 to Acts passed after the
    commencement of this Act which extend to Northern Ireland,
    "statutory instrument" includes statutory rule for the purposes
    1958 c. 18 of the Statutory Rules Act (Northern Ireland) 1958.
    (N.!.).
    (4) The following definitions contained in Schedule 1, namely
    those of-
    British subject and Commonwealth citizen;
    The Communities and related expressions;
    The Corporation Tax Acts;
    The Income Tax Acts;
    The Tax Acts,
    apply, unless the contrary intention appears, to Northern Ireland
    legislation as they apply to Acts.
    (5) In this section "Northern Ireland legislation" means-
    (a) Acts of the Parliament of Ireland;
    (b) Acts of the Parliament of Northern Ireland;
    (c) Orders in Council under section 1(3) of the Northern
    Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972;
    (d) Measures of the Northern Ireland Assembly; and Interpretation Act 1978 c. 30 7
    (e) Orders in Council under Schedule 1 to the Northern 1974 c. 28
    Ireland Act 1974.
    25.-(1) The enactments described in Schedule 3 are repealed Repeals and
    to the extent specified in the third column of that Schedule.
    savings.
    (2) Without prejudice to section 17(2)(a), a reference to the
    Interpretation Act 1889, to any provision of that Act or to any 1889 c. 63.
    other enactment repealed by this Act, whether occurring in
    another Act, in subordinate legislation, in Northern Ireland
    legislation or in any deed or other instrument or document,
    shall be construed as referring to this Act, or to the correspond-
    ing provision of this Act, as it applies to Acts passed at the time
    of the reference.
    (3) The provisions of this Act relating to Acts passed after any
    particular time do not affect the construction of Acts passed
    before that time, though continued or amended by Acts passed
    thereafter.
    26. This Act shall come into force on 1st January 1979. Commence-
    ment.
    27. This Act may be cited as the Interpretation Act 1978. Short title. 8 c. 30 Interpretation Act 1978
    SCHEDULES
    Section 5. SCHEDULE 1
    WORDS AND ExPREssIoNs DEFINED
    Note: The years or dates which follow certain entries in this
    Schedule are relevant for the purposes of paragraph 4 of Schedule 2
    (application to existing enactments).
    Definitions
    "Associated state" means a territory maintaining a status of
    1967 c. 4. association with the United Kingdom in accordance with the West
    Indies Act 1967. [16th February 19671
    "Bank of England" means, as the context requires, the Governor
    and Company of the Bank of England or the bank of the Govecnor
    and Company of the Bank of England.
    "Bank of Ireland" means, as the context requires, the Governor
    and Company of the Bank of Ireland or the bank of the Governor
    and Company of the Bank of Ireland.
    "British Islaniis" means the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands
    and the Isle of Man. [1889]
    "British possession" means any part of Her Majesty's dominions
    outside the United Kingdom; and where parts of such dominions are
    under both a central and a local legislature, all parts under the
    central legislature are deemed, for the purposes of this definition, to
    be one British possession. [1889]
    "British subject" and "Commonwealth citizen" have the same
    meaning, that is-
    1948 c. 56. (a) a person who under the British Nationality Act 1948 is a
    citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or who under
    any enactment for the time being in force in a country
    mentioned in section 1(3) of that Act is a citizen of that
    country; and
    (b) any other person who has the status of a British subject
    under that Act or any subsequent enactment.
    "Building regulations ", in relation to England and Wales, means
    1936 C. 49. regulations made under section 61(1) of the Public Health Act
    1936.
    "Central funds ", in an enactment providing in relation to England
    and Wales for the payment of costs out of central funds, means
    money provided by Parliament.
    "Charity Commissioners" means the Charity Commissioners for
    1960 c. 58. England and Wales referred to in section 1 of the Charities Act
    1960.
    "Church Commissioners" means the Commissioners constituted
    1947 by the Church Commissioners Measure 1947.
    C.A.M. No.2. •
    Interpretation Act 1978 c. 30 9
    "Colonial legislature ", and "legislature" in relation to a British Sci-i. I
    possession, mean the authority, other than the Parliament of the
    United Kingdom or Her Majesty in Council, competent to make laws
    for the possession. [1889]
    "Colony" means any part of Her Majesty's dominions outside
    the British Islands except-
    (a) countries having fully responsible status within the Common-
    wealth;
    (b) territories for whose external relations a country other than
    the United Kingdom is responsible;
    (c) associated states;
    and where parts of such dominions are under both a central and
    a local legislature, all parts under the central legislature are deemed
    for the purposes of this definition to be one colony. [1889]
    "Commencement ", in relation to an Act or enactment, means the
    time when the Act or enactment comes into force.
    for trial" means-
    (a) in relation to England and Wales, committed in custody or
    on bail by a magistrates' court pursuant to section 7 of
    the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952, or by any judge or other 1952 c. 55.
    authority having power to do so, with a view to trial
    before a judge and jury; [1889]
    (b) in relation to Northern Ireland, committed in custody or on
    bail by a magistrates' court pursuant to section 45 of the
    Magistrates' Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1964, or by a 1964 c. 21
    court, judge, resident magistrate, justice of the peace or (N.J.).
    other authority having power to do so, with a view to trial
    on indictment. [1st January 1979]
    "The Communities ", "the Treaties" or "the Community
    Treaties" and other expressions defined by section 1 of and Schedule
    I to the European Communities Act 1972 have the meanings 1972 c. 68.
    prescribed by that Act.
    "Comptroller and Auditor General" means the Comptroller-
    General of the receipt and issue of Her Majesty's Exchequer and
    Auditor-General of Public Accounts appointed in pursuance of the
    Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866. 1866 c. 39.
    "Consular officer" has the meaning assigned by Article 1 of the
    Vienna Convention set out in Schedule 1 to the Consular Relations 1968 c. 18.
    Act 1968.
    "The Corporation Tax Acts" means-
    (a) Parts X and XI of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 c. 10.
    1970;
    (b) all other provisions of that or any other Act relating
    to corporation tax or to any other matter dealt with in
    Part X or Part XI of that Act;
    (c) all the provisions of Part IV of the Finance Act 1965 and 1965 c. 25.
    of any other enactment which, at the passing of the said
    Act of 1970, formed part of or was to be construed with
    the Corporation Tax Acts. 10 c. 30 Interpretation Act 1978
    SCH. 1 " County court" means-
    (a) in relation to England and Wales, a court held for a district
    1959 c. 23. under the County Courts Act 1959; (18461
    (b) in relation to Northern Ireland, a court held for a division
    1959 c. 25 under the County Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1959. [1889]
    (N.I.).
    of Appeal" means-
    (a) in relation to England and Wales, Her Majesty's Court of
    Appeal in England;
    (b) in relation to Northern Ireland, Her Majesty's Court of
    Appeal in Northern Ireland.
    "Court of summary jurisdiction ", "summary conviction" and
    "Summary Jurisdiction Acts ", in relation to Northern Ireland, have
    the same meanings as in Measures of the Northern Ireland Assembly
    and Acts of the Parliament of Northern Ireland.
    "Crown Court" means-
    (a) in relation to England and Wales, the Crown Court consti-
    1971 c. 23. tuted by section 4 of the Courts Act 1971;
    (b) in relation to Northern Ireland, the Crown Court constituted
    1978 c. 23. by section 4 of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978.
    "Crown Estate Commissioners" means the Commissioners referred
    1961 c. 55. to in secton 1 of the Crown Estate Act 1961.
    "England" means, subject to any alteration of boundaries under
    1972 c. 70. Part IV of the Local Government Act 1972, the area consisting of
    the counties established by section 1 of that Act, Greater London and
    the Isles of Scilly. [1st April 1974].
    "Financial year" means, in relation to matters relating to the
    Consolidated Fund, the National Loans Fund, or moneys provided
    by Parliament, or to the Exchequer or to central taxes or finance, the
    twelve months ending with 31st March. [1889]
    "Governor-General" includes any person who for the time being
    has the powers of the Governor-General, and "Governor ", in rela-
    tion to any British possession, includes the officer for the time being
    administering the government of that possession. [1889]
    "High Court" means-
    (a) in relation to England and Wales, Her Majesty's High Court
    of Justice in England;
    (b) in relaņon to Northern Ireland, Her Majesty's High Court
    of Justice in Northern Ireland.
    "The Income Tax Acts" means all enactments relating to income
    tax, including any provisions of the Corporation Tax Acts which
    relate to income tax.
    "Land" includes buildings and other structures, land covered with
    water, and any estate, interest, easement, servitude or right in or over
    land. [1st January 1979]. Interpretation Act 1978 C. 30 11
    "Lands Clauses Acts" means- SCH. 1
    (a) in relation to England and Wales, the Lands Clauses Cbn-
    1845 C. 18.
    solidation Act 1845 and the Lands Clauses Conso'lidation 1860 c. 106.
    Aots Amendment Act 1860, and any Acts for the time being
    in force amending those Acts; [1889]
    (b) in relation Scotland, the Lands Clauses Consc4idation 1845 c. 19.
    (Scotland) Act 1845 and the Lands Clauses Consolidation 1860 c. 106.
    Acts Amendment Act 1860, and any Acts for the time being
    in force amending those Acts; [1889]
    (c) in relation to Northern Ireland, the enactments defined as
    such by section 46(1) of the Interpretation Act (Northern 1954 c.
    Ireland) 1954. [1889]
    (N.!.).
    "Local land charges register ", in relation to England and Wales,
    means a register kept pursuant to section 3 of the Local Land 1975 C. 76.
    Charges Act 1975, and "the appropriate local land charges register"
    has the meaning assigned by section 4 of that Act.
    "London borough" means a borough described in Schedule 1 to
    the London Government Act 1963, "inner London borough" means 1963 C. 33.
    one of the boroughs so described and numbered from 1 to J 2
    "Outer London borough" means one of the boroughs so described
    and numbered from 13 to 32, subject (in each case) to any alterations
    made under Part IV of the Local Government Act 1972. 1972 c. 70.
    "Lord Chancellor" means the Lord High Chancellor of Great
    Britain.
    "Magistrates' court" has the meaning assigned to it-
    (a) in relation to England and Wales, by section 124 of the
    Magistrates' Courts Act 1952; 1952 C. 55.
    (b) in relation to Northern Ireland, by section 1 of the Magis- 1964 C. 21
    trates' Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1964.
    "Month" means calendar month. [1850]
    "National Debt Commissioners" means the Commissioners for the
    Reduction of the National Debt.
    "Northern Ireland legislation" has the meaning assigned by
    section 24(5) of this Act. [1st January 1979]
    "Oath" and "affidavit" include affirmation and declaration, and
    "swear" includes affirm and declare.
    "Ordnance Map" means a map made under powers conferred
    by the Ordnance Survey Act 1841 or the Boundary Survey (Ireland) 1841 c. 30.
    Act 1854. 1854c. 17.
    "Parliamentary Election" means the election of a Member to serve
    in Parliament for a constituency. [1889]
    "Person" includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate.
    [1889] 12 c. 30 Interpretation Act 1978
    SCH. 1 "Police area", "police authority" and other expressions relating
    to the police have the meaning or effect described-
    1964 c. 48. (a) in relation to and Wales, by section 62 of the Police
    Act 1964;
    (b) in relation to Scotland, by sections 50 and 5 1(4) of the
    1967 c. 77. Police (Scotland) Act 1967.
    "The Privy Council" means the Lords and others of Her Majesty's
    Most Honourable Privy Council.
    "Registered medical practitioner" means a fully registered person
    1956 c. 76. within the meaning of the Medical Act 1956. [1st January 1979]
    "Rules of Court" in relation to any court means rules made by the
    authority having power to make rules or orders regulating the practice
    and procedure of that court, and in Scotland includes Acts of
    Adjournal and Acts of Sederunt; and the power of the authority to
    make rules of court (as above defined) includes power to make such
    rules for the purpose of any Act which directs or authorises anything
    to be done by rules of court. [1889]
    "Secretary of State" means one of Her Majesty's Principal
    Secretaries of State.
    "Sheriff ", in relation to Scotland, includes sheriff principal. [1889]
    "Statutory declaration" means a declaration made by virtue of
    1835 c. 62. the Statutory Declarations Act 1835.
    "Supreme Court" means-
    (a) in relation to England and Wales, the Court of Appeal and
    the High Court together with the Crown Court;
    (b) in relation to Northern Ireland, the Supreme Court of Judi-
    cature of Northern Ireland.
    1970 io. "The Tax Acts" means the Income and Corporation Taxes Act
    1970 and all other provisions of the Income Tax Acts and the
    Corporation Tax Acts. [12th March 1970]
    "The Treasury" means the Commissioners of Her Majesty's
    Treasury.
    "United Kingdom" means Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
    [12th April 19271
    "Wales" means, subject to any alteration of boundaries made
    1972 c. 70. under Part 1V of the Local Government Act 1972, the area con-
    sisting of the counties established by section 20 of that Act [1st
    April 1974]
    "Water authority ", in relation to England and Wales, means an
    1973 c. 37. authority established in accordance with section 2 of the Water Act
    1973; and "water authority area ", in relation to any functions of
    such an authority, means the area in respect of which the water
    authority are for the time being to exercise those functions.
    "Writing" includes typing, printing, lithography, photography and
    other modes of representing or reproducing words in a visible form,
    and expressions referring to writing are construed accordingly. Interpretation Act 1978 C. 30 13
    Construction of certain expressions relating to children I
    In relation to England and Wales the following expressions and
    references, namely-
    (a) the expression "the parental rights and duties";
    (b) the expression "legal custody" in relation to a child (as
    defined in the Children Act 1975); and 1975 C. 72.
    (c) any reference to the person with whom a child (as so
    defined) has his home,
    are to be construed in accordance with Part IV of that Act. [12th
    Noveniber 19751
    Construction of certain expressions relating to off ences
    In relation to England and Wales-
    (a) "indictable offence" means an offence which, if committed
    by an adult, is triable on indictment, whether it is exclusively
    so triable or triable either way;
    (b) "summary offence" means an offence which, if committed
    by an adult, is triable only summarily;
    (c) "offence triable either way" means an offence which, if
    committed by an adult, is triable either on indictment or
    summarily;
    and the terms "indictable ", "summary" and "triable either way ".
    in their application to offences, are to be construed accordingly.
    In the above definitions references to the way or ways in which an
    offence is triable are to be construed without regard to the effect,
    if any, of 23 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 on the mode of 1977 C. 45.
    trial in a particular case.
    SCHEDULE 2 Sections 22, 23.
    APPLICATION OP Acr TO EXISTING ENACIMENTS
    PART I
    Acrs
    1. The following provisions of this Act apply to Acts whenever
    Section 6(a) and (c) so far as applicable to enactments relating
    *0 offences punishable on indictment or on summary con-
    viction
    Section 9
    Section 10
    Section 11 so far as it relates to subordinate legislation made
    after the year 1889
    Section 18
    Section 19(2).
    2. The following apply to Acts passed after the year 1850:-
    1
    Section 2 14 C. 30 Interpretation Act 1978
    SCH. 2 Section 3
    Section 6(a) and (c) so far as not applicable to such Acts by
    virtue of paragraph 1
    Section 15
    Section 17(1).
    3. The following apply to Acts passed after the year 1889:-
    Section 4
    Section 7
    Section 8
    Section 12
    Section 13
    Section 14 so far as it relates to rules, regulations or byelaws
    Section 16(1)
    Section 17(2Xa)
    Section 19(1)
    Section 20(1).
    4.-(1) Subject to the following provisions of this paragraph-
    (a) paragraphs of Schedule I at the end of which a year or date
    earlier than the commencement of this Act is specified apply,
    so far as applicable, to Acts passed on or after the date,
    or after the year, so specified; and
    (b) paragraphs of that Schedule at the end of which no year or
    date is specified apply, so far as applicable, to Acts passed
    at any time.
    (2) The definition of "British Islands ", in its application to Acts
    passed after the establishment of the Irish Free State but before
    the commencement of this Act, includes the Republic of Ireland.
    (3) The definition of "colony ", in its application to an Act passed
    at any time before the commencement of this Act, includes-
    1889 c. 63. (a) any colony within the meaning of section 18(3) of the Inter-
    pretation Act 1889 which was excluded, but in relation only
    to Acts passed at a later time, by any enactment repealed
    by this Act;
    (b) any country or territory which ceased after that time to be
    part of Her Majesty's dominions but subject to a provision
    for the continuation of existing law as if it had not so
    ceased;
    and paragraph (b) of the definition does not apply.
    (4) The definition of "Lord Chancellor" does not apply to Acts
    passed before 1st October 1921 in which that expression was used in
    relation to Ireland only.
    (5) The definition of "person ", so far as it includes bodies
    corporate, applies to any provision of an Act whenever passed
    relating to an offence punishable on indictment or on summary
    conviction.
    1973 32. (6) This paragraph applies to the National Health Service
    1973 c. 37. Reorganisation Act 1973 and the Water Act 1973 as if they were
    passed after 1st April 1974. Interpretation Act 1978 c. 30 15
    5. The following definitions shall be treated as included in Schedule
    1 for the purposes specified in this paragraph-
    (a) in any Act passed before 1st April 1974, a reference to
    England includes Berwick upon Tweed and Monmouthshire
    and, in the case of an Act passed before the Welsh
    Language Act 1967, Wales; 1967 C. 66.
    (b) in any Act passed before the commencement of this Act
    and after the year 1850, "land" includes messuages, tene-
    ments and hereditaments, houses and buildings of any
    tenure;
    (c) in any Act passed before the commencement of the Criminal 1975 c. 21.
    Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975, "the Summary Jurisdic-
    tion (Scotiand) Acts" means Part II of that Act.
    PART H
    SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
    6. Sections 4(a), 9 and 19(1), and so much of Schedule 1 as defines
    the following expressions, namely-
    British subject and Commonwealth citizen:
    England;
    Local land charges register and appropriate local land charges
    register;
    Police area (and related expressions) in relation to Scotland;
    United Kingdom;
    Wales,
    apply to subordiifate legislation made at any time before the com-
    mencement of this Act as they apply to Acts passed at that time.
    7. The definition in Schedule 1 of "county court ", in relation to
    England and Wales, applies to Orders in Council made after the
    year 1846. 16 c.30 Interpretation Act 1978
    Section 25. SCHEDULE 3
    ENACrMENTS REPEALED
    20 Geo.
    c.42.
    33 Geo.
    c. 13.
    43 & 44 Vict.
    c. 9.
    47 & 48 Vict.
    c. 62.
    52 & 53 Vict.
    c. 63.
    53 & 54 Vict.
    c. 21.
    59 & 60 Vict.
    c. 14.
    S.R. &O. 1923
    No. 405.
    15 & l6Geo.5.
    No. 1.
    17 & 18 Geo. 5.
    c. 4.
    22 &23 Geo. 5.
    c. 4.
    11 &l2Geo.6.
    c. 7.
    11 &l2Geo.6.
    c. 56.
    15&l6Geo.6
    & 1 Eliz. 2.
    C. 55.
    4 & 5 Eliz. 2.
    c. 76.
    5 & 6 Eliz. 2.
    c. 6.
    8 & 9 Eliz. 2.
    c. 55.
    9 &lOEliz.2.
    c. 16.
    10& llEliz.2.
    C. 1.
    10& 11 Eliz.2.
    c. 30.
    The Wales and Berwick
    Act 1746.
    The Acts of Parliament
    (Commencement) Act
    1793.
    The Statutes (Definition
    of Time) Act 1880.
    The Revenue Act 1884.
    The Interpretation Act
    1889.
    The Inland Revenue
    Regulation Act 1890.
    The Short Titles Act 1896.
    The Irish Free State (Con-
    sequential Adaptation
    of Enactments) Order
    1923.
    The Interpretation
    Measure 1925.
    The Royal and Parlia-
    mentary Titles Act 1927.
    The Statute of West-
    minster 1931.
    The Ceylon Independence
    Act 1947.
    The British Nationality
    Act 1948.
    The Magistrates' Courts
    Act 1952.
    The Medical Act 1956.
    The Ghana Independence
    Act 1957.
    The Nigeria Indepedence
    Act 1960.
    The Sierra Leone Inde-
    pendence Act 1961.
    The Tanganyika Inde-
    pendence Act 1961.
    The Northern Ireland Act
    1962.
    The words from "and to be
    the date" to the end.
    The whole Act.
    In section 14, the second para-
    graph, that is the words from
    "Any reference" to "Ex-
    chequer and Audit Depart-
    ments Act 1866" in the
    second place where that Act
    is referred to in the section.
    The whole Act except para-
    graphs (4), (5) and (14) of
    section 13 in their application
    to Northern Ireland.
    In section 38(1), the words from
    "and" to "of this Act ".
    Section 3.
    In the Schedule, the entry
    relating to the Interpretation
    Act 1889.
    Section 1.
    In section 2(2) the words "Act
    passed and ".
    Section 11.
    Section 4(2).
    In section 1(2) the words
    "other enactment or" and
    the words "passed or ".
    In Schedule 5, the amendment-
    of the Interpretation Act 1889.
    Section 52(3).
    Section 4(1).
    Section 3(1).
    Section 3(1).
    Section 3(1).
    Section 27.
    Chapter
    or Number
    Short Title
    2.
    3.
    Extent of Repeal
    The whole Act. Interpretation Act 1978 c. 30 17
    10& 11 Eliz.2.
    40.
    L0&llEliz.2.
    C. 54.
    10&lIEIiz.2.
    c. 57.
    1963 c. 33.
    1963 c. 54.
    1964 c. 46.
    1964 c. 48.
    1964 c. 86.
    1964 c. 93.
    1966 c. 14.
    1966 c. 37.
    1967 c. 4.
    1967 c. 66.
    1967 c. 77.
    The Jamaica Indepen-
    dence Act 1962.
    The Trinidad and Tobago
    Independence Act 1962.
    The Uganda Indepen-
    dence Act 1962.
    The London Government
    Act 1963.
    The Kenya Independence
    Act 1963.
    The Malawi Independence
    Act 1964.
    The Police Act 1964.
    The Malta Independence
    Act 1964.
    The Gambia Independ-
    ence Act 1964.
    The Guyana Independ-
    ence Act 1966.
    The Barbados Independ-
    ence Act 1966.
    The West Indies Act 1967.
    The Welsh Language Act
    1967.
    The Police (Scotland) Act
    1967.
    The Mauritius Independ-
    ence Act 1968.
    The National Loans Act
    1968.
    The Income and Corpora-
    tion Taxes Act 1970.
    The Fiji Independence
    Act 1970.
    The Sheriff Courts (Scot-
    land) Act 1971.
    The European Com-
    munities Act 1972.
    The Local Government
    Act 1972.
    In section 62 the words from
    "and in any other enact-
    ment " to " this Act) ".
    Section 4(1).
    Section 4(1).
    Section 5(1).
    Section 4(l).
    Section 3(5).
    Section 4.
    In section 50, the words from
    "and in any other enactment"
    tO " this Act) "; and in
    section 51, in subsection (4),
    the words from "and in any
    other enactment" to "this
    Act) ".
    Section 4(1).
    Section 1(6).
    In section 526, in subsection
    (1) the words "and in any
    other Act "; and in sub-
    section (2) the words "and in
    any Act passed after this Act."
    Section 4(1).
    In section 4(3) the words from
    (which " to " the said
    section 28 ".
    In section 1(2) the words from
    "and except" to "Northern
    Ireland) ".
    In section 269 the words from
    "in every Act" to "that
    date)" in the second place
    where those words occur.
    Chapter Short Title Extent of Repeal
    or Number
    SCH. 3
    Section 3(1).
    Section 3(1).
    Section 3(1).
    In section 1, in subsection (1)
    the words "and any other"
    and in subsection (6) the
    words from" and section 15"
    to " that is to say ".
    Section 4(1).
    Section 4(1).
    1968 c. 8.
    1968 c. 13.
    1970 c. 10.
    1970 c. 50.
    1971 c. 58.
    1972 c. 68.
    1972 c. 70. 18 c. 30 Interpretation Act 1978
    SCH. 3
    Chapter
    or Number
    Short Title Extent of Repeal
    1973 C. 14. The Costs in Criminal
    Cases Act 1973.
    In section 13(1) the words" and
    in any other enactment pro-
    viding for the payment of
    costs out of central funds ".
    1973 c. 27. The Bahamas Independ-
    ence Act 1973.
    Section 4(1).
    1973 c. 32. The National Health Re-
    organisation Act 1973.
    In section 55(2), the words from
    the beginning to "that date;
    and ".
    1973 c. 37. The Water Act 1973. In section 2(3) the words "and
    any other enactment ".
    Section 38(2).
    1975 c. 21. The Criminal Procedure
    (Scotland) Act 1975.
    In Schedule 9, paragraph 6.
    1975 c. 72. The Children Act 1975. Section 89.
    1975 c. 76. The Local Land Charges
    Act 1975.
    In section 4 the words "and any
    other statutory provision ".
    1976 c. 63. The Bail Act 1976. In Schedule 2, the amendment
    of the Interpretation Act
    1889.
    1977 c. 45. The Criminal Law Act
    1977.
    In section 64(1) the words from
    "and, unless" to "this Act)".
    1978 c. 12. The Medical Act 1978. In Schedule 5, in paragraph 48
    paragraph (b) and the word
    "and" immediately preced-
    ing that paragraph. -
    1978 c. 15. The Solomon Islands Act
    1978.
    Section 7(1).
    1978 c. 20. The Tuvalu Act 1978. Section 4(1).
    Printed in the UK
    For The Stationery Office Limited under the
    authority and superintendence of Carol Tullo, Controller of
    Her Majesty's Stationery Office
    and Queen's Printer of Acts of Parliament
    1st Impression August 1978
    7th Impression February 1998
    Dd 5065225 2/98 173 1/2 19585 Job no. ON 068
    LONDON: The Stationery Office Limited
    ISBN 0-10-543078-1
    9 780105 430780

  • #2
    Re: The Controversial Person by GM Fletcher

    Excellent post ! Everyone should read it completely and take an hour or two to reflect on what they just read (sarcasm inside).

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: The Controversial Person by GM Fletcher

      Thanks Sapiens, for posting this and recent Material; much appreciated
      "that each simple substance has relations which express all the others"

      Comment


      • #4
        Re: The Controversial Person by GM Fletcher

        Originally posted by Diarmuid View Post
        Thanks Sapiens, for posting this and recent Material; much appreciated
        Hi Sapiens

        Thanks again - this poses more questions then it answers I think :p.

        Firstly the notion of a corporation or a legal person is a thought object, it does not exist in the physical world a cooperation can consist of buildings employees etc.. but these physical manifestations of the company are not the company itself; the corporation is a shared thought object among the minds of men. This meeting of the minds or common understanding allows for the perpetuity as eluded to below.


        ".... consist of one person only and his successors, in some particular station, who are
        incorporated by law, in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages,
        particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have
        As such the object must be construed, either partially or fully by each for its existence, it is the passing and shared understanding of the concept , the idea, which gives the entity its perpetuity, for its continued existence, we as individuals must continually rebirth the entity / definition, though shared understanding. Which at least for me throws up a major conundrum, how can a thing, which is born of the minds ability to manifest it, be classified as the same as the mind.

        For a classification system to work I suppose, such as biotic, abiotic mammals, fish, etc.., there must be a shared common base for their classification, how is it that a fiction that is only manifested by the minds ability to do such a thing be classified as the same as that which manifested it. The poet is not the poem, the author not the story. One would reasonably classify the poem and the story together or the poet and the author but surely not vice versa.

        As has been seen widely from corporate abuse of the environment and people generally, it is near impossible to ascribe duties or penalties to a thing which has such an ephemeral quality the definition offers a shield of limited liability, and in fact seems to be the reason for such classification to those who would perpetuate such crimes , I believe the equating of the fiction to that of the real has been a great travesty for the world.
        Last edited by Diarmuid; November 26, 2009, 10:07 PM.
        "that each simple substance has relations which express all the others"

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