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FRED
07-31-08, 10:10 AM
http://www.itulip.com/images/wallstreetgpr.jpgRecorded at Wall Street

US-Flaggen wehen am Dienstagmorgen auf der Wall Street in New York. (Bild: AP)

Aufzeichnungen zur US-Blasen-Ökonomie

Von Barbara Eisenmann

Und wieder einmal ist eine Blase geplatzt, Kredite können nicht zurückgezahlt werden, Banken gehen pleite. An der Börse gibt man sich optimistisch, solange es eben geht. Aber die Gefahrenzonen multiplizieren sich, und die Immobilienblase und Bankenkrise, die Dollarabwertung und Ölpreisexplosion sind nicht mehr so einfach wegzuspekulieren. Es sei denn, man kreierte eine neue Blase.

Inzwischen haben allerdings auch in den USA die Schwarzseher unter den Wirtschaftsexperten das Wort übernommen. Ihre Kritik an den Exzessen einer blasenproduzierenden Finanzwirtschaft, die in keiner Beziehung mehr zur güterproduzierenden realen Wirtschaft steht, wird immer lauter. Vor Ort, an der Wall Street, die lange das geografische und imaginäre Zentrum des Kapitalismus war, hat sich die Autorin umgehört und dabei mit chinesischen Touristen, Geschäftsleuten, großen und kleinen Spielern und Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern gesprochen.

Manuskript zur Sendung als pdf (http://www.dradio.de/download/88726/) oder im barrierefreien Textformat (http://www.dradio.de/download/88727/).

Audio formats. (http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/dasfeature/774418/vorschau/)

English excerpts from transcript.

O-Ton 15 (Janszen)
I am not actually a big fan of the term bubble because I don´t think that is really what, that sort of
describes a finality, it is really more a system of believes that builds up over time, it is a system
of false believes that are developed in an atmosphere of delusion around the real source of gains
and asset prices that builds up, that become a self-reinforcing systems. So I prefer to call them
asset hyperinflations because that is ultimatley what they are.

O-TON 16 (Janszen)
So we have this asset bubble, asset inflation in tecnology stocks, when that ended so what the US
did to reflate the fire economy was to take what was already a growing part of the economy
which is housing and inflate it. Right. So this was policy. Of course they don´t talk about it as
policy, but as Chico Marx would say who are you going to believe me or your own eyes, you
know. In 1999 we got rid of all the regulations that were built after the last big crash like the
Glass Steagall act of 1933. That regulation was put in place because it was decided that the real
cause of the asset inflation in the 20ies was this non-transparent pools, these investment trusts
and pools of money that were manipulated ,and nobody really understood who is leveraged and
where the risks were. That was dismanteled in 1999, all based on the theory that markets will
work it out.

SPRECHERIN 1
Eric Janszen geht davon aus, dass eine produktionsschwache Wirtschaft wie die us-
amerikanische auf Spekulationsblasen angewiesen sei, und dass deshalb eine neue Blase immer
schon in die Wege geleitet werde, bevor aus der alten die Luft überhaupt vollständig entwichen
sei.

O-TON 17 (Janszen)
All our asset inflations have a certain structure to them, a certain way of evolution and
development. They usually / certainly involve some government legislation, it is very important
to get them kicked off. So for the internet bubble it was passage of right/of legislation that
allowed legal to do comercial transactions over the internet which it was passed in 1994 and that
is when that process started. And in housing, the real root of the housing inflation goes all back to
1986 with the tax relief act under Reagan, we got to write off the interest expense on your home
mortgage.

O-TON 18 (Roubini)
Certainly Greenspan was supportive of the market and didn´t worry about the irrational
exuberance in the 90ies and did nothing about it, and when the tec bust occurred he aggressively
eased the fed fund rates and created another bubble, the housing bubble, and now the housing
bubble is going to bust, so I don´t know if there is another bubble to create, but certainly Wall
Street hopes that the Fed easing is going to stimulate asset markets and equity markets.

O-TON 19 (Roubini)
Like in 2001 the Fed very aggressively cut interest rates and we still had a recession. And this
time the recession is going to be more severe than 2001. Plus the Fed has to worry about the fact
that cuting rates very fast might cause a very sharp fall of the dollar and that will become
dangerous, so the possibility of the Fed this time to cut rates as aggressive as it did in 2001 from
6 and a half Prozent all the way down to 1 Prozent is more limited this time around, so it is going
to be less Fed easing. So I think people yeah believe that there is a Bernanke put the way there
was a Greenspan put and Bernanke is going to rescue them. I don´t believe, this is not going to be
the case, it is not going to happen.

O-TON 20 (Parrott)
So may be it is a naive hope that people will look around and see what happened and ask
themselves why it happened, and particularily with the housing bubble, the subprime mortgage
where it was clear to so many people for so long and yet Alan Greenspan, chairman of the federal
reserve board was saying no there is not a housing bubble, it is just housing prices catching up
with income and nonesense like that that people will demand that the Fed and Washington
effectively regulate the financial sector and make the financial sector supportive and enabling of
activity in the real sector rather than the opposite.

SZENISCHE ATMO 27 (Schülerführung Wall Street)
Okay. Come on over guys. Come on over, so we can all stay close together ... this building right
here is probably the single most famous building on Wall Street, it is called the New York Stock
Exchange. There are 3000 stocks listed here, and they have a value today of somewhere around
22 or 23, anyone knows the number that comes after that - billion, billion, million - billion, no
keep going - trillion - trillion dollars, 23 trillion dollars, that is a lot of money. But you can´t
actually get all that money out.

SZENISCHE ATMO 28 (Schülerführung)
So what happens on a really bad day do you think? What makes the market really go down here?
- if no one buys - if no one buys right, and what might cause people to wanna think they
shouldn´t buy - it is expensive - stock suddenly seem expensive , but what kind of things make
them think that? Yeah - no one is buying the product - may be if no one is buying the product, so
may be if Coke announces they are not selling Coke classic anymore, only Coke black, did
anyone ever have a Coke black? - yeah - it was disgusting, I don´t even know if they are selling
it. So may be that news come out and then people say oh oh we don´t want Coke, so they start
selling Coke. May be people that own Pepsi what are they going to think yeah? - Buy more - But
would they buy more Pepsi if Coke is going down - because it is comeptitive - exactly right,
exactly right, may be they are going to think people are going to drink Pepsi instead, so let´s buy
more Pepsi. But there is another possibility, may be Coke goes down because there is a new
announcement that all you kids are drinking too much Coke and getting diabetes, so now what is
going to happen to the Pepsi buyers - they don´t sell - they are not going to sell too. Exactly right.
So this whole market moves on this kind of information. The whole Wall Street here just runs on
this kind of news. - ? - pardon - ? - that is when they go to grape juice exactly or may be water,
would be a better deal or diet soda or something. But you know what your comment there right,
that is whatcould make you a great Wall Street trader - oh - because you have to think about these
kinds of things instead, what are the subsitutes, what are other options, so you may have a future
here on Wall Street.

O-TON 21 (Roubini)
Certainly the US Federal Reserve cuts rates too much and kept them low for too long. But more
importantly I think that the interaction of essentially financial innovation, this process of
securitization where you take mortgages, you convert them in mortgage backed securitities, but
not only that you can create tranches of CDOs and then CDOs of CDOs and CDOs of CDOs of
CDOs, those things eventually become dangerous and useless and actually you can not price
these things. That creates a lot of lack of transparency, and at every step of the way each one of
the people in this process are earning fees, so they are not holding anything of the risks.That was
part of the problem. But then the other part of the problem was that while this was happening the
regulators were asleep at the wheel, they were actually saying all these market innovations are
fine. The US Fed and other regulators they were not only not doing their job in terms of
regulations and supervisions, but were cheerleaders of these financial innovations, so we led
these dangerous innovations and this opacity and lack of transparency to faster and grow into a
credit bubble without control. So it was a deadly combination.

SZENISCHE ATMO 31
The problem is there are no garantees, and one of the issues, excuse me I got to work while I am
talking to you, one of the issues that we have to deal with is the human emotion when it comes to
buying and selling stocks. Because at the end of the day it is human emotion that drives stock
crisis and so much of stock trading is driven by human emotion, and there are 2 emotions: fear
and greed. The greed, the greed I think we would attach to the bull, and the fear clearly we would
attach to the bear. And it is interesting because when human emotion takes over usually logic
goes out the window, and that is what creates all the volatility in the stock market.

O-TON 23 (Janszen)
Part of the thesis that we are developing is that the US will generate another asset inflation
subsequent to the housing deflation. And my current theory is that this will be in alternative
energy and infrastructure. In 2005 there was a new legislation passed in this country, the energy
security act I believe it was called, and this to me was the launch of the alternative energy bubble
because they are always launched by some sort of legislation. The reason is that you want
investors to be protected from losses, and the way you do that is either you open up a new market
as by deregulation or you do direct government subsidies to the industrie which is what is
happening with that act.

O-TON 25 (Janszen)
The problem of the US´ decline is that the rest of the world is really doing very well. Unless the
US economy adjusts to that new role in a thoughtful kind of way, how we put together an
industrial policy that allows us to be more/ to contribute more to the economy in ways other than
finance, you know it takes time, and frankly I think it is going to take a crisis to motivate, to
create the political motivation to do this.

akrowne
07-31-08, 11:38 AM
You say the rest of the world is "doing really well". Would you argue against a downturn in Asian and/or Europe? If so on what basis? People have pointed to signs of "slowdown" in both. Not that I necessarily agree, but how would you respond?

Second, if we've had a true long term credit capitulation at this point in the economy, will it really be possible to launch another bubble? It seems the credit machine itself is broken. Add the long-term decline of the dollar to this. How likely do you think it is that legislation will fail to lunch an alternative energy bubble because of these factors?

In fact, if there is such a "bubble", why would it even be here? Why not Asia or Europe?

EJ
07-31-08, 12:03 PM
I should point out that the interview was done a year ago.

You say the rest of the world is "doing really well". Would you argue against a downturn in Asian and/or Europe? If so on what basis? People have pointed to signs of "slowdown" in both. Not that I necessarily agree, but how would you respond?

At the time, the US was according to my forecast from Oct. 2006 likely to be in recession by Q4 2007. That forecast was confirmed today by this Bloomberg report (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601068&sid=axADxPkA6IA8&refer=home). Since 2001 I have argued for an eventual US-centric downturn when the next downturn happens. A financial crisis will be US-centric following from the housing bubble collapse. That means no flight capital escaping crises in Asia or elsewhere for US shores to shore up the dollar. The economic downturn that follows hits the US harder than other countries, with a couple of exceptions such as Spain that also had housing bubbles. Since 2001 the world has been weening itself off the US as primary demand engine. A period of negative growth in the US no longer translates into a major decline in GDP for US trade partners. My model, by the way, is Argentina in the 1930s. Like China today, it was a large and fast growing exporter. When the depression hit, by shifting exports to countries that were doing relatively well, Argentina escaped the worst of the period. China will do likewise.

Second, if we've had a true long term credit capitulation at this point in the economy, will it really be possible to launch another bubble? It seems the credit machine itself is broken. Add the long-term decline of the dollar to this. How likely do you think it is that legislation will fail to launch an alternative energy bubble because of these factors?

Indeed I get this question a lot as I'm researching my book. The US economy can withstand an incredible amount of abuse. You'll be surprised how quickly an entirely new structure of credit can be organized around areas of the economy that are succeeding.

In fact, if there is such a "bubble", why would it even be here? Why not Asia or Europe?

They don't do things that way. Their culture, legal and political framework, and financial and market institutions do not support it. There are exceptions, such as Belgium, that prove the rule. Such bubbles as we have are strictly Anglo-Saxon.

metalman
07-31-08, 02:21 PM
They don't do things that way. Their culture, legal and political framework, and financial and market institutions do not support it. There are exceptions, such as Belgium, that prove the rule. Such bubbles as we have are strictly Anglo-Saxon.

you mean financial bubble, right? real estate bubbles and busts are not us/uk/australia phenomena

http://img529.imageshack.us/img529/2098/riseandfall2nm6.jpg

Chris Coles
07-31-08, 05:02 PM
you mean financial bubble, right? real estate bubbles and busts are not us/uk/australia phenomena

http://img529.imageshack.us/img529/2098/riseandfall2nm6.jpg

A large part of the answer to the question of where this phenomenon remains dominant is where the falls in house price have already stopped. Norway 1993. Sweden, Denmark 1985 and 1982. Other economies have previously recognised the problem and adjusted their thinking to stop the overall problem in its tracks.

metalman
07-31-08, 10:24 PM
A large part of the answer to the question of where this phenomenon remains dominant is where the falls in house price have already stopped. Norway 1993. Sweden, Denmark 1985 and 1982. Other economies have previously recognised the problem and adjusted their thinking to stop the overall problem in its tracks.

the usa used to recognize the problem, then got amnesia under greasepan.

marvenger
07-31-08, 11:03 PM
not sure if you answer these kinds of questions EJ; are you investing in altE?

Lukester
07-31-08, 11:50 PM
A financial crisis will be US-centric following from the housing bubble collapse. That means no flight capital escaping crises in Asia or elsewhere for US shores to shore up the dollar. The economic downturn that follows hits the US harder than other countries ... A period of negative growth in the US no longer translates into a major decline in GDP for US trade partners. ... Argentina escaped the worst of the period. China will do likewise. ... You'll be surprised how quickly an entirely new structure of credit can be organized around areas of the [ USA ] economy that are succeeding. They [ non Anglo Saxon nations ] don't do things that way. Their culture, legal and political framework, and financial and market institutions do not support it. ... Such bubbles as we have are strictly Anglo-Saxon.

Whether or not an infrastructure boom occurring beyond US shores is bubbly or not may be a moot distinction. The infrastructure boom to be summoned to eventually rescue the US from deflation may need to be as large as our recent US bubbles, but even that is not going to be very large compared to the infrastructure boom already in full swing worldwide. Disparities of scale between the anticipated US infrastructure event and the current global one are remarkable. Examining the scale of the numbers sketched out below it would seem a period of negative growth in the US will have a less than the anticipated effect upon Rest Of World growth - that means less in retrospect than some have surmised during the past 2 years in this community's anticipation of this final US crumpling. The long anticipated implosion of the US is playing out against a global longer term backdrop which given the disparity of scale in ten years time may evidence that this US event was shrugged off in terms of it's effect on the global trend.

The global infrastructure spending numbers mentioned below certainly point to a disparity of scale.

QUOTE:

While Western banks have written off close to $300 billion in subprime loans, emerging economies will spend four times that amount -- an estimated $1.2 trillion -- on roads, railways, electricity, telecommunications and other infrastructure projects just this year. That's the equivalent to 6% of their combined GDPs -- and twice the percentage being invested in developed economies. Even at the height of the United States' infrastructure spending -- the expansion of railways in the mid-nineteenth century -- total investment barely hit 5% of GDP. Today, the equivalent number in China is 12%. 'Laggard' India intends to almost double the infrastructure investment share of its GDP from 5% to 9% within the next five years.

Morgan Stanley predicts that emerging economies will spend $22 trillion on infrastructure between now and 2018. Australia's Macquarie Bank puts the number at $30 trillion through 2030. Last year, Brazil announced a four-year plan to spend $300 billion to modernize its infrastructure. The Indian government has penciled in $500 billion in infrastructure projects in its latest five-year plan. Russia now has plans to construct 39,000 miles of new roads and 5,300 miles of railways by 2015, including an eight-lane expressway that will link St. Petersburg to Helsinki and Moscow by 2015. And this investment boom isn't limited to emerging economies. A casual drive through the Northeast corridor of the United States will confirm that much of the United States' roads, airports, bridges and tunnels are in sore need of upgrading. The American Society of Civil Engineers estimated that $1.6 trillion would be required during a five-year period to bring U.S. infrastructure back into shape.

Unsurprisingly, the biggest player in the infrastructure boom is China. Four out of 10 dollars spent on infrastructure during the next 10 years will be spent by Asia's emerging economic giant. China's commitment to infrastructure has been relentless. Between 2001 and the end of 2005, it spent more on roads and railways than it did in the previous 50 years combined. By the end of 2007, China had built some 33,500 miles of roads, thereby achieving in 17 years what the West took 40 years to accomplish. And its remarkable pace is continuing. Between 2006 and 2010, China will invest $200 billion in railways alone, four times more than in the previous five years.

Like the Olympics, China's infrastructure boom is a collection of trophy projects. Beijing's new airport terminal is the world's largest. The floor space is 17% bigger than London's Heathrow -- the world's busiest airport. Designed in the form of a Chinese dragon, it was planned and built in a mere four years by an army of 50,000 workers. And China plans to add another 97 airports by 2020 to the 142 it had at the end of 2006. The number of airports handling more than 30 million passengers a year will grow from three to 13.

________________

If bankrupt America is gearing up for another bubble go-round via an infrastructure boom(let) to rival the housing bubble, why should we have a moment's hesitation about significantly faltering global GDP in response to that, when the BRIC nations mentioned above have a great deal more solvency than the US, better future earnings streams due to rich strategic commodities stores or structural labor cost advantages, and a great deal more fundamental a need for what the excerpt above suggests will be 20-30 times more infrastructure spending than the US? The global infrastructure boom in full swing, when tallied up across three or four recent years, already makes the misallocated global liquidity that found it's demise in the housing bubble look like small potatoes. Going by the estimates above it is scheduled to ramp up to dwarf even current global spending levels in just the next 12 years. How big a ripple will the US implosion be percieved to have caused ten years from now, in a world which just spent 22 trillion $ in that span of time on infrastructure elsewhere? And does that $22 trillion even scratch the surface of energy infrastructure spending?

How the heck are you gonna throw a good old fashioned global recession with all this gargantuan global spending due?

metalman
08-01-08, 12:00 AM
Whether or not an infrastructure boom occurring beyond US shores is bubbly or not may be a moot distinction. The infrastructure boom to be summoned to eventually rescue the

... what happened? where's the rest of your thought?

c1ue
08-01-08, 09:03 AM
Lukester,

There is no question the emerging economies are trying to build themselves into first world status.

The question I keep asking is: should the US cease being the primary consumer, where then will the money come from to pay for this expense?

Russia has its mineral and oil/gas resources so I see a path there.

But China still derives a huge part of its income from the US. India also. So does Brazil indirectly via commodity exports to China.

Sure, there will be some retrenchment of export to Europe and Russia, but the scale of income is not going to replace the US consumer.

Not that the US consumer will disappear, but a switch from $700B+ currency account deficits to a $200B+ currency account surplus means a yearly trillion dollar swing - not even counting the impact of higher absolute and relatively dollar value of oil imports.

And if you want to respond with 'domestic demand', I'll immediately retort that the majority of domestic demand will be absorbed by higher food costs.

Where then will the $22T to $30T come from?

Construction booms - much like Ponzi schemes - require ever larger amounts of new money to be put in.

Dr. Michael Hudson has pointed out one way that will be attempted: "There is a striking parallel with the last time the Middle East began to receive sharply higher export earnings, after 1973. Back then, it arranged oil-for-infrastructure deals with Korean, Japanese and other Asian firms to build roads, hospitals and other construction needed to raise productivity and living standards. Today, China has entered the mix. And there is still a long way to go for investment in the array of public and private services that are needed to make the region one of the world’s most prosperous."

But the population of the oil exporting parts of the Middle East is in the single digit percentages compared to China.

Unless every single citizen of Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi/UAE, and Oman buys literally a mountain of Chinese crap, there just isn't enough to balance out the oil China needs vs. the infrastructure to be built in these nations.

raja
08-01-08, 09:43 AM
Where then will the $22T to $30T come from?

Construction booms - much like Ponzi schemes - require ever larger amounts of new money to be put in.

Unless every single citizen of Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi/UAE, and Oman buys literally a mountain of Chinese crap, there just isn't enough to balance out the oil China needs vs. the infrastructure to be built in these nations.
Also, there may be some environmental limitations to infrastructure expansion . . . such as air pollution, water shortages, etc.

MLM
08-01-08, 03:36 PM
Unless every single citizen of Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi/UAE, and Oman buys literally a mountain of Chinese crap, there just isn't enough to balance out the oil China needs vs. the infrastructure to be built in these nations.

Thus the difference between Argentina in the 1930's and China today.

Lukester
08-01-08, 10:39 PM
Unless every single citizen of Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi/UAE, and Oman buys literally a mountain of Chinese crap, there just isn't enough to balance out the oil China needs vs. the infrastructure to be built in these nations.

Sounds like a workmanlike and plausible argument. The problem however is that you've been reciting this (mechanical) formula with a few variations (which rich nations are about to stop coughing up the money for China et. al. to keep growing) for the past two years, to little apparent result. US is already into some sort of recession. It will deepen, and 18 months or two years from now when we can look around and see that little of note has occurred in the way of GDP and comodities consumption deterioration across the entire arc of BRIC nations, a scrupulous theorist would go back to the drawing board and reexamine why the theories he'd espoused for four long years had not yet materialised. Whether you will engage in that reexamination or not remains to be seen. I see plenty of people keep buying it. And it's always "just over the brow of the next hill" ... :D

c1ue
08-01-08, 11:45 PM
Since I joined iTulip in January of 2007, 2 years is still a significant time away.

As for when/why - again we are looking at economic time.

The debt levels in the US are still not falling because the general populace still is only beginning the cycle of understanding how screwed they are.

Even for housing - only in the last 6 months has hope started to give way to capitulation.

By the end of this year there should be more clear indications of whether my assertion is correct or not.

But to turn the question around - where then does this money come from? I have asked this again and again and still hear no answer.

Or will the emerging economies all collectively become rich selling crap to each other?

MLM
08-02-08, 02:24 AM
And it's always "just over the brow of the next hill" ... :D

Where's that next hill again?

"Indications of a slowdown in China’s manufacturing have appeared, according to a brief report issued by the China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing on Aug. 1. According to the report, the Purchasing Managers’ Index fell to a seasonally adjusted 48.4, down from 52 a month earlier and the first time it has fallen below 50 since reports began in 2005."



http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_implications_potential_manufacturing_slowdow n

Lukester
08-02-08, 08:02 AM
Here is coal, flashing an array of gaudy red lights and emitting a four alarm klaxon screetch, that the price of energy is about to collapse due to artificially sustained demand in the world's fastest growing economy. [ And this datum also hints broadly how that economy is on the verge of a growth plunge ;) ]

July 29 - Bloomberg (Wang Ying): "China, the world's second-biggest energy consumer, is facing a deepening summer power crisis that may persist into the winter months, the nation's dominant electricity distributor said. State Grid Corp. of China, which more than 1 billion people rely on for power, said electricity shortages have worsened because of inadequate coal supplies. Forty-six percent of the power stations connected to the distributor's grid have coal stockpiles below the 'caution line,' or seven days of consumption ... China, facing its sixth year of electricity shortages..."

FRED
08-02-08, 10:35 AM
EJ writes in:

The point we have been making is that now that Asia is trading more with the rest of the world than with the US, as the US goes into recession the resulting decline in demand from the US will have less impact on Asia less than during previous US recessions.

Asia <-> North America: $1 trillion

Asia <-> ME: $450 billion +
Asia <-> EU: $970 billion =
Asia <-> Non-US: $1.52 trillion

European trade is similarly diversified. A US-centric economic downturn simply will not have the same impact as it would have in the past when the US was the demand engine for the world.

http://www.itulip.com/images/2006tradeflows.jpg

jk
08-02-08, 01:56 PM
morgan stanley just published a piece which is germane:


Why Is the World Slowing in Super Slow-Motion?
August 01, 2008

By Stephen Jen & Luca Bindelli | London

Summary and Conclusions
Global trade patterns are changing, due to both a cyclical change (reflecting varying strengths of economies) together with a structural shift (reflecting the impact of higher oil prices). First, so far, trade regionalisation has helped the world to de-couple from a slowing US. However, we believe that sustained weakness in the <st1:country-region w:st="on">US</st1:country-region> will eventually lead to a global slowdown, which in turn will boomerang back to undermine <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1>US</st1></st1:country-region> growth. The trade patterns in the world help to explain why the global slowdown has occurred in such slow-motion. Second, with the elevation in oil prices, the world’s distribution of savings-investment (S-I) balances has become much broader and more diverse. In theory, this should lead to more currency volatility when there are disruptions to capital flows.

{snip}
<snip>
Bottom Line
(1) The world is starting to re-couple and slow with the <st1><st1:country-region w:st="on">US</st1:country-region></st1>. This whole process has taken place in much slower motion than many had expected because of trade regionalisation. (2) The world’s distribution of imbalances has become significantly more pronounced than five years ago. This should in theory lead to greater currency volatility.




i think the global recession is/will be LESS BAD than it would have been without the other inter-regional flows pointed to by ej, above. however, that is not to say that the ROW will dodge the bullet.


re the question posed by c1ue: "what will be the source of demand given an impaired u.s. consumer?" i would answer that investment - real investment, not portfolio investment - is itself a source of demand. instead of the steel going into high-rises, it can go into bridges. instead of electronic entertainment doodads, there'll be electricity conservation and monitoring doodads and alternative-energy source doodads. and so on.



re infrastructure in general- yes, it appears it will be a global boom, with the u.s. actually coming late to the party.

re alternative energy bubble- we'll see. i don't assume that the u.s. has a corner on the ingenuity market.</snip>

rchdenton
08-02-08, 03:38 PM
love the table. do you have a reference for where it came from?

c1ue
08-02-08, 08:25 PM
Lukester,

The state of coal stockpiles, or diesel stockpiles in a nation which subsidizes energy doesn't mean squat.

Russia in the late 80's had all sorts of shortages - did that mean they were doing well?

re the question posed by c1ue: "what will be the source of demand given an impaired u.s. consumer?" i would answer that investment - real investment, not portfolio investment - is itself a source of demand. instead of the steel going into high-rises, it can go into bridges. instead of electronic entertainment doodads, there'll be electricity conservation and monitoring doodads and alternative-energy source doodads. and so on.


JK,

I agree the investment can itself drive demand, however, some type of value still must be exchanged for the food, consumer products, and what not as well as the building commodities themselves.

The numbers I have seen seem to indicate that a large part of the profit China has been making on its labor economy are in fact going towards infrastructure building rather than the US$ stockpile.

Thus while China is indeed exporting more to Europe, the US is still the single largest trade partner - and a significant slowdown will hurt a lot.

Europe also is not exactly burning up the spreadsheets either; the export portion of the EU is being hurt severely by the Euro exchange rate and the negative CAD portions are mostly suffering severe RE breakdowns, not to mention threatening to break the EU debt limits.

Thus even the assumption that present absolute levels of China-Europe trade are likely optimistic.

FRED
08-02-08, 09:33 PM
Lukester,

The state of coal stockpiles, or diesel stockpiles in a nation which subsidizes energy doesn't mean squat.

Russia in the late 80's had all sorts of shortages - did that mean they were doing well?



JK,

I agree the investment can itself drive demand, however, some type of value still must be exchanged for the food, consumer products, and what not as well as the building commodities themselves.

The numbers I have seen seem to indicate that a large part of the profit China has been making on its labor economy are in fact going towards infrastructure building rather than the US$ stockpile.

Thus while China is indeed exporting more to Europe, the US is still the single largest trade partner - and a significant slowdown will hurt a lot.

Europe also is not exactly burning up the spreadsheets either; the export portion of the EU is being hurt severely by the Euro exchange rate and the negative CAD portions are mostly suffering severe RE breakdowns, not to mention threatening to break the EU debt limits.

Thus even the assumption that present absolute levels of China-Europe trade are likely optimistic.

A picture is worth 1,000 words.

http://www.itulip.com/images/termsoftrade2000-2008.gif

jk
08-03-08, 06:44 AM
JK,

I agree the investment can itself drive demand, however, some type of value still must be exchanged for the food, consumer products, and what not as well as the building commodities themselves.

The numbers I have seen seem to indicate that a large part of the profit China has been making on its labor economy are in fact going towards infrastructure building rather than the US$ stockpile.

Thus while China is indeed exporting more to Europe, the US is still the single largest trade partner - and a significant slowdown will hurt a lot.

Europe also is not exactly burning up the spreadsheets either; the export portion of the EU is being hurt severely by the Euro exchange rate and the negative CAD portions are mostly suffering severe RE breakdowns, not to mention threatening to break the EU debt limits.

Thus even the assumption that present absolute levels of China-Europe trade are likely optimistic.
i agree, c1ue. the emerging slowdown looks to be global. the morgan stanley piece i posted pointed to intRAregional flows, and ej to intER-regional flows that tend to mitigate the globe's dependence on the u.s. end-market. but you're right, the weakening is pervasive. and decoupling was just a stock salesman's dream.


A picture is worth 1,000 words.

http://www.itulip.com/forums/../images/termsoftrade2000-2008.gif


no doubt the middle east [i assume that's what "ME" stands for] has had enormous improvement in its terms of trade. and ME is indeed accumulating huge sums. but c1ue was asking what would be the sources of future end user demand for real goods. where will petrodollars go in the future? there are only so many high rises to build in dubai. there will be refineries and chemical plants [e.g. plastics and fertilizer] that use petrochemical feedstocks. [the saudis are already doing this.] but a goodly share of petrodollars will still be recycled as portfolio investment. so the beneficiaries of those investments will be a source of demand, not the ME itself.

MLM
08-03-08, 07:40 AM
A picture is worth 1,000 words.

http://www.itulip.com/images/termsoftrade2000-2008.gif

Isn't the rough interpretation of this picture that oil has become more expensive in dollars while we (China) have continued to peg our currency to the dollar?

metalman
08-03-08, 08:22 AM
Isn't the rough interpretation of this picture that oil has become more expensive in dollars while we (China) have continued to peg our currency to the dollar?

i'm no expert but i think terms of trade takes into account currency differences...

Terms of trade - currency and prices (http://www-personal.umich.edu/%7Ealandear/glossary/t.html#TermsOfTrade)

Q: I was looking at your 'terms of trade' definition, and --- maybe this reflects approaching senility --- it seemed to me you should clarify that Px/Pm is denominated in 'dollars', not local currencies. Is this too obvious to mention? Does everybody know this? Or am I wrong?
A: Since the terms of trade is a ratio, it doesn't matter what currency the prices are measured in, as long as they are measured in the same currency. The units of the terms of trade are: import goods per export good. However, it is true that both of these prices should be world prices (in whatever currency), not domestic prices within the country, since the latter may be different due to tariffs or other trade policies. That is an important qualification and I am changing my definition to include that. Thanks.

c1ue
08-03-08, 12:52 PM
The other thing to keep in mind is that historically every instance where an extreme minority had control of a vital resource needed by its much larger neighbors, the minority gets eaten.

It may well be that the bargain the Middle East made with the US - protection in exchange for cheap oil - is the exception rather than the rule.

jk
08-03-08, 01:44 PM
i think al queda's argument against the house of saud - and that of any other internal dissidents in gcc - is that, in essence, they WERE eaten by the u.s. just very daintily.

c1ue
08-05-08, 01:07 AM
JK,

I understand your point, and Al Qaeda's, but I disagree with it.

If the House of Saud were truly a puppet regime of the US, we would not have had the oil embargo in the 70s nor the present oil situation.

I think a more correct analogy is that the Saudis and their South Arabian Peninsulas cohorts have played a very good bridge round with the US as a bidding partner, but in reality the Arabs are playing spades.

The relationship is bounded by the general guns for oil deal, but absolutely the side with the guns still doesn't dictate all the terms.

Chris Coles
08-05-08, 03:51 AM
JK,

I understand your point, and Al Qaeda's, but I disagree with it.

If the House of Saud were truly a puppet regime of the US, we would not have had the oil embargo in the 70s nor the present oil situation.

I think a more correct analogy is that the Saudis and their South Arabian Peninsulas cohorts have played a very good bridge round with the US as a bidding partner, but in reality the Arabs are playing spades.

The relationship is bounded by the general guns for oil deal, but absolutely the side with the guns still doesn't dictate all the terms.

Absolutely right on the button. Again, we saw the same thing here in the UK when the Saudis quietly stopped the investigation into extracurricular costs for a major defence contract.